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Abstract 
This doctoral thesis contributes to the existing corporate finance literature by investigating the 
incentives that affect the decisions of firms to undertake R&D investment and by examining 
the impact of financial constraints on the levels of R&D expenditure of AIM-listed firms in the 
UK. The thesis comprises six chapters.  The first chapter provides an introduction to the 
research, followed by an overview of the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in Chapter 2, 
from which several promising ideas were derived. Chapter 3 investigates the incentives that 
influence a firm’s decision to carry out R&D investment. The key empirical findings from a 
dynamic logistic regression suggest that large sized firms are better at generating innovative 
activities, that young firms tend to be more likely to innovate, that competitive markets are 
better at stimulating innovative activities, and that corporate income tax rates have a positive 
impact on this probability. Chapter 4 explores the impact of financing constraints on the levels 
of expenditure by directly examining the role that working capital plays in buffering the path 
of R&D spending from transitory finance shocks. Using a system GMM estimator, the 
empirical findings suggest that working capital buffers R&D levels from transitory financial 
shocks, thus avoiding the high adjustments costs associated with any change in levels of R&D 
investment.  Chapter 5 investigates the impact of the proceeds from the disposal of fixed assets 
on the R&D expenditure of AIM-listed firms. Using several estimation approaches, and in 
contrast to prior literature, the main findings of this chapter suggest that there is a negative 
association between R&D expenditure and the cash raised from voluntary asset sales, indicating 
severe binding financing constraints. Practical implementations, promising ideas for future 
research, and the main findings of this research are summarized in the concluding chapter of 
the thesis.   
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Research Background 
The capital structure irrelevance principle, proposed by the works of Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) and later Miller and Modigliani (1961), suggests that, in perfect capital market 
conditions, external and internal sources of capital are considered to be perfect substitutes. 
Accordingly, it is proposed that corporate financing and investment decisions are entirely 
independent in such a situation. Not surprisingly, by relaxing the assumption, a large body of 
research has shown that corporate decisions on both investing and financing are closely related, 
and that decision-making is a complex process.  As illustrated by the financial constraint 
literature1, the higher the costs of external sources of finance, the lower the level of corporate 
investment (Myers and Majluf, 1984). On the other hand, corporate investment may also affect 
corporate financing decisions, especially when considering the nature and type of investment 
(Bond and Meghir, 1994). 
 According to the financial constraint literature, and based on the required type of investment, 
when considering the availability of and accessibility to means of finance, firms are classified 
into two types: finance-constrained and finance-unconstrained. Financial managers in both 
types of firm face two broad questions: what investment should the firm make and how should 
this investment be financed (Brealey et al., 2011). According to Bodie et al. (2011), investment 
is defined as “The current commitment of money or other resources in the expectation of 
reaping future benefits”. In competitive environments, companies are required to invest in 
assets that allow them to increase profitability and market share and to confront competition. 
These assets can be categorised into two types: tangible assets (such as machinery and plant) 
                                                 
1 Please refer to section 4.3.2 for further illustrations. 
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and intangible assets (for example, research and development (R&D), patents and brand 
names). Companies can finance their investments either internally, externally or by using both 
sources.  Figure 1-1 below illustrates the investment types and sources of funds. 
 
Figure 1-1: Investment types and sources of funds. 
Among other types of investments, and due to the importance of the technological changes in 
recent decades, R&D investment has become a core capital expenditure for a large number of 
firms. It has been stated officially and internationally that “Research and Experimental 
Development comprise creative work on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of 
knowledge, including knowledge of man, culture and society, and the use of this stock of 
knowledge to devise new applications” (Bosworth et al., 1993).   
Researchers have classified R&D as an important driver for the long-run growth of both firms 
and economies, and as a critical input for innovation. R&D and the utilization of new 
technology, for creating new products and developing new production processes, are used to 
Machinery 
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provide product differentiation which leads to competitive advantage over competitors, as well 
as to enhance the growth of society by creating more employment and income opportunities 
(Rothaermel, 2008; Miyamoto, 2014).    
Unlike other types of investment, R&D is characterized by its riskiness and the high degree of 
uncertainty associated with it2. Further, it offers little or no collateral value, and is linked with 
high levels of asymmetric information problems, making it more prone to financing constraints 
(Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Brown et al., 2012). In addition, this type of investment 
involves salary payments to highly skilled and trained workers (e.g. engineers and scientists), 
who require considerable firm-specific training, and cannot be fired in the case of any 
temporary cutting back on R&D activity in response to any financing shocks3.  
The attention of researchers and policymakers has been drawn to the importance of R&D. 
Accordingly, governments have started introducing several schemes as incentives to promote 
R&D activities at corporate levels. Researchers have studied the factors that influence the 
decisions to undertake such investment, as well as the determinants that affect the level of 
expenditure on it.  
More precisely, little research has focused on the factors that influence a firm’s decision to carry 
out R&D investment, and of this, much has been rooted in the industrial organization 
framework (Tirole, 1988; Symeonidis, 1996; Hall and James, 2009), examining external factors 
influencing R&D activity; for instance, the concentration of the industry in which the firm is 
                                                 
2 R&D is considered a risky and uncertain investment, as the success of its output is not guaranteed, and will only 
generate profits with a time lag in the case of success. 
3 If the cut in R&D is temporary and is due to financing shocks, firms should bear the costs of hiring and training 
new workers in the future. Potentially, more costly, firms should bear in mind that fired R&D workers know 
valuable information and commercial secrets (firm-specific) that they would not want imparted to other 
competitors. So the dissemination of information that fired workers may transfer to competitors is considered as 
being too costly for firms, as such a situation would damage the value of the innovation being undertaken by these 
firms (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Brown, et al., 2012; Brown, et al., 2013).    
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competing (Shrieves, 1978; Kamien and Schwartz, 1982; Takahashi, 1999). Another branch of 
research has considered the effect of internal factors on firms’ R&D activities, for example their 
resources and capabilities when carrying out R&D activity (Del Canto and Gonzalez, 1999).  
However, less attention has been devoted to government incentives to encourage R&D 
activities. The lack of research on the role of fiscal policy in R&D activities lies behind this 
research, which assesses the role that the R&D schemes introduced by the UK government and 
corporate tax rates plays in firms’ decisions to carry out R&D activities. 
On the other hand, and considering the financing menu, empirical research on firms’ level of 
R&D expenditure is based almost exclusively on the availability of internal cash flow and tested 
on large and mature firms (Grabowski, 1968; Hall, 1992; Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; 
Bhagat and Welch, 1995). These studies find evidence that firms’ level of R&D is mainly linked 
to the availability of internal cash flow. However, since riskiness and the lack of collateral value 
are two characteristics of R&D, it has been found that debt finance (as an external source of 
funds) is not a realistic source of funds to finance R&D (Switzer, 1984; Hall, 1992; Piga and 
Atzeni, 2007; Brighi and Torluccio, 2009; Wang and Thornhill, 2010). It has been widely 
accepted that equity is the only realistic source of external funds to finance R&D investment 
(Brown and Petersen, 2009; Chen et al., 2010; Brown et al., 2012).   
While the vast majority of the existing research on both the incentives for and determinants of 
R&D has been mainly conducted on large and mature firms, small and young ones have been 
given little attention and have been clearly overlooked. Furthermore, the focus has mainly been 
on US firms, with little attention paid to listed firms in other developed economies, particularly 
the UK. The lack of research on the factors that affect firms’ decisions to undertake R&D 
activities in the UK, and whether the sources of finance matter, is a puzzle. There is a dearth of 
knowledge on whether financing constraints are important for R&D expenditure in Britain. This 
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has been the motivation for this research to be conducted on and devoted to young and small 
listed firms in particular. Such an investigation might dramatically alter the conclusions 
regarding the importance of fiscal policies and the impact of financing constraints on corporate 
R&D activities. 
 
1.2 Development in entrepreneurial finance 
Although typical financing sources for listed firms are mainly in the form of debt, equity and 
returned earnings, difficulties faced by entrepreneurs in raising funds have led to the recent 
developments in entrepreneurial finance and the offer of alternative financing options, 
especially in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis.  Angel networks, corporate venture 
capital (CVC), crowdfunding, mini-bonds, and initial coin funding are examples of the new 
trends in entrepreneurial financing4 (Adhami et al., 2017; Block et al., 2017; Bottiglia and 
Pichler, 2016; Mietzner et al., 2017).  
Initially, angel networks and corporate venture capital were the first and more traditional 
financing means for innovative start-up businesses that were facing difficulties in accessing 
external finance. Angel networks are networks of affluent individuals who provide equity 
capital for early-stage high growth ventures under the networks of business angels. Similarly, 
corporate venture capital (CVC) refers to the investment of large corporate funds in external 
start-ups or growth firms. These means are considered as solutions for financing businesses that 
are looking to grow and require extra network access and management support (Block et al., 
2017).  
                                                 
4 Please refer to Bottiglia and Pichler (2016), Adhami et al. (2017), Block et al. (2017) and Mietzner et al. (2017) 
for more comprehansive reviews on recent developments in entrepreneurial finance. 
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On the other hand, crowdfunding is an alternative financing tool for ventures, which mainly 
comes in four different types, based on debt, equity, reward and donation. The practice of 
crowdfunding is achieved by pooling small amounts of money from many people to support a 
particular project, typically via the internet (Block et al., 2017).  
The most recent trends in entrepreneurial finance are mini-bonds and initial coin funding. Mini-
bonds are a special SME bond segment from public bonds. They emerged as a consequence of 
banks’ unwillingness and inability to provide debt finance in the wake of the recent financial 
crisis. The rise of this trend in entrepreneurial finance is considered as a financing solution, 
especially for innovative firms whose survival might be threatened by financing constraints 
(Bottiglia and Pichler, 2016). Initial coin funding, on the other hand, is an unregulated means 
of funds that has recently become available to start-up businesses, through which they can avoid 
the rigorous process required by banks or venture capitalists. This new financing trend allows 
businesses to acquire the required funds through cryptocurrencies, in exchange for a 'token', 
which can be used to acquire services or products in the future, or can be sold on the secondary 
market (Adhami et al., 2017). 
It is worth noting that crowd motivations for debt-based, equity-based crowdfunding and angel 
networks are purely financial (to achieve financial rewards), while donation-based crowd 
motivation is social, and based on the reward of product-related goals; that is, for future delivery 
of a service or a product. The motivations of the corporate venture capital (CVC) equity 
providers are financial, strategic and technological; for example, the strategic goals of accessing 
new markets or technology. 
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1.3 Data and methodology  
The flowchart in Figure 1-2 shows the research process adopted to conduct this study. The 
process starts by a comprehensive and critical review of the existing research on the field of 
corporate finance. The importance of this step is not only to understand the core and relevant 
context of the study, but also to identify the existing gaps, which helps to derive the proposed 
ideas of this research. Accordingly, promising ideas are translated into testable hypotheses and 
empirical model formulation.     
The data used in this thesis are secondary, which have been electronically collected through 
different economic and financial data providers. More precisely, the accounting and financial 
data of the AIM-listed firms for the period 1999-2014 were extracted from the Datastream and 
Worldscope databases via Thomson One Banker Analytics. The list of active and inactive firms 
was publicly available and obtained from the Worldscope database via Datastream and the main 
website of the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The economic figures relating to tax rates and 
R&D incentive schemes were retrieved from the main website of Her Majesty’s Revenue & 
Customs department (HMRC), and were publicly available.   
R&D activities mainly take place in high-tech industries. The initial dataset comprised 747 
firms listed under AIM manufacturing and services industries, over the period between 1999 
and 2014. In the empirical analysis, the sample size varied in accordance with the aim and 
objectives of the study, the form of the model utilised, as well as the required adopted estimation 
approach. More details of each sample size are given in each of the empirical investigations 
separately.   
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The dataset of this thesis is defined as panel data, having dimensions of both time-series and 
cross-sectional data. In the context of empirical corporate finance research, rich structuring of 
the dataset by pooling company-year observations is more preferable than pure time series or 
cross-sectional data. Such a structuring allows for better control of the potential estimate biases 
in accordance with the existence of the dynamic generation process, the heterogeneity among 
individuals, and endogeneity problems. However, based on the nature of each empirical 
investigation, several models have been formulated and estimated.  
The empirical models in this thesis are analysed using several estimation techniques. These 
techniques are Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV), 
Dynamic Logistic Regression, Difference Generalized Method of Moment (Difference-GMM) 
and System Generalized Method of Moment (System-GMM) estimations. The choice of 
estimator for each empirical study mainly depends on the panel size, model specification, 
generation process and the variable types.  
In each study, several robustness tests are carried out to statistically evaluate the sensitivity of 
the main results. In all cases, if inadequacy in the statistics of models is observed, the models 
are either reformulated or re-estimated using more appropriate estimation techniques. 
Accordingly, the results of the models estimation are reported and interpreted in accordance 
with prior research findings, theoretical predictions and research hypotheses. Overall, the steps 
followed in structuring the overall thesis and its three stand-alone empirical chapters (chapters 
3, 4 and 5) are adopted to ensure that the conclusions and findings of the study are reliable and 
solid enough to enrich the existing literature.     
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1.4 Structure and storylines of the thesis 
The thesis comprises six chapters. Chapter 2 briefly presents an overview of the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) in the UK. It covers the benefits that a firm may achieve by becoming 
a public company, the balanced admission criteria of AIM, and a comparison between AIM and 
the Main Market on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The chapter also contains information 
on corporate tax rates applied in the UK and the tax benefits of being listed on AIM. 
Furthermore, it reviews the incentives for innovation in the UK represented by R&D tax relief 
and R&D tax credit schemes. Finally, it considers the motives for choosing AIM.   
Chapter 3 comprises the first original research of the thesis. This empirical work investigates 
the incentives that influence a firm’s decision to carry out R&D investment. Most empirical 
research on this topic has examined the effect of market factors, while others have investigated 
the impact of firm-specific factors. Accordingly, the aim of this research is to investigate the 
effect of government tax policies on R&D activities. Its intended contribution is to focus on an 
analysis of the role of micro, miso and macro-level factors on R&D investment. Specific 
hypotheses on the effect of these factors on the probability of a firm to carry out R&D 
investment are derived and tested on a sample of 630 AIM-listed firms. Using a dynamic 
logistic regression model to control for initial condition problems, the findings suggest that the 
larger the size of the firm, the higher the probability that it will undertake innovative activities; 
that young firms tend to have a higher probability of innovating, that competitive markets are 
better at stimulating innovative activities; and that corporate tax rates have a positive impact on 
this probability. 
Chapter 4 is the second chapter to contain original work. This empirical research investigates 
the determinants of R&D expenditure on AIM; the effect of financing constraints on R&D 
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investment; and the role that working capital (as a store of liquidity) plays in maintaining a 
stable R&D path in the presence of financial constraints.  
In this chapter, we address the often ignored role of working capital on R&D investment, as we 
aim to examine the role that this plays in buffering the path of R&D spending in face of 
transitory finance shocks for young and small firms listed on AIM. Working capital is defined 
as current assets minus current liabilities, and measures a firm's net position in liquid assets.  
In this chapter, our basic argument proceeds as follows. As R&D investment is associated with 
high adjustment costs, it is expensive for firms to change their level of R&D investment, so 
they will seek to maintain a stable R&D investment path, other things being equal. Financial 
constraints may impede this objective whenever firms are not able to offset cash-flow 
fluctuations with external funds. Even constrained firms, however, can offset the impact of 
cash-flow shocks on R&D investment by adjusting working capital, even by setting working 
capital investment to negative levels. These actions provide short-run liquidity, allowing firms 
to maintain a stable path of R&D investment relative to cash flow and finance shocks. 
In order to examine the aim of this study, specific testable hypotheses have been derived and 
tested on a sample of 235 UK firms listed on AIM. When using the dynamic system-GMM 
estimator, the findings suggest that firms appear to maintain a stable level of R&D investment 
spending by drawing down liquidity from working capital when the availability of finance is 
low, and by building up liquidity in the form of working capital when finance is readily 
available. However, the results show that, regardless of the applied splitting criteria, that are 
dividend pay-out ratios, all firms are found to be financially constrained. Indeed, the differences 
in dividend pay-out among firms helps to differentiate between the uses of typical financing 
means. 
13 | P a g e  
 
Chapter 5 presents the third original piece of research. It extends the previous chapter by 
considering the impact of the disposal of fixed asset proceeds on the level of R&D expenditure. 
In this chapter, we examine the importance of financial constraints on corporate R&D 
expenditure by directly examining the role that the disposal of fixed asset proceeds plays in 
determining the level of R&D spending of the AIM-listed firms. The hypothesis on the impact 
of these proceeds was derived and tested on a sample of 235 firms. Using several estimation 
approaches, and in contrast to the previous literature, the research finds a negative association 
between R&D expenditure and cash raised from voluntary asset sales, indicating severe binding 
financing constraints. These findings highlight the importance that financing constraints have 
in their negative impact on corporate R&D investment. To the best of knowledge, this study is 
the first that emphasizes the importance of financing constraints on the R&D investment of 
AIM-listed firms. 
Finally, chapter 6 concludes the main findings, highlights the contributions of the original 
research, and presents the implications of the study and its limitations. Moreover, it presents 















 The Alternative Investment Market (AIM) 
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2 The Alternative Investment Market (AIM) 
Although firms aim to sustain growth through the initial capital provided by backing investors, 
this is insufficient to sustain the required capital. Therefore, firms often join a public equity 
market as a stepping-stone to achieve their desired growth and development. Once a firm 
decides on listing, by observing the admission criteria of the appropriate markets, it is required 
to decide on a market that best fits the criteria and supports its needs in the short and long run. 
However, it may not be ready for a traditional listing; for instance, on the UK Main Market.  
Firms at early stages of development would aim to join a market that support their needs, but 
requires fewer regulations and admission requirements. 
Therefore, the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) plays an essential role in the funding 
environment. It bridges the gap for growing firms that seek to enhance their business to benefit 
from external finance from capital markets. AIM is a sub-market of the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE). It was launched on 19 June 1995, as one of the world’s leading growth markets. It 
provides an equity market for firms from a wide range of sectors around the world and allows 
small firms to float stocks with a much flexible regulatory system than other applicable 
regulatory systems of more established markets.  
Although there are other markets available, for example NASDAQ, firms choose to join AIM 
for a number of key reasons. First, it offers a balanced regulatory environment, which is 
specifically tailored to fit the needs of small and growing firms. Furthermore, it gives firms 
access to a diverse and wide range of investors, such as the international investor base. 
Moreover, AIM provides firms with a large number of expert advisers, thus acts as an aid in the 
process of joining the market, and supports them during their time of being listing in the market. 
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Therefore, investors, firms and scholars have recognised AIM as the market of choice for small 
and growing firms, which fosters financial growth opportunities (Nielsson, 2013). 
Since the launch of the market in 1995, AIM has helped more than 3500 firms to finance their 
growth opportunities, through raising over £90 billion (London Stock Exchange, 2015). The 
stock exchange comprises small and growing firms that fit the requirements at early stages of 
development and supports their ongoing needs (Nielsson, 2013). Benefits for firms joining a 
public market can be in the form of raising capital at admission and throughout their time on 
the market. In addition, listing on a public market allows firms to create market shares, and to 
expand their number of shareholders.  
Furthermore, a market helps firms to obtain an objective market value for their business, as well 
as encouraging employees’ long-term motivation, by enhancing share schemes, and by 
increasing attention through the public market. Moreover, a market increases the ability to 
expand and make acquisitions by using quoted shares as currency (i.e. paper as opposed to 
cash). Joining a market is also considered as a significant approach to enhancing status with 
suppliers and customers (Fabozzi, 1981; Sanger and McConnell, 1986; London Stock 
Exchange, 2015). 
As summarized in table 2-1, between the two major markets in the UK, small firms aim to be 
listed on AIM rather than the Main Market. The main differences between the admission criteria 
are that, first, a more established market requires applicant firms to have at least three years’ of 
audited records before listing to ensure that the issuer has representative financial information. 
As a result, this provides investors with a reasonable assessment of the new applicant firm and 
its future performance and prospects. However, other applicants may not have representative 
historical financial records to make them eligible for listing in established markets. AIM does 
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not require firms to have any audited records, so allowing less established and high growth 
firms (with confident future growth prospects) to benefit from the more flexible regulatory 
environment and to achieve growth by being admitted to a public market. 
Second, the more established market requires firms to have a certain level of revenues to be 
listed, in order to ensure that the applicant firms are well established and of relatively low risk. 
However, less established firms can be listed on a stock market to finance their growth 
opportunities, and find AIM to be the most beneficial market, thus acting as a stepping-stone 
for those that seek official listing through simplified admission criteria. Third, this market does 
not specify the level of a firm’s stocks that are in public hands, unlike the criteria of other 
markets (that is, this market does not impose any restrictions on the size of the investor base). 
Furthermore, the market does not have any minimum requirements for public flotation (giving 
the applicant flexibility to issue equity as they require, with no minimum requirements).  
Moreover, considering the ongoing criteria, AIM does not require prior approval of the firm’s 
stockholders for most of its transactions, which gives firms more flexibility in the process of 
making important transactions. Furthermore, AIM obliges a firm to appoint a nominated 
advisor (Nomad5) at all times, to assess the criteria for listing, and to ensure awareness of the 
assigned responsibilities when it is quoted. However, it has been observed that AIM is a less 
regulated market in comparison to the official list of other markets, thus requiring applicants to 
have the same level of transparency as the more established markets.  
                                                 
5 The exchange requires the Nomad to be able to assess the suitability and the reputation of the firm, its potential 
advisers and directors, and to confirm that a firm is appropriate for AIM and potential investors. Further to the 
assessment of the firm’s appropriateness, the Nomad must provide it with guidance throughout the flotation 
process, and should prepare it for life on the public market (AIM). The Nomad might be an accountancy firm, 
corporate finance firm or an investment bank, which is approved by the exchange to act in such a capacity. 
18 | P a g e  
 
As observed, from the ongoing financial information requirements UK listed firms (on both 
AIM and the Main Market) are obliged to report more frequently in comparison to the other 
markets, indicating that firms’ performance and progress in the UK are more transparent. 
Furthermore, investors can easily obtain details on performance, as they have access to more 
frequent historic performance records (financial records).   
 
Table 2-1: Differences between admission criteria and continuing obligations for the Main Market and AIM in the UK. 
Differences between admission criteria and continuing obligations for the Main Market and AIM in the UK. 
  
London   
 
Main Market AIM 
  
Audited track record  
 
Three year track record required 
 




No minimum requirement 
 




No minimum requirement 
 
 







An entity’s business must be supported by 
revenue earnings by at least 75% 
(track record for three-year period) 
 









No minimum requirement 
 
 
Financial information requirements 
 
 
International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) or equivalent 
 
 
International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) or equivalent 
 
   






Minimum number of shareholders 
 
 
No minimum requirement 
 
 
No minimum requirement 
 
 
 Minimum shares traded on market  
 
≥25% of the listed shares to be held in public 
hands 
 
No minimum requirement 
 
 













Nominated advisor required at all time (key 
advisor) 
 Ongoing requirements-financial 
information   
  
  




















Not for most transactions 
 





                                                 
6 As part of the IPO process, the listing authority requires a listing document to be reviewed by a relevant regulator. 
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Although AIM-traded SMEs comprise the minority of the SME population of the UK market, 
AIM presents a stepping stone to those who aim to achieve further growth and development by 
joining a public market. As reported in table 2-2, the total SME population in the UK was 
around 5.687 million in 2017, representing 99 percent of all businesses (5.695 million). 
Breaking down UK businesses based on the number of employees, the figures show that micro-
businesses account for 96 percent of the total population, 3.5 percent are small-businesses, 0.5 
percent are medium-businesses and only 0.1 percent are large ones (Rhodes, 2017).      













Number7 5445 208 34 7 5695 
Percentage 
of total 96% 3.5% 0.5% 0.1% 100% 
 
Considering the motivations for investors on the AIM market, that is the supply side of AIM 
finance. The UK government has introduced several schemes to support investors who invest 
in risky and high growth AIM firms, which helps firms to reach their required capital and 
achieve their desire growth. As summarized in table 2-3, unlike the Main Market, both types of 
investors (individual and institutional) in AIM can benefit from a set of five different schemes 
(London Stock Exchange, 2017; European Commission, 2017). 
Individual investors in AIM firms can benefit from capital gains tax gift relief and 
entrepreneurs’ relief.  In the first type of relief, if shares of an AIM trading firm are transferred 
(gifted), the deemed capital gain on it can be postponed until they are disposed of by the 
                                                 
7 Figures reported are in 1000s.  
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transferee. In the second type, individual investors8 can reduce the rate of capital gains tax from 
28 to 10 per cent. 
The enterprise investment scheme (EIS) can benefit individual investors who invest in new 
AIM firms by a 30 per cent initial income tax relief on investment, as well as exemption from 
the capital gains tax on disposals for the original gross investment. Third, the inheritance tax 
allows individual investors to benefit from 100 per cent exemption from inheritance tax in 
respect of transfer value; that is, the shares that rise in value following the death of the 
shareholder.   
The relief for loss, however, is designed to benefit both individual and institutional investors. 
In this type of relief, if investments in AIM shares are disposed of for less than their initial cost, 
investors can relieve the arising losses against capital gains during that year or in the subsequent 
one. In this relief, the cap on the amount of losses that can be relieved is restricted to £50,000 
or 25 per cent, whichever is the higher. However, separate rules apply for institutional investors. 
Finally, the Venture Capital Trust scheme allows individuals and institutional investors (of 
business angels and venture capital trusts) to benefit from exemption from tax on dividends, 
and exemption from capital gains tax on the disposal of shares in a venture capital trust (30 per 
cent income tax relief on amounts of up to £200,000 invested in new ordinary shares issued by 
venture capital trusts and held for five years).     
  
                                                 
8 Certain conditions need to be met; please see a guide to AIM UK tax benefits (London Stock Exchange, 2017). 
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Table 2-3: UK tax incentives for investors in London Stock Exchange 
                                                 
9 Please refer to A guide to AIM tax benefit (London Stock exchange, 2017) for further and more in depth  details of the introduced schemes.  
UK tax incentives for investors in London Stock Exchange9 
 
AIM   MAIN  
 Individual Investors   Corporate Investors    Individual Investors   Corporate Investors 
— Capital gains tax (CGT) 
         – Gift relief 
      – Entrepreneurs’ relief 
  
 
   
 
   
 
   
 





   
 
   
 
   
 
 
— Inheritance tax (IHT) 




   
 
   
 
   
 






   
 
   
 






   
 
   
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Based on official statistics of the London Stock Exchange, the flexibility of the regulatory 
environment of AIM has resulted in attracting a large number of foreign firms10 to join the 
market. As presented in table 2-4, the number of traded foreign firms increased from 3 in 1995 
to 219 in 2014. The percentage distribution of international firms and the number of admissions, 
as shown in tables 2-4 and 2-5, demonstrate that percentage increases were observed during the 
year 2004; subsequently, as a consequence of the amendments to the market regulations and 
intensive marketing campaigns, this resulted in a more broadly based market. 
 The trend of foreign listing on AIM is mainly explained by AIM’s flexible regulatory 
environment compared to other equity markets; the simplicity of its listing process; the tax 
incentives offered to firms and investors; and the fact that AIM has competitive strength in 
capital raising options, as it lies within the city of London financial services (Arcot et al., 2007; 








                                                 
10 Based on the statistics of the London Stock Exchange, foreign listings include firms from across six continents 
and 100 countries.   
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Table 2-4: Distribution of foreign firms listed on AIM during 1995-2014. 
Year   Number of Firms    Percentage distribution (%)   
UK International Total 
 
UK International Total 
1995 118 3 121 
 
97.5 2.5 100 
1996 235 17 252 
 
93.3 6.7 100 
1997 286 22 308 
 
92.9 7.1 100 
1998 291 21 312 
 
93.3 6.7 100 
1999 325 22 347 
 
93.7 6.3 100 
2000 493 31 524 
 
94.1 5.9 100 
2001 587 42 629 
 
93.3 6.7 100 
2002 654 50 704 
 
92.9 7.1 100 
2003 694 60 754 
 
92.0 8.0 100 
2004 905 116 1021 
 
88.6 11.4 100 
2005 1179 220 1399 
 
84.3 15.7 100 
2006 1330 304 1634 
 
81.4 18.6 100 
2007 1347 347 1,694 
 
79.5 20.5 100 
2008 1233 317 1,550 
 
79.5 20.5 100 
2009 1052 241 1,293 
 
81.4 18.6 100 
2010 967 228 1,195 
 
80.9 19.1 100 
2011 918 225 1,143 
 
80.3 19.7 100 
2012 870 226 1,096 
 
79.4 20.6 100 
2013 861 226 1,087 
 
79.2 20.8 100 
2014 885 219 1,104  80.2 19.8 100 
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Table 2-5: Distribution of new admissions of foreign firms on AIM during 1995-2014. 
Year   Number of admissions    Percentage distribution (%)   
UK International Total 
 
UK International Total 
1995 120 3 123 
 
97.6 2.4 100 
1996 131 14 145 
 
90.3 9.7 100 
1997 100 7 107 
 
93.5 6.5 100 
1998 68 7 75 
 
90.7 9.3 100 
1999 96 6 102 
 
94.1 5.9 100 
2000 265 12 277 
 
95.7 4.3 100 
2001 162 15 177 
 
91.5 8.5 100 
2002 147 13 160 
 
91.9 8.1 100 
2003 146 16 162 
 
90.1 9.9 100 
2004 294 61 355 
 
82.8 17.2 100 
2005 399 120 519 
 
76.9 23.1 100 
2006 338 124 462 
 
73.2 26.8 100 
2007 197 87 284 
 
69.4 30.6 100 
2008 87 27 114 
 
76.3 23.7 100 
2009 30 6 36 
 
83.3 16.7 100 
2010 76 26 102 
 
74.5 25.5 100 
2011 67 23 90 
 
74.4 25.6 100 
2012 47 24 71 
 
66.2 33.8 100 
2013 77 22 99 
 
77.8 22.2 100 
2014 95 23 118  80.5 19.5 100 
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Based on the data employed11, the total sample was 1859 listed firms (both active and inactive) 
throughout the period 1999 to 2014. As summarized in Figure 2-1, during the study 1393 new 
listings were added to the market, yet the majority were recorded during the years 2004 to 2006. 
However, 922 firms were delisted from the records with the majority being recorded during the 
period of the global financial crisis and afterwards. Among all the listed records, 929 are active 
firms and 930 are dead ones. The average age of active firms is 7 years, while that of the dead 
ones is 3.85 years.  
It worth noting that the reasons for delisting are not purely bankruptcy or liquidation. Based on 
the recent investigation of Pour and Lasfer (2013), a significant number of AIM firm delistings 
were voluntary, when firms decided to become privately traded rather than publicly. This type 
of information, however, was not available for this research. However, it is acknowledged that 
it is required for reader information, and that further investigation would be considered 
advantageous in future research. 
                                                 
11 We construct our research sample on all active and inactive firms listed on AIM. The dataset of the thesis covers 
all publicly listed firm included on the Worldscope database and the London stock exchange official website, over 
the period 1999-2014. 
28 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure 2-1: Listed and delisted firms of AIM between 1999 and 2014. 
The high number of new listings observed from 1999 to 2001 is explained by the dot.com boom 
period, when many new listings were recorded for internet and high technology stocks. 
However, the number declined in 2002, as a consequence of the burst of the dot.com bubble, 
when 36 new listings were recorded for companies moving from the main market to AIM.  The 
globalization period of the AIM market is represented by the year 2003, which explains the 
renewed increase in the number of new listings. In this period, AIM regulations allowed for 
dual listing, by which firms listed on certain designated exchanges were able to obtain a 
secondary listing on AIM (with the target of Commonwealth countries).  The increasing number 
of new listings was due to the dual listing of mining, oil and gas exploration companies from 
Commonwealth countries (mainly Canadian and Australian firms). By 2007, the marketing 
campaigns had paid off, making AIM a more broadly based market. As shown in records of 
2006 and 2007, many of the new listings were now recorded for mining and oil companies from 
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Russia, and close-end investment entities from emerging markets (for example, China and 
India). Finally, the high level of delisting observed in 2007 and subsequently was due to the 
recent financial crisis and it consequences (Arcot et al., 2007; London Stock Exchange, 2018). 
The distribution size of the sample firms is shown in Figure 2-2, based on employment 
thresholds12, and indicates that the majority of firms are classified as micro, small and medium 
size enterprises, at 5, 23 and 41 percent respectively. However, large enterprises under this 
threshold represented 31 per cent of the full sample throughout the period.   
 
Figure 2-2: Distribution size of AIM-listed firms during 1999-2014. 
The 1859 firms are distributed among 69 industries, as shown in table 2-6; the majority of the 
firms are divided between Metal Mining, Business Services and Engineering & Management 
Services. 
 
                                                 
12 Based on the employment thresholds, firms with fewer than 10 staff are defined as micro enterprises, while those 
with fewer than 50 staff are defined as small enterprises, those with fewer than 250 medium sized, and if the 























30 | P a g e  
 
Table 2-6: Distribution of the AIM-listed firms across all industries. 
Division Industry  Number of Firms    Percentage Distribution (%)  
        Inactive Active Total  Inactive Active Total 
01 
AGRICULTURAL 




LIVESTOCK 0 1 1  0 100 100 
07 
AGRICULTURAL 
SERVICES 1 2 3  33 67 100 
08 FORESTRY 1 1 2  50 50 100 
09 
FISHING, HUNTING, 
AND TRAPPING 0 1 1  0 100 100 
10 METAL MINING 33 103 136  24 76 100 
12 COAL MINING 5 10 15  33 67 100 
13 
OIL AND GAS 




FUELS 9 16 25  36 64 100 
15 
GENERAL BUILDING 
CONTRACTORS 9 10 19  47 53 100 
16 
HEAVY 
CONSTRUCTION. 2 2 4  50 50 100 
17 
SPECIAL TRADE 
CONTRACTORS 3 3 6  50 50 100 
 20 
FOOD AND KINDRED 
PRODUCTS 12 10 22  55 45 100 
 22 
TEXTILE MILL 
PRODUCTS 4 2 6  67 33 100 
 23 
APPAREL AND OTHER 
TEXTILE PRODUCTS 7 5 12  58 42 100 
 24 
LUMBER AND WOOD 
PRODUCTS 1 3 4  25 75 100 
 25 
FURNITURE AND 
FIXTURES 8 3 11  73 27 100 
 26 
PAPER AND ALLIED 
PRODUCTS 4 6 10  40 60 100 
 27 
PRINTING AND 
PUBLISHING 15 4 19  79 21 100 
 28 
CHEMICALS AND 
ALLIED PRODUCTS 41 37 78  53 47 100 
 29 
PETROLEUM AND COAL 
PRODUCTS 1 5 6  17 83 100 
 30 
RUBBER AND MISC. 
PLASTICS PRODUCTS 2 3 5  40 60 100 
 31 
LEATHER AND 
LEATHER PRODUCTS 2 1 3  67 33 100 
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 32 
STONE, CLAY, AND 
GLASS PRODUCTS 8 6 14  57 43 100 
 33 
PRIMARY METAL 
INDUSTRIES 1 2 3  33 67 100 
 34 
FABRICATED METAL 




EQUIPMENT 27 23 50  54 46 100 
 36 
ELECTRONIC & OTHER 
ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT 33 41 74  45 55 100 
 37 
TRANSPORTATION 
EQUIPMENT 4 3 7  57 43 100 
 38 
INSTRUMENTS AND 




INDUSTRIES 2 5 7  29 71 100 
40 
RAILROAD 
TRANSPORTATION 1 0 1  100 0 100 
41 
LOCAL & INTERURBAN 
PASSENGER TRANSIT 3 1 4  75 25 100 
42 
TRUCKING AND 
WAREHOUSING 0 4 4  0 100 100 
44 
WATER 
TRANSPORTATION 4 7 11  36 64 100 
45 
TRANSPORTATION BY 
AIR 2 4 6  33 67 100 
46 
PIPELINES, EXCEPT 
NATURAL GAS NA NA NA  NA NA NA 
47 
TRANSPORTATION 
SERVICES 8 1 9  89 11 100 
48 COMMUNICATIONS 26 12 38  68 32 100 
49 
ELECTRIC, GAS & 
SANITARY SERVICES 8 19 27  30 70 100 
50 
WHOLESALE TRADE-
DURABLE GOODS 18 5 23  78 22 100 
51 
WHOLESALE TRADE-
NONDURABLE GOODS 7 6 13  54 46 100 
52 
BUILDING MATERIALS 
& GARDEN SUPPLIES 4 0 4  100 0 100 
53 
GENERAL 
MERCHANDISE STORES 2 1 3  67 33 100 
54 FOOD STORES 0 2 2  0 100 100 
55 
AUTOMOTIVE DEALERS 
& SERVICE STATIONS 4 2 6  67 33 100 
56 
APPAREL AND 




STORES 5 1 6  83 17 100 
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58 
EATING AND DRINKING 
PLACES 21 10 31  68 32 100 
59 
MISCELLANEOUS 
RETAIL 13 9 22  59 41 100 
60 
DEPOSITORY 
INSTITUTIONS 6 9 15  40 60 100 
61 
NONDEPOSITORY 
INSTITUTIONS 13 8 21  62 38 100 
62 
SECURITY AND 
COMMODITY BROKERS 31 38 69  45 55 100 
63 INSURANCE CARRIERS 6 7 13  46 54 100 
64 
INSURANCE AGENTS, 
BROKERS & SERVICE 7 3 10  70 30 100 
65 REAL ESTATE 49 29 78  63 37 100 
67 
HOLDING & OTHER 
INVESTMENT OFFICES 56 52 108  52 48 100 
70 
HOTELS AND OTHER 
LODGING PLACES 6 7 13  46 54 100 
72 PERSONAL SERVICES 2 2 4  50 50 100 




PARKING 3 2 5  60 40 100 
76 
MISCELLANEOUS 
REPAIR SERVICES 2 0 2  100 0 100 
78 MOTION PICTURES 13 10 23  57 43 100 
79 
AMUSEMENT & 
RECREATION SERVICES 42 13 55  76 24 100 
80 HEALTH SERVICES 11 3 14  79 21 100 
81 LEGAL SERVICES NA NA NA  NA NA NA 
82 
EDUCATIONAL 
SERVICES 3 1 4  75 25 100 
83 SOCIAL SERVICES 1 2 3  33 67 100 
84 
MUSEUMS, BOTANICAL, 
ZOOLOGICAL GARDENS 1 0 1  100 0 100 
86 
MEMBERSHIP 




SERVICES 64 60 124  52 48 100 
89 SERVICES, NEC 4 5 9  44 56 100 
Total  929 930 1859   50 50  100 
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Other than the balanced regulatory environment offered by AIM, firms who are listed on this 
market can gain benefits in relation to the corporate income tax rates applied in the UK. As 
shown in Figure 2-3, in the UK the high tax rates on corporate income declined from 30% in 
1999 to 21% in 2014. The rate is much lower in the UK than other developed countries; for 
example, 39% in the US. Similarly, the low tax rate (applied to firms with small profits) is also 
among the lowest in developed countries and is considered attractive specifically for small firms 
with relatively small profits. The reasonable tax rates applied are especially designed to govern 
and support firms’ growth. 
 
Figure 2-3: The UK’s corporate tax rates from 1999 to 2014 (OECD, 2015). 
Notes: 
UK Low refers to the small profits tax rate applied to firms with profits of ≤ £300,000. 
UK High refers to the main tax rate (top rate) applied to firms with large profits (i.e. ≥ £300,000). 
The designed rates and rules of AIM allowed a large number of firms to join this market in 
order to achieve growth. Achieving growth can be obtained in two ways, either organically or 
by making acquisitions. Both ways require a demand for cash, albeit in different ways. 
Acquisition may require firms to have high up-front cash levels. However, in an organic 
approach, growth makes firms increase their demand for working capital. 
20% 20% 20%
19% 19% 19% 19% 19%
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In simple terms, firms raise money through stock issuing or by increasing debt. In stock issuing, 
money is obtained by inviting investors to participate in the equity share capital of the business. 
Increasing debt is generated by borrowing from banks. Money raised in either process can be 
used differently. Firms may use raised fund to reduce pressure on working capital, reduce their 
dependency on bank finance, pay down significant creditors, or to finance promising investment 
opportunities.  
Based on the nature of a firm and its investments, it may not wish to raise money by issuing 
equity. Obtaining funds through banks can be more convenient. Firms with risky investments 
(for example, research and development) which have low collateral value may prefer raising 
funds through equity issuing, which is considered to be more flexible, to finance their 
investments, and avoid rigorous structuring processes by banks.  
R&D is becoming a core investment in many firms. In some industries, it is strategically crucial 
for firms to invest in it in order to maintain their competitive advantage. The critical importance 
of R&D can be shown by the creation of new products or the development of new production 
processes that are part of the success of a firm. This investment takes a number of years to be 
completed. Firms cannot cutback their investments until projects are completed, since they are 
associated with high adjustment costs.  In AIM specifically, a significant number of firms have 
invested in R&D13.  Table 2-7 shows the distribution of the firms based on whether they are 
carrying out R&D activities or not, across all industries. Twenty-nine percent of the total of 
listed firms have invested in R&D, of which the majority are quoted under manufacturing (two-
digit SIC 20-39) and service (two-digit SIC 73) industries.  
                                                 
13 Firms invest in R&D to obtain process and/or product innovations that lead to competitive advantage. Product 
innovations create new goods and services, while process innovations yield reductions in the cost of producing 
existing services and products (Tirole, 1988). 
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Table 2-7: Distribution of the AIM-listed firms based on whether they are carrying out R&D 
activities or not, across all industries. 
Division Industry  Number of Firms    Percentage Distribution (%)  





















LIVESTOCK 0 1 1  0 100 100 
07 
AGRICULTURAL 
SERVICES 1 2 3  33 67 100 
08 FORESTRY 0 2 2  0 100 100 
09 
FISHING, HUNTING, AND 
TRAPPING 1 0 1  100 0 100 
10 METAL MINING 15 121 136  11 89 100 
12 COAL MINING 0 15 15  0 100 100 
13 
OIL AND GAS 




FUELS 2 23 25  8 92 100 
15 
GENERAL BUILDING 
CONTRACTORS 0 19 19  0 100 100 
16 HEAVY CONSTRUCTION. 2 2 4  50 50 100 
17 
SPECIAL TRADE 
CONTRACTORS 2 4 6  33 67 100 
 20 
FOOD AND KINDRED 
PRODUCTS 5 17 22  23 77 100 
 22 
TEXTILE MILL 
PRODUCTS 2 4 6  33 67 100 
 23 
APPAREL AND OTHER 
TEXTILE PRODUCTS 2 10 12  9 91 100 
 24 
LUMBER AND WOOD 
PRODUCTS 1 3 4  25 75 100 
 25 
FURNITURE AND 
FIXTURES 2 9 11  18 82 100 
 26 
PAPER AND ALLIED 
PRODUCTS 5 5 10  50 50 100 
 27 
PRINTING AND 
PUBLISHING 3 16 19  16 84 100 
 28 
CHEMICALS AND 
ALLIED PRODUCTS 61 17 78  78 22 100 
 29 
PETROLEUM AND COAL 
PRODUCTS 3 3 6  50 50 100 
 30 
RUBBER AND MISC. 
PLASTICS PRODUCTS 1 4 5  20 80 100 
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 31 
LEATHER AND LEATHER 
PRODUCTS 1 2 3  33 67 100 
 32 
STONE, CLAY, AND 
GLASS PRODUCTS 5 9 14  36 64 100 
 33 
PRIMARY METAL 
INDUSTRIES 1 2 3  33 67 100 
 34 
FABRICATED METAL 




EQUIPMENT 36 14 50  80 20 100 
 36 
ELECTRONIC & OTHER 
ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT 61 13 74  82 18 100 
 37 
TRANSPORTATION 
EQUIPMENT 2 5 7  29 71 100 
 38 
INSTRUMENTS AND 




INDUSTRIES 4 3 7  57 43 100 
40 
RAILROAD 
TRANSPORTATION 0 1 1  0 100 100 
41 
LOCAL & INTERURBAN 
PASSENGER TRANSIT 0 4 4  0 100 100 
42 
TRUCKING AND 
WAREHOUSING 0 4 4  0 100 100 
44 
WATER 
TRANSPORTATION 0 11 11  0 100 100 
45 
TRANSPORTATION BY 
AIR 0 6 6  0 100 100 
46 
PIPELINES, EXCEPT 
NATURAL GAS NA NA NA  NA NA NA 
47 
TRANSPORTATION 
SERVICES 0 9 9  0 100 100 
48 COMMUNICATIONS 8 30 38  21 79 100 
49 
ELECTRIC, GAS & 
SANITARY SERVICES 6 21 27  22 78 100 
50 
WHOLESALE TRADE-
DURABLE GOODS 3 20 23  13 87 100 
51 
WHOLESALE TRADE-
NONDURABLE GOODS 2 11 13  15 85 100 
52 
BUILDING MATERIALS & 
GARDEN SUPPLIES 1 3 4  25 75 100 
53 
GENERAL 
MERCHANDISE STORES 0 3 3  0 100 100 
54 FOOD STORES 0 2 2  0 100 100 
55 
AUTOMOTIVE DEALERS 
& SERVICE STATIONS 0 6 6  0 100 100 
56 
APPAREL AND 




STORES 0 6 6  0 100 100 
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58 
EATING AND DRINKING 
PLACES 0 31 31  0 100 100 
59 
MISCELLANEOUS 
RETAIL 1 21 22  5 95 100 
60 
DEPOSITORY 
INSTITUTIONS 3 12 15  20 80 100 
61 
NONDEPOSITORY 
INSTITUTIONS 1 20 21  5 95 100 
62 
SECURITY AND 
COMMODITY BROKERS 1 68 69  1 99 100 
63 INSURANCE CARRIERS 0 13 13  0 100 100 
64 
INSURANCE AGENTS, 
BROKERS & SERVICE 0 10 10  0 100 100 
65 REAL ESTATE 3 75 78  4 96 100 
67 
HOLDING & OTHER 
INVESTMENT OFFICES 7 101 108  6 94 100 
70 
HOTELS AND OTHER 
LODGING PLACES 0 13 13  0 100 100 
72 PERSONAL SERVICES 1 3 4  25 75 100 




PARKING 0 5 5  0 100 100 
76 
MISCELLANEOUS 
REPAIR SERVICES 0 2 2  0 100 100 
78 MOTION PICTURES 0 23 23  0 100 100 
79 
AMUSEMENT & 
RECREATION SERVICES 6 49 55  11 89 100 
80 HEALTH SERVICES 2 12 14  14 84 100 
81 LEGAL SERVICES NA NA NA  NA NA NA 
82 
EDUCATIONAL 
SERVICES 0 4 4  0 100 100 
83 SOCIAL SERVICES 1 2 3  33 67 100 
84 
MUSEUMS, BOTANICAL, 
ZOOLOGICAL GARDENS 0 1 1  0 100 100 
86 
MEMBERSHIP 




SERVICES 44 80 124  35 65 100 
89 SERVICES, NEC 2 7 9  22 78 100 
Total  546 1313 1859    29 71   100 
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Small firms who invest highly in R&D may find it more attractive to join a UK public market 
(AIM), since the applied tax procedure for R&D in the UK is considered among the best in the 
world (please refer to section 3.1, table 3-1).  
After reviewing the balanced regulatory environment and the admission criteria of AIM, the 
attractive corporate income tax rates, the R&D tax relief scheme, and the R&D tax credit 
incentive applied in the UK, how these incentives affect a firm’s decision to undertake R&D 
activities will be investigated. Furthermore, how AIM-listed firms finance their R&D 
investments and whether the investments of the small listed firms are facing binding financial 
constraints will be investigated.      
The research is focused on UK-listed firms, with special attention paid to small and young 
firms, since the financial constraints on corporate investment are more severe in market-based 
economies (for example, the UK and USA) than in bank-based economies (for example, 
European countries).  Bond et al. (2003) suggest that, among the European financial markets, 
the UK is the weakest in channelling funds towards firms with more promising investment 
opportunities, due to the arm’s-length relationship between finance providers and companies. 
Thus, the market-based UK financial system may give rise to financial constraints amongst UK-
listed firms.  
Few studies have concentrated on how finance affects the R&D expenditure of small size and 
high growth firms. The financing constraints that are present may also influence R&D levels. 
Since AIM in the UK is as developed as the capital markets in the US, the lack of evidence on 
R&D determinants in the UK is a puzzle, and calls into question whether small firms listed on 
AIM face binding financing constraints on their R&D investments.  
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3 Incentives of innovation on the AIM market 
3.1  Introduction 
In the current economic environment, innovation is considered as a major source of competitive 
advantage14, and is achieved through intensive research and development (R&D) expenditure 
and the utilization of new technology. For firms to provide some differentiation that would lead 
to competitive advantage, that is to create new products or develop new production processes, 
they invest in R&D, which is a critical input for innovation. As a consequence, the innovation 
factor has a growing importance for society as a whole, which will benefit from the progress of 
firms in terms of generating new services and products, and consequently creating further 
employment and income opportunities, which all contribute to societies’ needs and wants 
(Miyamoto, 2014; Rothaermel, 2008). 
There are various ways in which firms can carry out innovative activities; for instance, through 
constant internal investment, thereby generating the minimum requirements (sufficient critical 
mass) for further innovative developments15. These internal activities include R&D investment, 
as indicated by Hay and Morris (1991), but also others which are executed outside the structured 
area of R&D activities, and are interconnected with other functions of the firm, such as 
engineering works, quality control or design improvement (Del Canto and Gonzalez, 1999). 
On the other hand, firms can execute innovative activities through external sources, by adopting 
the new technology developed by other industries (Dahlander and Gann, 2010; Huizingh, 
                                                 
14 The business term “competitive advantage” refers to the attributes that allow an organization to perform at a 
higher level than its rivals.  These attributes can be, for example, geographical location, highly skilled employees, 
or the application of new technology in creating new products or production processes. (Porter, 1990).    
15 It is important to distinguish between process innovations and product innovations. Product innovations create 
new services and goods, while process innovations yield reductions in the cost of producing existing services and 
products (Tirole, 1988). 
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2011). The classic way is via license agreements. However, one could also argue that the 
adoption of external sources is embodied in capital equipment and intermediate inputs (Pavitt, 
1984; Tirole, 1988), the intermediate mechanism between the market and organizations can be 
achieved by R&D cooperation between firms (Veugelers, 1997; Del Canto and Gonzalez, 1999; 
Laursen and Salter, 2006). 
Internal development of innovation has some advantages over external acquisition. However, 
cooperation is difficult to achieve as it generates competitive advantage. There is no dependence 
on third parties for development activities and it eliminates any potential restrictions on firms 
to make improvements in their existing technology, regardless of its high risk (Tirole, 1988; 
Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Vega-Jurado et al., 2008). In reality, the success of the vast 
majority of firms is due to their superior technological and innovation capability. It is therefore 
logical to understand why academics, as well as policymakers, are focusing on understanding 
the factors and the determinants that facilitate these internal mechanisms. 
One of the key determinants of technological change is knowledge accumulation, which is 
chiefly presented through investment in R&D. Researchers have provided an extensive body of 
empirical evidence on the theoretical argument that R&D investment has a significant positive 
effect on the growth of economies at both aggregate and disaggregate levels16. The recognition 
of the importance of R&D, for the long-run growth of economies and for living standards within 
society, has drawn the attention of policymakers and been reflected in government policies.  
In the UK, the government has introduced special tax schemes to encourage firms to conduct 
R&D activities, namely R&D tax relief and R&D tax credit, on top of the continuous reductions 
                                                 
16 As explained by endogenous growth theory, research and development makes a significant contribution to 
economic growth; see, for example, Arrow (1962), Cohen and Levinthal (1989), Romer (1990) and Laincz (2009).  
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in corporate tax rates. These schemes are UK tax incentives aimed at reducing a firm’s tax bill 
and/or at allowing a firm to claim payable cash credits as a proportion of their qualifying 
spending17 on R&D, therefore reducing the cost of corporate R&D, and encouraging firms to 
invest in R&D.  
The rationale for the introduction of these schemes by the UK government was due to the 
country’s spending on R&D as a proportion of gross domestic product, which was lagging 
behind many other countries, especially during the period 1981-1999 (HMRC, 2015; The 
World Bank, 2016). However, owing to the importance of R&D in building a modern 
knowledge-based economy and improving productivity, the UK government has made an effort 
to increase the amount spent on R&D by firms. For this purpose, it introduced the two relief 
schemes for firms incurring expenditure on this type of investment (HMRC, 2015). 
There is one scheme for large firms and another for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). A 
general comparison and overview of the R&D tax relief and R&D tax credit schemes are 
presented in Table 3-1. The first scheme was introduced in 2000 for SMEs, giving both tax 
relief and tax credit, while separate schemes for large firms came into being in 2002 for tax 






                                                 
17 The definition of qualifying R&D expenditure is reasonably broad, and qualifying R&D activities cover the 
whole range of firm operations (see the definition of R&D for tax purposes (HMRC, 2015)). 
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Table 3-1: General comparison of R&D tax schemes in the UK. 
SME18  R&D Scheme 
Active date from 
 
Enhanced deduction rate 
on qualifying R&D 
expenditure 
R&D expenditure credit 
(payable credit rate)  
 
01/04/2000 150% 16% 
01/08/2008 175% 14% 
01/04/2011  200% 12.5% 
01/04/2012  225% 11% 
01/04/2014 225% 14.5% 
01/04/2015 230% 14.5% 
Large firm R&D scheme 
 01/04/2002 125% No payable credit 
 01/04/2008 130% No payable credit 
 01/04/2014 130% 10% 
01/04/2015 130% 11% 
 
Although the UK government introduced policies to motivate firms to undertake R&D 
activities, no research has been devoted to assess the impact of these government policies on 
such activities, with very little special focus on young and small listed firms (the government’s 
target group).  
 
 
                                                 
18 For a firm to fall within the definition of an SME it must have a staff headcount of below 500, and have either 
less than €100 million turnover, or less than €86 million gross balance sheet assets; that is, approximately less than 
£85 and £73 million in turnover and balance sheet total respectively.   
44 | P a g e  
 
3.2 Research aim and objectives 
Despite the renewed interest in the impact of R&D investment on the growth of firms and 
economies, relatively little is known about the determinants of firms’ innovative activities, 
either in the UK or in other developed countries. This chapter aims to fill the gap and investigate 
the incentives and the determinants of the innovative activities of AIM-listed firms.  
Most of the recent empirical and theoretical research has focused on the factors influencing 
R&D activity at the firm level. A great amount of research on the factors behind R&D activities 
was rooted in an industrial organization framework (Tirole, 1988; Symeonidis, 1996; Hall and 
James, 2009). Studies focused on the external factors for carrying out R&D activity; for 
instance, the degree of concentration of the industry in which the firm operates (Shrieves, 1978; 
Kamien and Schwartz, 1982; Takahashi, 1999). Another stream of research has focused on the 
effect of internal factors on a firm’s R&D activities; for example, resources and capabilities in 
carrying out R&D activity (Del Canto and Gonzalez, 1999). This chapter aims to evaluate the 
effect of government policies on firms’ R&D activities, explaining why firms pursue such 
promising and risky investments.  
The empirical results of this research are of high importance, providing a clearer view of the 
factors that influence a firm’s decision to undertake R&D investment, and measuring the role 
that government policies have on firms’ decisions to perform R&D activities.     
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no such investigations have been made on the effect 
of fiscal policy on R&D activities. Investigating the effect that such policy has on the carrying 
out of R&D investment in the UK is of great importance, especially for firm managers and 
policymakers, and calls into question whether these government incentives play a significant 
role in motivating firms to undertake R&D activities. The second contribution of this research 
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is that most of previous research conducted on the incentives for carrying out R&D investment 
has been almost exclusively based on the investigation of large and mature firms. Thus, in this 
work we contribute to the literature by investigating the determinants of and the incentives for 
carrying out R&D activity for small and young firms in particular, owing to their important 
contributions to society and the economy. 
 The third contribution of this research lies in the applied methodology; that is, the dynamic 
logistic model that controls for the initial condition issues with unobserved heterogeneity. 
Previous research has not considered the role of the dynamic process in the probability of 
undertaking R&D expenditure, nor has controlled for the initial condition issues. In addition, 
this work will contribute to the literature related to corporate tax changes and R&D tax schemes 














Traditionally, in the economic literature on industrial organizations, one of the most important 
questions has been the connection between market structure, industry characteristics and 
innovation. From this theoretical perception, it is assumed that the differences between firms' 
innovative activities are illustrated by the industry’s structural characteristics. In this respect, 
sources of inter-industry that have been studied with regard to the varied innovative strategies 
are technological strategy, demand growth intensity and appropriability19 conditions (Tirole, 
1988; Takahashi, 1999; Lopez, 2009). The effect of some firm characteristics are also 
considered, but are relatively limited to firm size and other variables, for instance diversification 
or profitability and liquidity, which are relatively correlated with size (Grabowski, 1968; 
Adams, 1970; Hundley et al., 1996; Cohen, 2010).  
On the other hand, unlike industrial organisational and from another theoretical perspective, the 
resource-based perspective, research has also been conducted on the effect of internal resources 
and capability on innovation strategies. This research has devoted efforts to developing models 
and frameworks to analyse the firm environment rather than organizational factors in 
determining the relationship between internal firm characteristics and innovation activities (Del 
Canto and Gonzalez, 1999; Galende and de la Fuente, 2003; Webster, 2004). The view of the 
resource-based perspective is that innovation does not come merely by surveying external 
characteristics for market opportunities, but by looking in-depth internally, to form and build 
the core competencies of the firm. It states that incentives to innovate are also found in the 
funding resources of the firm, which are simply heterogeneous between firms. Hence, 
                                                 
19 Appropriability is defined as the environmental factors that govern an innovator's ability to obtain profits 
generated from inventions or innovations (Lopez, 2009). 
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innovation is relatively tied to particular resources and can be explained as a function of a firm’s 
internal resources (Arrow, 1962; Kamien and Schwartz, 1982; Becker, 2013). 
Instead of explaining the determinants of innovation and the incentives to innovate from 
industrial structure and resource-based perspectives only, this analysis also considers fiscal 
policy incentives as possible causes of innovativeness. In order to do this, we will distinguish 
three types of determinants that could influence a firm’s decision to carry out R&D activity: 
firm-specific factors, market structure factors, and fiscal policy factors. However, for 
simplicity, these factors will be classified into micro-level, meso-level, and macro-level factors. 
Figure 3-1 illustrates the theoretical model which is the map for this work and which is the 















Figure 3-1 : Factors determining internal R&D investment activity. 
 
Macro-level factors  
 Tax policies  
 Corporate tax rate  
(Czarnitzki et al., 2011) 
 R&D tax relief  




 Financial resources  
 Internal/External  
(Financial autonomy)  
(Del Canto and Gonzalez, 1999) 
 Equity/Debt 
(Leverage)    
(Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2009) 
 Firm size  
(Kamien and Schwartz, 1982) 
 Firm age   
(Huergo and Jaumandreu, 2004) 
              
Meso-level factors  
 Market concentration (HHI) 
(Kamien and Schwartz, 1982) 
Taking up internal 
R&D activity 
48 | P a g e  
 
3.3 Theoretical framework and hypotheses derivation  
3.3.2 Micro-level factors  
3.3.2.1 Financial Resources 
Financial resources include retained earnings, debt, equity and working capital (Scherr, 1989; 
Bond and Meghir, 1994). The availability of a firm’s financial resources can affect its decision 
to undertake internal R&D activity.  According to the imperfect capital market and agency 
literature, internal funds are much favoured by firms over external funds. Thus, the availability 
of internal funds should be more positively related to R&D investment than external sources. 
If internal funds are exhausted, and external funds are needed, investment in R&D will be 
ideally financed through equity rather than debt (Wang and Thornhill, 2010; Martinsson, 2010; 
Brown et al., 2012). 
First, the lack of internal sources of funds can limit a firm’s capacity to support its R&D activity 
and expenses, whereas a firm’s internally generated cash flow can make these activities more 
possible (Grabowski, 1968; Hall, 1992; Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Bhagat and Welch, 
1995; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). Internal funds are more preferable than external funds 
because of the asymmetric information problem; that is, when the firm’s management and 
external capital markets do not have the same information available about the firm (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984).  
Internal management (insiders) have more information about their internal projects, including 
R&D, due to disclosure issues to capital markets, than outsiders. Information about the R&D 
projects of a firm should not be fully revealed, as this would become a signal to competitors, 
which could result in losing the opportunity to maintain control over innovative activity. 
Consequently, a firm would not be able to convert its innovative activity (innovation) into a 
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source of competitive advantage.  The control and demands for information required by the 
providers of external funds, therefore, offer an example of the pecking order theory of capital 
structure (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984). 
The principle of this theory is centred on the idea that in the presence of the information 
asymmetry problem, if firms try to issue risky securities, outside investors will interpret this 
effort as a sign that the firm is overvalued. Based on this, investors will reasonably discount the 
price of a firm’s security, leading to a negative market reaction. According to this theory, firms 
will prefer to finance their investment opportunities by available internal funds, debt issuance, 
and equity issuance in that order, creating a hierarchy of finance (Oliner and Rudebusch, 1992), 
and according to which firms will prefer to finance their R&D activities by their own available 
internal funds rather than external sources of funds. 
Second, a firm’s capital structure that is based on debt can dampen the incentive to undertake 
R&D activities. Theories that support this argument can be found in transaction-cost economics 
and the agency theory (Jaffee and Russell, 1976; Fazzari et al., 1988; Williamson, 1988; Wang 
and Thornhill, 2010).  Williamson (1988) and Wang and Thornhill (2010) state that the 
determinants of financing a project through debt or equity depend mainly on the characteristics 
of the assets. Accordingly, equity is suggested to be the ideal financing means, especially when 
a firm is investing in firm-specific assets (for example, R&D investment), and debt is more 
appropriate to finance non-specific or re-deployable assets. Assets have a higher resale value 
and are easily redeployed if they have a low degree of firm specificity, so debt providers have 
the option of forcing assets sales or liquidation if the company fails to meet its debt obligations 
(Wang and Thornhill, 2010).  
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As the asset-specificity of R&D investment is high, implying a low resale value, the protection 
offered to debt providers against this type of investment is low and affords limited protection. 
Thus, debt providers can intervene in the conduct of management to avoid risky investments. 
Equity funding, which does not impose restrictions and so allows for much greater discretion, 
is considered as the preferred financing channel for projects where asset-specificity is high 
(Switzer, 1984; Hall, 1992; Brown and Petersen, 2009). Thus, the greater the intervention power 
of the debt providers in the firm, the greater their capacity to direct activities towards less risky 
investment, and therefore investment in R&D is expected to be lower (Scellato, 2006; Casson 
et al., 2008; Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2009).  
Moreover, in the cases of large firms, especially the ones that operate in mature sectors, Jensen 
(1986) states that these firms have a greater incentive to over-invest in projects, for example 
R&D, even if they do not generate value for shareholders. Consequently, debt providers impose 
more restrictions on firm managers to act more in the shareholders’ interests; that is, by 
overriding decisions that would reduce a firm's productivity and profitability. Furthermore, 
researchers argue that firms would need to reduce their financial obligations in order to reduce 
the risk of financial distress and bankruptcy. Because firms’ financial obligations are 
represented by debt interest payments, research assumes that they would try to limit their use 
of debt. 
 Despite the fact that the success of R&D investment may lead to better financial performance 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Fazzari and Petersen, 1993; Wang and Thornhill, 2010), which 
would lead to a future stream of cash flows that would make financing through debt relatively 
cheaper, firms place more emphasis on factors that might threaten their survival. Thus, firms 
with high levels of leverage would reduce their investment in risky activities in order to reduce 
the risk of financial distress and bankruptcy.   
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Taking the previous empirical findings, along with the roles of external and internal financing, 
into consideration, the proposed hypotheses are as follows:    
H1: High levels of equity and internally generated funds increase the probability that a firm 
will undertake R&D investment. 
H2:  High levels of debt decrease the probability that a firm will takes up R&D investment. 
 
 
3.3.2.2 Firm Size 
There has been growing interest in the role of firm size20 in R&D activities and the undertaking 
of them. This effect has been frequently studied, and the empirical evidence varies significantly. 
First, according to the Schumpeterian hypothesis, large firms are deemed to be comparatively 
more innovative than small ones, with the latter devoting little expenditure to this (Smyth et al., 
1972; Kamien and Schwartz, 1982; Acs and Isberg, 1991; Babutsidze, 2016). The economies 
of scale in this activity, or the existence of the required critical mass, make research and 
development difficult for small firms (Shefer and Frenkel, 2005). Furthermore, firm size is also 
considered as an indicator of firm power in the market, which would facilitate innovation by 
better ability to finance research and development (Symeonidis, 1996).  
As pointed out by Nelson (1959), Cooper (1964) and Graves and Langowitz (1993), other 
factors favour larger firm size; for example, the lower probability of risk of failure owing to the 
fact that larger firms are more able to diversify their R&D projects. Equally, the successful 
R&D activities of large firms are more profitable due to their larger market. Furthermore, large 
                                                 
20 Firm size can be measured by total assets, sales or by number of employees. 
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firms hire many highly skilled workers and scientists, who can interact and discuss their ideas, 
and rely on the expertise of colleagues at particular points when needed (Vaona and Pianta, 
2008; Herrera and Sánchez-González, 2013).  
On the other hand, several studies have failed to show the suitability of the Schumpeter 
hypothesis on the favouring of large sized firms (Cooper, 1964; Smyth et al., 1972; Cohen et 
al., 1987; Shefer and Frenkel, 2005; Pla-Barber and Alegre, 2007). Others have proposed an 
intermediate point; that is, medium size firms (Kamien and Schwartz, 1982; Laforet, 2008). In 
this sense, Acs and Audretsch (1988) state that although small and medium sized firms spend 
less on R&D than large firms, they produce a significant number of innovations, especially if 
comparison is on a per-employee basis. Similarly, Tether (1998) shows that small firms are 
much more innovative than large ones. As argued by the employment literature, while large 
firms often follow the rationalisation mode, small ones have a greater tendency to increase their 
rates of growth and employment opportunities. However, as these growths are associated with 
innovativeness, small firms are expected to be more innovative than large ones (Rothwell, 
1984). 
In addition, considering the types of innovation being undertaken by firms, Baumol (2002) and 
Baumol (2004) discriminate between firm innovation based on breakthrough and incremental 
innovations. In his research, Baumol revealed that breakthrough revolutionary innovation 
comes predominantly from small sized firms, while large sized ones contribute by their 
incremental innovation/improvement. The rationale behind these findings is that the innovative 
activities of large sized firms are carefully designed to avoid unnecessary losses or surprising 
outcomes; that is, keeping the risk level at a minimum hinders the imagination and risk taking 
of large firms.  
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On the other hand, small firms are marked by breakthrough innovations as a result of their being 
guided by risk taking entrepreneurs/investors, who seek to achieve high marginal growth and 
profit on their initial investments. Consequently, Baumol et al. (2007) conclude their research 
recommendations by emphasizing more support for small sized firms owing to their 
contribution in leading modern economies, through their breakthrough outcomes. 
Furthermore, Cooper (1964), and Hitt et al. (1991) argue that small firms have positive effects 
on R&D activities, with these effects illustrated by their better networks of communication and 
better coordination between units. In addition, Tether (1998) states that small-size firms are 
more effective at generating innovative products, whilst large-sized ones are more effective at 
large scale production and product distribution. 
Del Canto and Gonzalez (1999) argue that this relationship may depend on the characteristics 
of the industry in which the firm is operating and on the type of innovative activity and 
innovation being developed. Thus, Acs and Audretsch (1987) and Shefer and Frenkel (2005) 
argue that large-sized firms tend to stress innovation activities in sectors where capital and 
advertising are relatively intensive, as well as in sectors that are marked by high concentration. 
On the other hand, small firms tend to have a relative advantage in innovation in sectors that 
are in their early growth stages, and in those that are less concentrated (Tether, 1998). This 
argument is illustrated by the fact that these sectors are associated with low R&D costs and 
capital inputs (Rothwell, 1984). 
The findings for UK firms have varied with regard to the positive relationship between R&D 
activity and firm size (for example, Smyth et al., 1972; Tether, 1998).  Taking the findings of 
the previous empirical studies into consideration, we conclude that the effect of firm size on the 
willingness to carry out R&D activity is complex and cannot be simplified in a single 
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hypothesis. Considering that firms listed on the AIM market are small-size ones, the proposed 
hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H3:  The greater the size of the firm, the greater the probability that it will undertake R&D 
investment. 
 
3.3.2.3 Firm age 
One of the factors that has an effect on the growth process of firms, and which has received 
little empirical attention in the context of innovation, is experience as measured by firm age. 
Firm experience, ideally measured as cumulative output or proxied by time, has to some extent 
been used in the studies of firm survival and some studies of learning by doing. However, it has 
been relatively ignored in the innovation literature. Sørensen and Stuart (2000) were among the 
first to examine the relationship between firm age and innovation activity. They investigated 
the impact of firm age on innovation and its quality, providing evidence that older firms 
generate significantly more innovations. They state that the competence to produce new 
innovations appears to improve with age, “but these gains in organizational competence come 
at a price, namely, an increasing divergence between organizational competence and current 
environmental demands”. 
 Moreover, and in another context, Huergo and Jaumandreu (2004) also investigated the impact 
of firm age on innovation. Their research concludes that young firms tend to have the highest 
probability of innovation, while the oldest ones tend to present a lower probability of innovative 
activity. They also show that firms of an intermediate age present a high probability of 
innovation, and that those that are exiting the market are the ones that present the lowest level 
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of process innovation. They conclude that there is a nonlinear relationship between age and 
innovative activities.  
These studies vary in support for the idea that the quality and quantity of firms’ innovation 
activities change over time as they accumulate experience, and that this relationship may vary 
across industries. However, Balasubramanian and Lee (2008) examined the effect of firm age 
on innovation activities in accordance with the heterogeneity of technological changes across 
industries. They conclude that ageing has a negative effect on innovation, and that the effect 
varies with the level of technological activity. Furthermore, they suggest that younger firms are 
more likely to be better at contributing to innovation than older ones.  
It is clear that little research has analysed the effect of firm age on innovation, and that there is 
no consensus. This chapter contributes to the literature by assessing the probability of 
innovation being carried out with firm age being one of the factors that influences a firm’s 
decision to perform R&D activity. Taking the findings of the previous empirical studies into 
consideration, to capture the effect of firm age on the willingness to carry out R&D activity is 
difficult and needs further investigation. Considering the young age of the firms listed on the 
AIM market, the proposed hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H4: The older the firm the greater the probability that a firm will carry out R&D investment. 
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3.3.3 Meso-level factors  
3.3.3.1 Market concentration  
Over the past decades, a large body of research has been devoted to how market structure affects 
innovation activities and their intensity. According to Schumpeter (1942), societies must be 
prepared to support imperfectly competitive markets in order to attain rapid technical progress. 
It is argued that large-sized firms in imperfectly competitive markets are considered to have the 
most conducive conditions for innovation progress, and that a firm in an imperfectly 
competitive industry is more able to prevent imitation and can therefore obtain more revenue 
from innovation. Furthermore, a firm with monopoly profits is better able to finance its 
innovative activities than other firms. Innovation is claimed to be greater in monopolistic 
industries than in more competitive ones (Symeonidis, 1996; Kamien and Schwartz, 1982). 
In the Schumpeterian hypothesis, the degree of monopoly power did not influence the 
probability of successful innovation, but was a crucial incentive for firms to engage in 
innovation activities (Vossen, 1999; Gayle, 2001; Weiss and Wittkopp, 2005). This view led to 
the much debated and long-standing hypothesis that industries that are more concentrated have 
the most conducive conditions for innovation, leading to recent empirical research on the 
relation between market structure and innovation which has investigated the relationship 
between industrial concentration and R&D. With a few exceptions, a positive relationship has 
been found. However, these empirical results have been found to be inconclusive, as they fail 
to consider more fundamental sources of variation in innovative behaviour, and the 
performance of firms and industries (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989).     
The Schumpeterian hypothesis challenged the classical economic understanding of the ideal 
market structure for optimal resource allocation, and has engendered empirical and theoretical 
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literature on this topic. Based on the argument, policies that aim to reduce or eliminate imperfect 
competition could at the same time limit the amount of innovation in an economy (Gayle, 2001). 
Kamien and Schwartz (1982) conducted a comprehensive review of the empirical literature up 
to the late 1970s on the relationship between market structure and innovative activity and 
revealed the inappropriateness of this relationship. Findings vary, with some studies supporting 
the Schumpeterian hypothesis, that competitive markets are less active at stimulating innovative 
activity, while others suggest that competitive markets are better at stimulating innovative 
activities. 
These studies offer several arguments on the advantages of market power on innovation and on 
how it results in greater innovative activities. Firms enjoying market power with their existing 
products can introduce new products, for instance through the domination of firms in the 
channels of marketing and distribution. As market power has the ability to extend new product 
ranges, a monopolist should find innovation more attractive (Nelson, 1959). Second, as 
innovative activities are more susceptible to moral hazard problems, Arrow (1962) has argued 
that firms will more ideally finance their innovation internally; therefore, firms with higher 
market power are in an advantageous position, as they are generally associated with 
supernormal profits. Third, firms with high market power often have more resources, which 
enable them to hire the most knowledgeable and innovative staff (Acemoglu, 1997).  
 More recently, researchers have found empirical evidence contrary to the Schumpeterian 
hypothesis; for instance, Geroski (1990), Blundell et al. (1992), Vossen (1999), Gayle (2001), 
and Weiss and Wittkopp (2005), among others. These recent studies claim that technological 
opportunity, which varies across industries, should not be neglected as a determinant of 
innovative activity and must be controlled for when examining the relationship between 
innovation and market structure. Several arguments have been offered for why a competitive 
58 | P a g e  
 
market has advantages for innovation. As suggested by Gayle (2001), firms with more 
monopoly power may consider additional leisure to be superior to additional profits, due to the 
lack of active competition in the industry.  
A firm that has market power from existing processes or products could be slower in replacing 
them with a superior ones than newcomers. Firms with monopoly profits calculate the profits 
from innovation as the difference between the profit that could be generated from new products 
and their current profits, while newcomers consider new product profits as the total gain 
(Kamien and Schwartz, 1982). As a result, the larger the current monopoly profits, the less 
incentive there is for monopolists to replace their processes or products. 
Theoretical models on the incentives to innovate provide predictions about the impact of market 
concentration on innovative effort. Since there are arguments both for and against a positive 
relation between market concentration and innovative activity, the net result is an empirical 
matter. Considering that a pure monopoly is a rare case in the real world (and in our tested 
market in particular), the empirical research will examine the following hypothesis concerning 
market concentration and a firm’s decision to carry out R&D activity:  
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3.3.4 Macro-level factors  
3.3.4.1 Tax policies  
There are two different views on the relationship between government tax policies and 
innovation. In the first view, researchers argue that taxes can distort a firm’s incentive to 
innovate or to carry out innovative activities. Higher corporate tax rates reduce after-tax profits, 
and any stakeholder (for example, firm managers or stockholders) that depends on these profits 
will be less likely to support any investment of money, time or effort in R&D investment.  
The literature on the corporate tax effect on investment has offered several theories that explain 
how the tax rate could significantly affect innovation at the firm-level. First, as explained by 
Tirole (2010), a lower tax rate can increase the after-tax profit, which in turn increases the 
amount that a firm can offer to its stockholders in return for their investment. In this way, any 
potential innovative projects are more likely to be financed internally if the tax rates are low. 
Thus in the presence of information asymmetry and the agency problem, the higher after-tax 
profit as a result of low tax rates will have a significant effect on the probability of actively 
financing and carrying out R&D activities. 
Second, lower tax rates also play a significant role in making alternative projects with higher 
tax rates less profitable, thus reducing the opportunity cost of innovation. As a result, if we 
assume two similar firms listed on competitive but scarce capital markets, shareholders would 
prefer to invest in the firm that has lower corporate tax, and therefore higher after-tax profits. 
Third, if the remuneration of the firm’s managers and employees depend on the after-tax profits 
through annual bonuses, stock ownership and stock options, highly skilled and talented 
employees would prefer to join a firm that has low corporate tax rate and high after-tax profits 
(Atanassov and Liu, 2014).  
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Fourth, through low corporate tax, firms can save some of their after-tax profits as a 
precautionary reserve for difficult future times. Since innovation activity is considered to be a 
highly uncertain process, firms with more precautionary cash reserves will be in a better 
position in face of any volatility in funding and be able to continue with their innovation 
processes.  
Fifth, adverse selection in the capital markets induces the pecking-order theory of financing 
new projects, in which a firm would prefer to finance its new projects (especially the more 
asset-specific ones) by its available internal rather than external funds. However, firms which 
engage in innovation process are more susceptible to asymmetric information problems. Brown 
and Petersen (2009) and Brown et al. (2012) state that firms are more dependent on internally 
generated funds to finance the expenditure of future innovation activities. Other factors being 
constant, internally generated funds will be higher for firms with lower tax rates, giving more 
incentive to innovate (Hall, 1992; Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Bhagat and Welch, 1995; 
Brown et al., 2012).  
On the other hand, considering the corporate tax effect on external sources of funds, debt in 
particular, researchers argue that, although a lower tax rate may increase the after-tax profit, a 
higher rate may give firms more incentive to invest more with debt financing instead. As 
explained in the trade-off theory, debt is considered as a shield for tax paying firms, where any 
interest on debt is tax deductible (Myers, 1984). However, considering the nature of innovation 
activities, increasing debt use as a result of a high tax rate would dampen a firm’s incentive to 
invest in R&D. The reasons for this are covered in the literature on transaction-cost economies 
and agency theory (please refer to sections 3.4.1.1. and 4.3.3.1 for further illustrations). 
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Although the higher the tax rate, the higher the tax shield that firms can achieve, those that aim 
to engage in R&D activities will place more emphasis on the elements that might threaten their 
survival. The increase in the financial obligations through the use of debt, as well as the high 
asset-specificity of R&D projects, will offer limited protection to debt providers and a high 
probability of failure for firms. It is concluded that high after-tax profit gives more incentive to 
innovate, while a higher use of debt as a consequence to high corporate tax rates will discourage 
firms from becoming engaged in the process (Wang and Thornhill, 2010). 
Finally, Atanassov and Liu (2014) argue that when the input market is not perfectly flexible, 
and if labour, especially the more skilled and the talented human capital, is a scarce resource, 
then firms will operate with maximum production possibilities, where resources will be 
allocated to the activities that yield the best approachable return. If corporate tax rates are high, 
firms will allocate relatively more of their resources to projects through which they can avoid 
paying taxes. If tax rates are low, some of these resources will be devoted and allocated to more 
innovative projects. In addition, high tax rates will give firms the incentive to invest their 
financial resources, such as cash, in government instruments that have lower tax rates, even if 
the return on these instruments are low. However, if tax rates are low, firms will shift those 
financial resources to more high return projects; for example, innovation projects. 
A separate branch of the related literature has been devoted to investigating the effect and real 
influence of R&D tax relief and credit on R&D investment (Mukherjee et al., 2017), and there 
is consensus on their significant positive influence, similar to the influence of corporate tax rate 
effects (Bloom et al., 2002; Sakakibara et al., 2002; Czarnitzki et al., 2011). 
Considering the previous findings with regard to the effect of both corporate tax rates and R&D 
tax relief, a spectator might consider the two rates as motives for firms to engage in an 
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alternative investment financing strategy, consequently increasing the tax benefit via debt and 
moderating the corporate tax burden via R&D relief. This strategy might be viewed to be in a 
firm's benefit if considering R&D tax relief as an alternative means of avoiding a high tax 
burden and a way of obtaining high after-tax profit., while on the other hand considering a high 
tax rate as a benefit, through which firms can obtain more debt financing and benefit from the 
tax shield that can be obtained. 
This might be viewed as a novel strategy that firms could follow. However, it leads to more 
concerns about the increasing factors that might threaten their survival. By following such a 
strategy, firms are increasing their use of debt, therefore increasing their financial obligations. 
At the same time, they are increasing their investment in risky projects, which as a consequence 
might lead to unexpected results and ultimately failure.     
The alternative theoretical view on the role of corporate income tax on innovation states that 
taxes rate will have no impact, or have a positive impact, on innovation. First, if investment and 
expenditure were all tax deductible, there would be no private benefits of control for firm 
insiders and no asymmetric information. The after-tax profit would not affect the incentives of 
the firm's stakeholders, and the tax rate would be of no concern for any promising project, which 
would be financed whatever the level of tax rates (Atanassov and Liu, 2014). The effect of the 
tax rate will be present only when determining how the profit is shared out. Second, from a 
macro level effect, if the tax rate decreases, this will potentially lead to an increase in the budget 
deficit, and a decrease in the spending of the government on public goods, such as 
infrastructure, education and basic research. This will result in a slowdown in the growth of 
society and hinder innovation at the firm level.  
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To summarise, these two different views lead to opposing predictions. We conclude that the 
effect of tax policies on a firm’s willingness to carry out R&D activity is very complex and 
cannot be simplified in a single hypothesis. Essentially, it is an empirical question that needs to 
be investigated. Considering the schemes offered by UK governments as incentives for firms 
to invest in R&D, especially the small and young ones, the hypotheses on the effect of tax 
policies on the probability of carrying out R&D activity are as follows:     
 
H6:  Higher corporate tax rates decreases the probability that a firm will take up R&D 
investment. 
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3.4 Operational Measures 
Based on the theoretical framework and the derived hypotheses, this section will present the 
definition of the variables which are considered as potential determinants for a firm to decide 
whether or not to carry out R&D activity. The dependent variable is a dummy variable (R&D), 
which is equal to 1 if a firm undertakes research and development activity at time t, otherwise 
zero. 
R&D = {𝟏       𝒊𝒇 𝒂 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎  𝒅𝒐𝒆𝒔 𝑹&̇𝑫 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆 𝒕
𝟎                    𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒘𝒊𝒔𝒆
 
 
3.4.1 Micro-level factors 
3.4.1.1 Financial resources  
The relevant literature was presented in 3.3.2 and the hypotheses derived relating to the 
influence of a firm’s capital structure as an incentive for carrying out R&D activity. It is 
important to measure the ability of a firm to obtain the financing that is needed for carrying out 
R&D activity. To analyse the size of a firm’s equity, and its capacity to obtain internal and 
equity financing, the following variable will be used: 




Leverage is a measure of debt financing and risk bearing and is calculated as:  
Leverage= ( 𝐓𝐨𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐝𝐞𝐛𝐭 
𝐓𝐨𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐞𝐪𝐮𝐢𝐭𝐲
)  
where total debt equals the sum of short-term and long-term debt. 
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Data were collected from the Thomson One Banker and Worldscope databases. According to 
hypotheses 1 and 2, we expect a positive sign for the coefficient on financial autonomy and a 
negative sign for the parameter on the ratio of leverage.  
 
3.4.1.2 Firm size 
The hypothesis presented in section 3.3.3 considers the influence of a firm’s physical factors 
on the decision to carry out R&D activity. According to hypothesis 3, firm size should be 
positively related with the decision to carry out R&D activity and is measured as: 
 
Size= (Total Assets) 
Data were collected from the Worldscope via Thomson One Banker database. 
 
3.4.1.3 Firm age 
 
Intangible factors were proposed as determinants of the decision to carry out R&D activity. 
According to hypothesis 4, the age of a firm is claimed to be positively related with the decision 
to undertake R&D activity and is measured as: 
Age= years since the firm’s birth. 
Data on firm age were collected from the Worldscope database via Thomson One Banker. 
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3.4.2 Meso-level factors 
3.4.2.1 Market concentration 
The role that the industry concentration factor plays as an incentive for a firm to carry out R&D 
activity is also considered; according to hypothesis 5 we expect a negative sign on the 
coefficient of industry concentration, reflecting a negative relationship between industry 
concentration and a firm’s decision to take up R&D activity. This variable is measured as: 
 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHIjt) = (∑ 𝑺𝒊𝒋𝒕
𝟐𝒏
𝒊=𝟏  ) 
 where, HHIjt is the index for industry j at year t, and 𝑺𝒊𝒋𝒕𝟐  is the sum of the squared market 
shares of firm i in industry j at year t, over all firms in industry j. This variable measures the 
market concentration based on the market share of each firm competing in an industry. The data 
for this measure were also collected from the Worldscope database via Thomson One Banker. 
 
3.4.3 Macro-level factors 
3.4.3.1 Tax polices 
These variables analyse the possible effect that government tax policies have on the probability 
of a firm carrying out R&D activity. According to hypothesis 6, the corporate tax rate is 
expected to be negatively related with the decision to carry out R&D activity, and this factor is 
measured as: 
TaxChg = {𝟏 𝒊𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒂𝒏 𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆/𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒂𝒙 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆,
𝟎                                                                                                   𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒘𝒊𝒔𝒆 
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Furthermore, and regarding the effect of R&D tax relief on a firm’s R&D activity, hypothesis 
7 states that R&D tax relief rate is expected to have a positive effect on a firm’s decision to 
carry out R&D activity, and is measured as: 
ReliefChg = 
{
𝟏 𝒊𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒂𝒏 𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆/𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑹𝑫 𝒕𝒂𝒙 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒇 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆,
 𝟎                                                                                                      𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒘𝒊𝒔𝒆
   
 
 
Data on corporate tax rates and R&D tax relief rates were collected from the HM Revenue and 
Customs official website. However, 20 dummy variables will be included in the model to 
capture and control for inter-industry differences. A summary of the factors that affect firms’ 
decision to undertake R&D activity, their operational measures and the expected effects are 
shown in Figure 3-2. 

















                                                           
 
   
   Figure 3-2 : Summary of the factors that affect firms’ decision to undertake R&D activity, their operational measures and the expected 
effects (Del Canto and Gonzalez, 1999; Huergo and Jaumandreu, 2004; Kamien and Schwartz, 1982; Campello and Hackbarth, 2008; Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2009; Czarnitzki et al., 
2011; Atanassov and Liu, 2014). 
Micro-level factors 
 Financial resources  
 Financial Autonomy  
(T.Equity/T.Assets) This variable 
measures the firm’s capacity to obtain 
internal and external equity financing. 
 Leverage (T.Debt /T.Equity) This 
variable measures the firm capacity 
of obtaining debt financing and risk. 
 
 Firm size (T.asstes) 
 
 Age (Years of  firm i at time t) 
 
 Meso-level factors  










 Corporate tax rate (increase/decrease) 
dummy variable 
 





H1: High levels of equity and internally generated funds 
increase the probability that a firm will undertake R&D 
investment. 
H2:  High levels of debt decrease the probability of that a 
firm will takes up R&D investment. 
H3: The greater the size of the firm, the greater the 
probability that it will undertake R&D investment. 
H4: The older the firm the greater the probability that a 
firm will carry out R&D investment. 
 
 
H5: Higher industry competition increases the probability 
of that a firm will takes up R&D investment. 
    
 
H6:  Higher corporate tax rates decreases the probability 
that a firm will takes up R&D investment. 
H7:  Higher R&D tax relief rates increase the probability 






 Decision to undertake R&D 
investment  
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3.5 Data and preliminary analysis 
3.5.1 Data and measurement 
As the focus of this research is to examine the determinants and incentives that influence a 
firm’s decision to make R&D investment, the variables have been constructed from firms listed 
on AIM. Our unbalanced dataset21 covers all the publicly listed firms on AIM over the period 
from 1999 to 2014, which are contained on the Worldscope database and the London stock 
exchange official website. To be consistent with the previous literature22, we only focus on the 
firms that are listed on the two-digit SIC industries 20-39 (manufacturing) and 73 (services), 
since R&D activities mainly take place in these high-tech industries.  
 
Figure 3-3: Summary of the research sample population of the firms listed on AIM between 
1999 and 2014. 
                                                 
21 Our research data have been collected from Worldscope, the DataStream via Thomson one banker analytics 
database and the HM Revenue and Customs official website. 
22 See, for example, Hall (1992), Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), Del Canto and Gonzalez (1999), Brown and 
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The number of listed firms on AIM over the estimation period of 1999 to 2014 was 1858 active 
and inactive23 firms. In December 2014, the total number of firms in the manufacturing (two-
digit SIC 20-39) and the services (two-digit SIC 73) that was listed on AIM was 746, of which 
379 firms have exited the market, delisted, over the sample period. Given the birth and death 
of firms, the econometrics analysis will use an unbalanced data set.  This unbalanced panel 
avoids survivorship bias24. Referring to the investigation of Pour and Lasfer (2013), there is a 
significant number of AIM-firm delistings which are recorded as voluntary, although further 
investigation into the breakdown of reasons for delisting is required to achieve the intended to 
be mitigated survival bias.  Figure 3-3 gives a summary of the dataset. 
However, it is worth noting that the number of inactive firms in our dataset is slightly higher 
than the number of active firms; the number of delisted firms of these two industries was 
relatively high as a percentage of the newcomers during the tested period, as shown in Figure 
3-4. 
 
Figure 3-4: Summary of the new listed and delisted firms of our research sample between 
1999 and 2014 
                                                 
23 These inactive firms are dead firms, not firms involved in merger or acquisition. 
24 Elton et al. (1996) define survivorship bias as the tendency to exclude failed (inactive) firms from the sample 
study because they no longer exist. This bias often makes the obtained results skewed higher as a result of only 
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The majority of firms delisting did so in the global financial crisis and its aftermath; during our 
sample period we observed 508 new firms in the industries with two-digit SIC 20-39 and 73. A 
significant number of these newcomers had been listed during the fiscal years 2000, 2004 and 
2005. On the other hand, the observed number of total delisted firms of these sectors during our 
research period was 379, with a significant number of firms delisting during fiscal years 2008 
and 2009.  
Before moving to preliminary analysis of the incentives and factors that influence a firm’s 
decision to carry out R&D activity, it is important to mention that the final number of firms 
used in the research was 630, with firms with fewer than two observations excluded from the 
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Table 3-2: Description of the main variables used in this paper 
Variable Name Description a Source b 
R&D ijt Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i in industry j 
does research and development at time t , otherwise 
zero. 
Worldscope 
Financial Autonomy ijt  
(Fauto) 
The total equity of firm i in industry j at time t 
divided by the total assets of firm i at time t. 
Worldscope 
Leverage ijt  
(Levage) 
The total debt of firm i in industry j at time t divided 
by the total equity of firm i at time t where total debt 
equals the sum of short-term and long-term debt. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Firm Size ijt 
(Size) 
The logarithm of the total assets of firm i in industry 
j at time t. 
Worldscope 
Age ijt  
(Age) 
Age of firm i in industry j in years t. i.e.  the period 
between a firms’s start date on Worldscope and the 
date of observation. 
Worldscope 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index jt (HHI ) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index for industry j at time t, 
calculated as the sum of the squared market shares 
of all firms in a given two-digit SIC industry (j) 
based on sales. 
 
Worldscope 
Corporate tax rate t 
(TaxChg) 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if there has been an 
increase/decrease in the corporate tax rate by at 
least 1% at time t , otherwise zero. 
HM Revenue 
& Customs 
Tax relief change t 
(RelfChg) 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if there has been an 
increase/decrease in the R&D tax relief rate by at 




a. The measurement of variables and definition are based on the existing literature. 
b. The data are collected from several data bases. 
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3.5.2 Summary statistics  
 
Table 3-3: Distribution of the firm-year observations based on whether R&D activities are 
carried out or not, across different industries. 
Division Industry  
Number of Firm-year 
Observations    Percentage Distribution (%)  
















FOOD AND KINDRED 
PRODUCTS 32 128 160  20 80  100 
 22 
TEXTILE MILL 
PRODUCTS 4 32 36  11 89  100 
 23 
APPAREL AND OTHER 
TEXTILE PRODUCTS 0 81 81  0 100  100 
 24 
LUMBER AND WOOD 
PRODUCTS 1 12 13  8 92  100 
 25 
FURNITURE AND 
FIXTURES 13 62 75  17 83  100 
 26 
PAPER AND ALLIED 
PRODUCTS 46 60 106  43 57  100 
 27 
PRINTING AND 
PUBLISHING 6 96 102  6 94  100 
 28 
CHEMICALS AND 
ALLIED PRODUCTS 360 155 515  70 30  100 
 29 
PETROLEUM AND COAL 
PRODUCTS 9 24 33  27 73  100 
 30 
RUBBER AND MISC. 
PLASTICS PRODUCTS 16 25 41  39 61  100 
 31 
LEATHER AND LEATHER 
PRODUCTS 16 9 25  64 36  100 
 32 
STONE, CLAY, AND 
GLASS PRODUCTS 48 67 115  42 58  100 
 33 
PRIMARY METAL 
INDUSTRIES 12 4 16  75 25  100 
 34 
FABRICATED METAL 




EQUIPMENT 223 103 326  68 32  100 
 36 
ELECTRONIC & OTHER 
ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT 383 171 554  68 32  100 
 37 
TRANSPORTATION 
EQUIPMENT 17 34 51  33 67  100 
 38 
INSTRUMENTS AND 




INDUSTRIES 24 48 72  33 67  100 
 73 BUSINESS SERVICES 893 1408 2301  39 61  100 
Total   2453  2768  5221    47 53   100 
 
74 | P a g e  
 
The distribution of the firm-year observations based on who is carrying out R&D activities, 
broken down for different manufacturing and services industries, is summarized in Table 3-3.  
A significant number of the firm-year observations come from five industries, namely 
chemicals and allied products (515 firm-year observations), industrial machinery and 
equipment (326 firm-year observations), electronic & other electric equipment (554 firm-year 
observations), instruments and related products (449 firm-year observations), and business 
services (2301 firm-year observations). These industries account for 79 per cent of the total 
firm-year observations in our data set. 
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However, as noted by Yuan and Bentler (2001), the presence of outliers in the datasets can lead 
to biased estimates of parameters and test statistics. Considering their presence in our dataset, 
we considered screening the financial factors of our variables to reduce the potential influence 
of the outliers on the estimated parameters. We winsorized the financial factors in our analysis, 
namely Financial autonomy (Fauto) and Leverage (Levage), at the 1 per cent level of their 
respective distribution. The mechanism of Winsor transformation works by setting all 
observations above the 99th percentile equal to the 99th percentile, and the sets of observations 
below the 1st percentile equal to the 1st percentile. This transformation is significantly important 
in reducing the impact of outliers, and allows full use of the set of observations. 
Table 3-4 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the main variables, showing that the mean of 
Levage is slightly higher than the median, indicating that it is skewed to the right. Similarly, 
the means of Age and the HHI are all higher than their medians, indicating that they are also 
skewed to the right. While on the other hand, the means of financial autonomy (Fauto) and the 
Size are all lower than their medians, indicating that they are skewed to the left. 
Table 3-5 presents the pair-wise correlation matrix among the potential determinants. Apart 
from R&D tax relief, the explained variable (R&D) is significantly correlated with all of the 
explanatory variables, a finding consistent with theoretical expectations. The correlation 
coefficient matrix of the independent variables suggests little collinearity, the highest 
correlations being those between (TaxChg) and (ReliefChg) with a value of -0.5696, and 
between (Age) and (TaxChg), with a value of -0.3865. However, the pair-wise Pearson 
correlation coefficient matrix presents no evidence of the multi-collinearity problem between 
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Table 3-5: Correlation coefficient matrix of the main variables employed in the analysis of the chapter. 
Notes: 
a The reported figures are the pair-wise Pearson correlation coefficient between variables. 



















 Fauto 1.000                
 Levage 0.0278** 1.000        
 Size 0.3031*** 0.1152*** 1.000       
 Age -0.0006a -0.0427*** 0.1468*** 1.000      
 HHI 0.0629***b 0.0818*** 0.1727*** 0.0415*** 1.000     
 TaxChg -0.0465*** 0.0423*** -0.0973*** -0.3865*** 0.0969*** 1.000    
 ReliefChg 0.0246**c -0.0085 -0.0100 0.0657*** -0.0452*** -0.5696*** 1.000   
 R&D 0.0819*** -0.0693*** 0.0330** 0.0235* -0.0707*** -0.0253*d  0.0074 1.000  
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3.6 The dynamic logistic model of R&D investment 
3.6.1 Methodology  
A firm’s decision to make R&D investment is determined by different factors. Most of the 
previous studies that have empirically investigated the determinants of a firm’s decision to do 
this have focused on firm-specific or market structure factors, neglecting fiscal policy factors 
and their role in firms’ decision-making. Furthermore, most of the applied literature has used 
static estimation techniques and neglected the dynamic process of undertaking such decisions. 
To overcome the drawbacks of these techniques, we attempt to fill these gaps by considering 
the potential influence of all of these factors together, and by considering the dynamic process 
associated with a firm’s decision to make R&D investment.  
Recent research by Power (1998), Nilsen et al. (2008), Hecker and Ganter (2014) and Grazzi 
et al. (2016) presents evidence of the spiky nature of firms’ investment decisions, especially for 
lumpy investments, for example R&D. This spiky nature leads to lumpy investment behaviour 
by firms, producing investment spikes, with no or little investment activities in between (Nilsen 
et al., 2008). Since R&D tends to be lumpy investment, representing a cash flow problem for 
firms engaged in it, and is associated with high adjustment costs in the case of disruption or 
cuts in the process. Hecker and Ganter (2014) have introduced the idea of true persistence of 
the state dependence, as a result of the causal effect of the latest investment decision on the 
current decision, independent of the continuous influence of unobserved factors.  
Hecker and Ganter argue that the persistence phenomenon in R&D or the innovation process 
can be explained by three important factors. First, the sunk cost factor explains persistence by 
arguing that when R&D investment creates long-term capital goods for the use of innovation 
activities, the costs of equipping and building R&D facilities, and hiring or training highly 
skilled workers, among other costs, are unrecoverable if R&D activities cease. As a result, these 
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costs imply a barrier to exit from or entry to innovation activities, explaining the persistence in 
firms’ behaviour of being innovative or non-innovative.  
The second factor is the competence-based factor, which represents the mechanism of creative 
accumulation and capability building. When innovation is a process of reusing and recombining 
existing knowledge, the mechanism of this process works by building on accumulated 
knowledge, simultaneously setting up the foundation for future process opportunities. As a 
result, accumulating experience and knowledge over time gives motivation to firms to sustain 
their innovation processes, producing persistence in the innovation phenomenon (Hecker and 
Ganter, 2014).    
Finally, Hecker and Ganter (2014) explain the persistence of the process by referring to the 
resource constraints factor. They argue that when R&D activities are risky, resource consuming, 
and hard to be assessed by external financing providers, they are more prone to serious 
financing constraints (Chen et al., 2010; Brown et al., 2012). Therefore, if successful 
innovations are recorded, their revenues will alleviate these constraints by providing internal 
funding for future process. Additionally, these success stories may be interpreted by external 
finance providers as a sign of firms’ capacity for future success, encouraging resource providers 
to finance innovative activities. In conclusion, successful innovation facilitates access to 
resources, thus generating more future innovation success. Motivated by the above factors, 
therefore, this research considers the path-dependent process of R&D in the dynamics of 
undertaking investment decisions. 
The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in the estimated model causes the estimates to 
be biased, as a result of the correlation of both the past value of investment decisions and 
unobserved heterogeneity. The problem of biased estimates is the so called initial value 
problem. This problem occurs because the history of the stochastic process under investigation 
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is not observed from the very beginning. The lagged dependant variable of the initial period is 
assumed to be exogenous; however, since it is correlated with the unobserved heterogeneity, 
the exogeneity assumption of the random effect model is accordingly violated.  
There are three solutions that deal directly with the initial condition problem, proposed by 
Heckman (1979), Orme (1996) and Wooldridge (2005). The studies by Arulampalam and 
Stewart (2009) and Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh (2014) investigate the performance of these 
estimation strategies and provide evidence that the differences between the three methods are 
minor. However, a simulation study by Akay (2009) shows that the simple and novel strategy 
by Wooldridge is found to perform well, and provides better performance for panels with a 
moderately longer duration than the Heckman estimator. Taking these findings into account, 
and considering that they can be implemented using standard software, the Wooldridge method 
is employed in this research.  
The general model of the probability of carrying out R&D is formed as follows:     
    𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
∗ = 𝛽1𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛽 + 𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡            (1) 
where i indicates the ith firm, j indicates the industry and t indicates the time periods 
with (𝒊 = 𝟏, . . , 𝑵; 𝒕 = 𝟐, . . 𝑻).  𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 is the lagged dependent variable, 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the vector of 
independent variables, 𝑎𝑖𝑗 the unobserved individual random effect distributed as N (0,𝜎𝑢2 ), 
and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the error term distributed as N (0,1). 
The simplified Wooldridge method works by using the following density function of the 
unobserved heterogeneity (unobserved individual-effects) conditional on the initial state (initial 
value) and the time-varying explanatory variables: 
𝛼𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑗1 + ?̅?𝑖𝑗𝛾 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗                    (2) 
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where 𝜖𝑖𝑗 is a new unobserved heterogeneity, which is assumed to be normally distributed with 
a mean of zero and a variance of 𝜎𝜖2, that is, 𝜖𝑖𝑗~𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑁[0, 𝜎𝜖2]; the density is assumed to be 
𝛼𝑖𝑗|𝑋𝑖𝑗, 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑗1~[𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑗1 + ?̅?𝑖𝑗𝛾, 𝜎𝜖
2]. Wooldridge’s idea here is that the correlation 
between the initial value 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑗1 and the unobserved heterogeneity 𝛼𝑖𝑗 is handled by the use of 
equation (2), producing another unobservable individual-specific heterogeneity, that is 𝜖𝑖𝑗 , 
which is uncorrelated with the initial observation, 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑗1. In this formulation, Wooldridge 
specifies all the time-varying variables of the whole time periods to be in vector ?̅?𝑖𝑗. In the 
application of our data set, individual-specific averages have been used to allow for the use of 
unbalanced panel data with some missing observations25, although only for periods of 2 to T. 
Hence, by substituting equation (2) into (1), the probability that firm i in industry j at time t will 
undertake R&D activity, conditional on the observed and unobserved characteristics and the 
previous firm status in t-1, can be presented as:  
 
𝑃(𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡|𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡, 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡−1, 𝛼𝑖𝑗)
= Ω(𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛽 + 𝛽3𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑗1 + ?̅?𝑖𝑗𝛾 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡)
=
𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝛽1𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛽 + 𝛽3𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑗1 + ?̅?𝑖𝑗𝛾 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗)
1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝛽1𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛽 + 𝛽3𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑗1 + ?̅?𝑖𝑗𝛾 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗)
 
                                                                                    (3) 
where 𝑃 (𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡)  is the dependent variable, that is, the probability of carrying out R&D 
activity,  Ω is the logistic cumulative distribution function, 𝛼1 is a constant, 𝛽 is a vector of the 
estimated coefficients of explanatory variables, 𝑋 is a vector of independent variables, 𝛾 is a 
                                                 
25 See, for example, Arulampalam and Stewart (2007), Akay (2009) and Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh (2014). 
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vector of the estimated coefficients of individual-specific average explanatory variables, ?̅? is a 
vector of individual-specific average independent variables, and (exp) is the base of the natural 
logarithms (that is, approximately 2.718). The regression coefficients estimate the influence of 
the independent variables on the probability of carrying out R&D activities, where a positive 
value of these coefficients means that a variable increases the probability of carrying out R&D 
activities, while negative ones imply the opposite.   
This binomial dynamic random effect logistic model has been used in this study because the 
probability of a firm carrying out R&D activity can be converted into two outcomes, 0 or 1, 
according to the definition of our dependent variable.  The suitability of this mechanism is 
acquired from the binary nature of the dependent variable (i.e. qualitative and dichotomous), 
and the nature of our explanatory variables (a combination of continuous variables and 
categorical variables). Therefore, the final form of our suggested model on the probability of 
carrying out R&D investment is as follows:  
𝑹&𝑫𝒊𝒋𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑹&𝑫𝒊𝒋𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑭𝒂𝒖𝒕𝒐𝒊𝒋𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊𝒋𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊𝒋𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑨𝒈𝒆𝒊𝒋𝒕 +
𝜷𝟔𝑨𝒈𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊𝒋𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕𝑯𝑯𝑰𝒋𝒕 + 𝜷𝟖𝑻𝒂𝒙𝑪𝒉𝒈𝒕 + 𝜷𝟗𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒇𝑪𝒉𝒈𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎𝑹&𝑫𝒊𝒋𝟏 +




𝟏 𝒊𝒇 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎 𝒊 𝒊𝒏 𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚 𝒋 𝒊𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆 𝒕
𝟎 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒘𝒊𝒔𝒆
 
Table 3-6 summarizes the expected effect of each of the explanatory variables on a firm’s 
probability of undertaking R&D investment, as mentioned in the literature. 
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However, in order to interpret the estimated coefficients, the average marginal effect of each of 





′(𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛽 + 𝛽3𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑗1 + ?̅?𝑖𝑗𝛾 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡) 
 
Using the dynamic logistic model is considered to be the optimal analysis technique for 
investigating the probability of a firm carrying out R&D activities.  As pointed by Skrondal and 
Rabe-Hesketh (2014) the results of this technique are consider easier for interpretation, as they 
reflect the probability of carrying out R&D activities. Furthermore, the effect of all the 
independent factors can be captured simultaneously, and the statistical tests are immediately 
available. Finally, this model is considered flexible enough to deal with different forms of 
relationships between the responding and explanatory variables, including the dummy variables 
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3.6.2 Results 
In this sub-section we will discuss the maximum likelihood regression results.  The results of 
the binomial dynamic logistic model are presented in table 3-7.    
The second column shows the estimated coefficients of each of the independent variables, the 
third column presents their standard errors, and the statistical significance is presented in the 
fourth column, “p-value”. A significantly positive coefficient of an explanatory variable 
indicates that it tends to increase (influence) the probability that a firm will carry out R&D 
activities, while it reflects the opposite in the case of the independent variable “HHI”. However, 
in order to better interpret the parameters of our model, it is important to reflect on the marginal 
effect, as shown in the last column. The estimates of the logistic model are better interpreted in 
term of the margins, as they reflect the marginal effect on the probability of R&D activities 
occurring.   
The regression estimates of the dynamic R&D logistic model, as reported in table 3-7, show 
that lagged R&D expenditure has a significantly positive effect on the current probability that 
that a firm will undertake R&D, reflecting persistence in R&D investment decisions. However, 
all the other variables have the expected signs predicted in the research hypotheses, apart from 
financial autonomy, firm age and corporate tax rate. Nevertheless, the financial factors that 
relate to financial resources, namely Fauto and Levage, have insignificant coefficients, 
suggesting that a firm’s financial resources have no effect on its probability of carrying out 
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Table 3-7: Dynamic logistic model estimates of the probability of a firm carrying out R&D 











 R&Di,j,t-1 4.1143***b (0.1854)a 0.000 0.3093 
 Fautoi,j,t -0.1200 (0.0970) 0.216 -0.0090 
 Levagei,j,t -0.0002 (0.0005) 0.605 -0.0000 
 Sizei,j,t 0.4050***b (0.1450) 0.005 0.0304 
 Agei,j,t -0.1448*** (0.0476) 0.002 -0.0108 
Agesizei,j,t 0.0233*d (0.0135) 0.085 0.0017 
 HHIj,t -1.4614* (0.7491) 0.051 -0.1098 
 TaxChgt -0.5272**c (0.2427) 0.030 -0.0396 
 ReliefChgt 0.1710 (0.2030) 0.400 0.0128 
 R&Di,j,1 2.0372*** (0.3278) 0.000 0.1531 
 𝑭𝒂𝒖𝒕𝒐𝒊,𝒋e 0.6071*** (0.1832) 0.001 0.0456 
 𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒋 -0.0022 (0.0015) 0.140 -0.0001 
 𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊,𝒋 -0.5424*** (0.1341) 0.000 -0.0407 
 𝑨𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒋 0.1067** (0.0482) 0.027 0.0080 
Industry Dummies YES    
 Constant -2.8009 (0.4125) 0.000   
 Number of Firms 630     
 Number of obs 4437     
 ChiSq 40.94   0.000    
          
Notes: 
a The reported figures in parentheses are the standard errors. 
b Statistically significant at the 1% level; c  statistically significant at the 5% level; d statistically 
significant at the 10% level. 
e The bar sign reflects the individual-specific average of independent variable. 
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The negative sign of Fauto is contrary to what was expected in the first hypothesis. This result 
can be partly explained by the fact that the newest firms have had less time to generate internal 
earnings that can be converted into internal funds, so they are more likely to have a smaller 
volume of equity. These findings are consistent with previous research; for example, Del Canto 
and Gonzalez (1999) found that there was no association between the financial resources and 
the R&D expenditure of firms, as this insignificancy can be partially explained by the 
relationship between the financial resources and the age of the firm.   
The coefficient of the firm size has, as expected, a positive sign, with statistical significance 
below 1%. The significance of the coefficient of the size of the firm indicates that this factor 
discriminates against firms that carry out R&D activities. In this way, a firm’s probability of 
carrying out R&D activities increases when its size increases, so hypothesis 3 is accepted. This 
result supports the suitability of the Schumpeter hypothesis in proving that large firms are 
comparatively more innovative than small ones.  
The results obtained support hypothesis 4, in relation to firm experience, measured by age. The 
results of the role of experience suggest a negative relationship between a firm’s age and the 
probability of carrying out R&D activities; that is, young firms tend to have a higher probability 
of innovation, while the oldest firms tend to present a lower probability of such activity. 
However, the interaction signs of age and size show that a higher firm age is positively 
associated with the carrying out of R&D activities (only if mature firms are considered to be 
among the large sized firms), with a level of significance of 𝜌 < 0.07. 
The coefficient of the Meso-level factor in relation to the market concentration, measured by 
the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, is negatively associated with a firm’s decision to carry out 
R&D activities, with a level of significance of 𝜌 < 0.05. These findings do support the claim 
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that competitive markets are better at stimulating innovative activity, in contrast to the 
Schumpeterian hypothesis. With this result, hypothesis 5 is accepted 
Furthermore, Macro-level factors in terms of the corporate tax rate is opposite to what was 
predicted, being positively and significantly associated with the carrying out of R&D activities 
(given that the rates were just decreasing, negative coefficient sign reflect the positive effect of 
the corporate tax rate). In this way, a firm’s probability of carrying out R&D activities increases 
when the corporate tax rate increases; consequently, hypothesis 6 is not accepted. This result 
can be explained in part from a macro-level effect, where low tax rates impose in most of the 
cases a decrease in the budget surplus, or at worst an increase in the budget deficit, which results 
in  a decrease in government spending on public goods, infrastructure and basic research. This 
hinders firms’ incentive to innovate.  
An alternative explanation of the corporate tax rate effect is seen in the behaviour of firms to 
allocate more of their resources to projects through which they can avoid paying taxes, which 
is often the case in innovative projects (i.e. since the R&D expenditure is tax deductible, a 
higher corporate tax rate represents a degree of risk sharing with the government).  
On the other hand, the variable relating to R&D tax relief did not enter the equation with a 
significant coefficient, suggesting that government tax relief on R&D has no effect on the 
probability of undertaking R&D activities.  This result can be explained in part by the fact that 
firms focus more on the factors that threaten their survival, and avoid investing in risky 
investments, regardless of the level of incentives offered to firms undertaking R&D. Finally, 
the results also show that the initial investment decision is very important. The estimate reveals 
that there is a significant correlation between the initial conditions and the unobserved 
heterogeneity. The coefficient of the initial R&D investment is almost half the size of the lagged 
R&D investment decision.      
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The coefficients of the industry dummies are not all significant. A significant industry effect 
can be found in Chemicals and Allied products, Leather and Leather products, Machinery and 
Equipment, Electronic and other Electric equipment, and Instruments and related products 
Miscellaneous industries, which is consistent with the view that these industries are more likely 
to be engaged in highly technological activities (Balasubramanian and Lee, 2008). 
In this section, we consider re-estimating our dynamic logistic model by adjusting and applying 
the raw corporate tax and the R&D tax relief rates, rather than the dummy variables used, as 
previously explained in the definition of the variables in table 3-2. As reported in table 3-8 
below, we continue to find that the micro-level factors that are related to financial resources 
(namely Fauto and Levage) have not entered into our equation with significant coefficients, 
implying that a firm’s financial resources have no effect on the probability of it carrying out 
R&D activities. Moreover, we continue to find that R&D tax relief has no significant 
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Table 3-8: Dynamic logistic model estimates of the probability of a firm carrying out R&D 











 R&Di,j,t-1 4.1020***b (0.1856)a 0.000 0.3087 
 Fautoi,j.t -0.1231 (0.0967) 0.203 -0.0092 
 Levagei,j,t -0.0002 (0.0005) 0.624 -0.0000 
 Sizei,j,t 0.4011***b (0.1445) 0.006 0.0301 
 Agei,j,t -0.1669*** (0.0512) 0.001 -0.0125 
Agesizei,j,t 0.0258*d (0.0137) 0.059 0.0019 
 HHIj,t -1.4192* (0.7455) 0.057 -0.1068 
 TaxRatet 8.9468* (4.8745) 0.066 0.6734 
 ReliefRatet 0.4756 (0.4086) 0.244 0.0358 
 R&Di,j,1 2.0179*** (0.3264) 0.000 0.1518 
 𝑭𝒂𝒖𝒕𝒐𝒊,𝒋e 0.5851*** (0.1828) 0.001 0.0440 
 𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒋 -0.0022 (0.0015) 0.147 -0.0001 
 𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊,𝒋 -0.5187*** (0.1345) 0.000 -0.0390 
 𝑨𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒋 0.1232** c (0.0498) 0.013 0.0092 
Industry Dummies YES    
 Constant -6.2483 (1.9510) 0.001   
 Number of Firms 630     
 Number of obs 4437     
 ChiSq 40.18   0.000    
          
Notes: 
a The reported figures in parentheses are the standard errors. 
b Statistically significant at the 1% level; c  statistically significant at the 5% level; d statistically 
significant at the 10% level. 
e The bar sign reflects the individual-specific average of independent variable. 
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3.6.3 Robustness test and results 
To check the robustness of the findings from the dynamic logistic model, we consider running 
an alternative model specification to investigate the probability of a firm’s carrying out R&D 
activities of the listed firms on the AIM market. This section presents the re-estimation of the 
dynamic logistic model by including the initial values of time-varying covariates. The inclusion 
of the initial values of the micro-level time-varying covariates, a modification by Skrondal and 
Rabe-Hesketh (2014) based on the Wooldridge approach to allow for additional effects on 
unobserved-heterogeneity, and to avoid any potential finite sample bias of the Wooldridge 
solution. The advantage of this technique is that the dependence of the distribution on the 
covariates is taken into account, and a complete dataset is not required when there are missing 
data. This recommendation allows the coefficients of the initial values of the time-varying 
covariates to be different from the coefficients of the mean time-varying covariates.  
The results in Table 3-9 show that the micro-level factors that are related to financial resources 
(namely Fauto and Levage) are not statistically significant, indicating  that a firm’s financial 
resources have no effect on the probability of it carrying out R&D activities. Moreover, the 
estimates continued to present a significant positive association between firm size and the 
probability of R&D activity. The results further support the initial findings that competitive 
markets are better at stimulating innovative activity, and that young firms tend to have a higher 
probability of innovation compared to the more mature firms. In addition, it was found that the 
probability of a firm carrying out R&D activities increases when the corporate tax rate 
increases, and that government tax relief on R&D has no effect on the probability of investing 
in R&D, both findings being totally opposite to the research hypotheses. 
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Table 3-9: Dynamic logistic model estimates of the probability of a firm carrying out R&D 











 R&Di,j,t-1 4.1051***b (0.1855)a 0.000 0.3092 
 Fautoi,j,t -0.1165 (0.0970) 0.230 -0.0088 
 Levagei,j,t -0.0003 (0.0005) 0.503 -0.0000 
 Sizei,j,t 0.4070*** (0.1445) 0.005 0.0303 
 Agei,j,t -0.1303*** (0.0479) 0.007 -0.0098 
Agesizei,j,t 0.0207 (0.0135) 0.126 0.0015 
 HHIj,t -1.3810* (0.7524) 0.066 -0.0913 
 TaxChgt -0.5921**c (0.2499) 0.018 0.0434 
 ReliefChgt 0.2053 (0.2055) 0.318 0.0146 
 R&Di,j,1 2.0834*** (0.3311) 0.000 0.1540 
 Fautoi,j,1 0.1242 (0.2198) 0.572 0.0096 
 Levagei,j,1 -0.0007 (0.0007) 0.298 -0.0000 
 Sizei,j,1 -0.2119 (0.1376) 0.124 -0.0160 
 Agei,j,1 -0.0865 (0.1154) 0.453 -0.0063 
 𝑭𝒂𝒖𝒕𝒐𝒊,𝒋e 0.4782** (0.2022) 0.018 0.0356 
 𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒋 -0.0014 (0.0018) 0.419 -0.0001 
 𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊,𝒋 -0.3245*d (0.1887) 0.086 -0.0234 
 𝑨𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒋 0.1268** (0.0562) 0.024 0.0097 
 Industry Dummies YES    
 Constant -2.9033 (0.4308) 0.000   
 Number of firms 627     
 Number of obs 4419     
 ChiSq 41.55   0.000    
          
Notes: 
a The reported figures in parentheses are the standard errors. 
b Statistically significant at the 1% level; c  statistically significant at the 5% level; d statistically 
significant at the 10% level. 
e The bar sign reflects the individual-specific average of independent variable. 
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Table 3-10: Dynamic logistic model estimates of the probability of a firm carrying out R&D 












 R&Di,j,t-1 4.0883***b (0.1857)a 0.000 0.3077 
 Fautoi,j,t -0.1182 (0.0967) 0.222 -0.0089 
 Levagei,j,t -0.0003 (0.0005) 0.530 -0.0000 
 Sizei,j,t 0.4050*** (0.1441) 0.005 0.0304 
 Agei,j,t -0.1503*** (0.0518) 0.004 -0.0113 
Agesizei,j,t 0.0228 (0.0137) 0.098 0.0017 
 HHIj,t -1.3567* d (0.7489) 0.070 -0.1021 
 TaxRatet 9.4689* (4.9298) 0.055 0.7128 
 ReliefRatet 0.42853 (0.4117) 0.298 0.0322 
 R&Di,j,1 2.0711*** (0.3303) 0.000 0.1559 
 Fautoi,j,1 0.1283 (0.2191) 0.558 0.0096 
 Levagei,j,1 -0.0007 (0.0007) 0.292 -0.0000 
 Sizei,j,1 -0.2104 (0.1372) 0.125 -0.0158 
 Agei,j,1 -0.0576 (0.1147) 0.615 -0.0043 
 𝑭𝒂𝒖𝒕𝒐𝒊,𝒋e 0.4592** c (0.2017) 0.023 0.0345 
 𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒋 -0.0014 (0.0018) 0.434 -0.0001 
 𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊,𝒋 -0.3072 (0.1885) 0.103 -0.0231 
 𝑨𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒋 0.1346** (0.0568) 0.018 0.0101 
 Industry Dummies YES    
 Constant -6.4366 (1.9628) 0.001   
 Number of firms 627     
 Number of obs 4419     
 ChiSq 41.08   0.000    
          
Notes: 
a The reported figures in parentheses are the standard errors. 
b Statistically significant at the 1% level; c  statistically significant at the 5% level; d statistically 
significant at the 10% level. 
e The bar sign reflects the individual-specific average of independent variable. 
 
In relation to the application of the raw corporate tax and R&D tax relief rates, table 3-10 shows 
that the estimated coefficients and significance of the explanatory variables are almost the same 
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as those reported in table 3-9. However, although the sign of the corporate tax rate coefficient 
has changed from negative to positive, it presents the same positive effect on R&D as in table 
3-9. This can be explained by fact that corporate tax rates were just decreasing, and by 
considering this variable definition as in table 3-9, the significance of its negative coefficient 
sign reflects its positive effect on R&D. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter contributes to the literature by analysing the role of market structure, firm 
resources, and government tax policy factors in firms’ R&D activities in a dynamic logistic 
model which controls for the initial conditions. The most relevant explanatory factors are the 
meso-level and macro-level ones. In addition to lagged firm R&D expenditure, firm size and 
firm age, the meso- and macro-level factors are the main influencing ones on the probability 
that a firm will make internal R&D investment. These associated variables are those that have 
greater weight in discriminating between firms that carry out R&D activities and those that do 
not, namely market concentration and corporate tax rate. 
The chapter presents new evidence of the factors that have an impact on a firm’s decision to 
carry out R&D activities.  Competitive markets are better at stimulating innovative activities, 
in contrast with the Schumpeterian hypothesis, and the corporate income tax rate has a positive 
significant impact on a firm’s decision to undertake innovation. We show that tax increases 
have a positive impact on firms’ innovative activities; this finding has a strong implication for 
UK tax policy on long-run firm performance and economic growth.  Finally, since this chapter 
has focused on the factors and determinants that influence a firm’s probability of carrying out 
R&D activities, the complementary question would be what the determinants that affect the 
level of expenditure invested by firms in R&D is. Therefore, the following chapter of this thesis 
will focus on the determinants of R&D expenditure amongst AIM-listed firms.  










 The Financing Menu of R&D on the AIM Market: New 
Evidence on Financing Constraints 
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4 The Financing Menu of R&D on the AIM Market: New 
Evidence on Financing Constraints 
 
4.1  Introduction 
Research and Development expenditure is considered as a major driving force for the growth 
of firms and consequently for the growth of economies. In competitive environments, firms are 
obliged to adopt strategies that allow them to confront competition, and increase market share 
and profitability. Despite the fact that R&D has distinguishing characteristics from other 
investment, it plays an essential role in these strategies. R&D and the utilization of new 
technology in the creation of new products and development of new production processes are 
used to provide some differentiation that leads to a competitive advantage over competitors. 
Hence, firms invest in R&D to increase their profitability and market share.  
As an important driver of firms’ growth opportunities, and as one of the most important reasons 
that allows firms to remain competitive in the market, R&D investment has become a core type 
of investment in a large number of firms in recent decades. Lee and Shim (1995) investigated 
the impact of R&D investment on firms’ long-run performance, and the role that R&D 
investment plays in the growth of high-tech firms. They point out that there is a positive 
relationship between market growth and firms’ R&D activities, and that the deployment of 
R&D activities in high-tech industries helps firms to build competitive advantage and market 
growth in the long run. 
Although R&D expenditure is crucial for a firm’s competitive advantage and long-run success, 
this investment creates intangible assets. The characteristics of R&D investment, including the 
lack of collateral value, asymmetric information problems and the degree of uncertainty 
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associated with its output, make it susceptible to financing constraints26. For young and small 
firms, R&D may face significant adverse selection problems. For such firms, financing 
constraints can lead to a considerably lower level of R&D investment than the optimal level 
that they would choose in a world without financing constraints. If financing constraints bind 
firms’ level of R&D investment, such constraints will lead to lower growth levels than would 
have been achieved in a world with no constraints. 
Despite the fact that R&D investment plays an important role in firms’ growth and is prone to 
financing constraints, few studies have focused on the effects of financing constraints on R&D 
investment for young and small firms. Empirical studies that have examined firms’ level of 
R&D investment are based almost exclusively on the availability of internal cash flow and 
tested on large and mature firms (Grabowski, 1968; Hall, 1992; Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; 
Bhagat and Welch, 1995). They find evidence that firms’ levels of R&D are linked to the 
availability of internal cash flow. However, since riskiness and lack of collateral value are two 
of the characteristics of R&D, debt finance as an external source of fund is not a realistic source 
of funds to finance R&D (Switzer, 1984; Hall, 1992; Piga and Atzeni, 2007; Brighi and 
Torluccio, 2009; Wang and Thornhill, 2010). Equity is the only realistic source of external 
funds to finance firms’ R&D investment (Brown and Petersen, 2009; Chen et al., 2010; Brown 
et al., 2012).  
Both internal and external sources of funds are considered volatile sources of finance (Brown 
et al., 2009). Because R&D investment is associated with high adjustment costs and is financed 
with volatile sources, firms will find it very expensive to adjust the flow of R&D in response 
to transitory finance shocks. Researchers therefore argue that firms which are facing binding 
financing constraints, or facing financing frictions, may not be able to maintain a relatively 
                                                 
26 R&D is considering risky and an uncertain investment as the success of its output is not guaranteed, and will 
only generate profits with a time lag if successful. 
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smooth path of R&D spending. Therefore, the role that firms’ cash liquidity can play in 
smoothing the path of R&D has been analysed (Brown and Petersen, 2011; Guariglia and Liu, 
2014). Empirical evidence has been found to show that constrained firms can maintain a 
relatively smooth path of R&D spending by drawing down their precautionary cash holdings. 
However, few researchers have investigated the potential role of working capital as a source of 
liquidity for smoothing R&D investment in the presence of R&D financing constraints27. This 
chapter addresses this problem by emphasizing the overlooked role of working capital as an 
input and an easily reversible store of liquidity in R&D smoothing. Working capital is defined 
as the current assets, principally cash and equivalents, inventory and accounts receivable, less 
current liabilities, chiefly accounts payable and short-term debt. It is a common measure of 
whether a firm has enough short-term assets to cover its short-term liabilities; that is, it measures 
a firm's liquidity and efficiency through its net position in liquid assets. 
 
4.2  Research aim and objectives 
 
In this study, we explore two issues that are practically ignored in previous studies, and which 
are likely to be crucial for understanding the impact of financial constraints on R&D 
investment. The first is young, small and high growth firms, which have turned to stock markets 
for funding purposes to finance their growth opportunities. Firms mainly rely on issuing stock 
to finance R&D investment. R&D-intensive firms suffer, however, as they have little or no 
access to debt and limited amounts of internally generated funds to finance their investment. 
Scholars argue that stock issues are the main marginal source of funds for firms to finance R&D. 
                                                 
27 Fazzari and Petersen (1993) make a similar investigation on the role of smoothing fixed investment with working 
capital.   
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However, as firms at some points in their life cycle appear to rely heavily on stock issues as a 
source of external funds to finance their R&D investment (Brown et al., 2012), these firms 
suffer from financial market problems, such as the high cost of raising capital and adverse 
selection, because of asymmetric information problems. For this type of firm, R&D is almost 
exclusively financed by volatile sources of funds, internally generated funds and stock issues. 
An important research question is whether financial constraints play an important role in the 
R&D investment of the young, risky and high growth firms listed on AIM, dramatically altering 
the conclusions regarding the importance of financing constraints. The second issue is that 
R&D-intensive firms have a strong incentive to keep R&D investment smooth because of the 
high adjustment costs (Brown et al., 2012). The most sensible way to smooth R&D for firms 
facing binding financing constraints, relative to transitory finance shocks, is to manage internal 
stocks of liquidity, for example working capital, to buffer these transitory shocks.   
 In this chapter, we aim to examine directly the role that working capital, as a store of liquidity, 
plays in buffering the path of R&D spending from transitory finance shocks for the young, 
small and high growth firms listed on AIM. To the best of knowledge, this is the first study to 
test the role of working capital on R&D smoothing and to emphasize its importance for a firm’s 
financial policies. Further, it aims to solve the puzzle of whether financing constraints play an 
important role in R&D and the innovation of the young, small firms listed in the UK. These 
objectives could help these young, small and high growth firms listed on AIM to take advantage 
of designing proper strategies, which by taking into account the accessibility of sources of 
funds, and the importance of working capital, and so pointing out, the general dimensions of 
their financing and investments choices and decisions. 
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4.3 Theoretical background and Literature Review 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Investment and financing choices are the most important corporate decisions that have been 
highlighted in the last decades (see, for example, Fazzari et al., 1988; Bond and Meghir, 1994; 
Hubbard, 1997).  The original works of Modigliani and Miller (1958), and later of Miller and 
Modigliani (1961), show that external and internal capital are considered as perfect substitutes 
for firms to finance their investment opportunities, and thus the optimal level of firms’ 
investment and investment decisions are totally independent of their financial structure.   
Since the original work of Modigliani and Miller, scholars have focused on understanding how 
market imperfections affect firms’ investment decisions and their financing choices. However, 
by relaxing the perfect capital market assumptions, research in the corporate finance area has 
intensively examined each of these two types of decisions. Mueller (1967) shows that firms’ 
decision-making is a complex process, in which decisions that could be made by a particular 
department in a firm are likely to be affected by the decisions made in other departments. In 
practice, however, financial constraints, such as limited access to external capital and 
insufficient availability of internal capital, may tie up firms’ ability to invest efficiently (Fazzari 
et al., 1988). Under such circumstances, Gatchev et al. (2010) argue that firms need to study 
their financing choices in parallel with their investment decisions; that is, if any one policy is 
changed, other polices should also be changed accordingly.      
Over the last decades, much effort has been devoted to investigating the characteristics of firms 
and how they could be classified into constrained or unconstrained categories. The subsequent 
issue is whether firms can finance their investment activities based on the nature and type of 
investment opportunity (Bond and Meghir, 1994; Brealey et al., 2011).  
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Corporate investment activities are concentrated in investment in two types of assets: tangible, 
such as machinery, land and inventories; and intangible, for instance patents, brand names and 
research and development. Consequently, researchers have increasingly paid attention to 
investigating financing constraints and firms’ investment activities in both tangible and 
intangible assets.  Apart from the tangible asset financing studies, scholars have extensively 
investigated the financing choices for intangible assets, specifically R&D, owing to their special 
characteristics and importance. This investment, rather than any other type of investment, can 
be differentiated in terms of its riskiness, collateral value and the cost of adjustment. It is 
considered to be much riskier, offers little or no collateral value, and has higher adjustment 
costs than other investment types (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994). 
The remainder of the theoretical background and literature review will proceed as follows. 
Section 4.3.2 briefly reviews the corporate investment theories, while section 4.3.3 considers 
the corporate finance theories of investment. Section 4.3.4 briefly reviews R&D investment 
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4.3.2 Corporate investment theories 
4.3.2.1 Net present value theory 
The aim of management is to increase and create value for stockholders. In this regard, 
corporate investment decisions become some of the core decisions that any firm needs to take 
when investing funds in the expectation of reaping future benefit. There need to be some 
estimates of the returns from these potential projects. The best known estimates to determine 
the worthiness of targeting projects are the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) valuation and standard 
Net Present Value (NPV) estimate. The DCF is considered as a part of the NPV. The principle 
of this estimate is fairly simple; it discounts the expected future cash inflow out of the potential 
project back to its present value at a particular discount rate, the required rate of return, and 
then adds it to the initial cost of the project. If the NPV is positive, this means that the project 
should be accepted, as it would add value to the firm and would increase stockholders’ wealth. 
On the other hand, if the NPV is negative, then the project should be abandoned, as it would 









𝐶𝐹𝑡 is the expected net cash flow of a project at time t. 
𝐶𝐹0 is the initial cash outlay on a project. 
𝑟𝑡 is the required risk-adjusted rate of return (discount rate). 
𝑇 is the life of the project. 
 
NPV is widely used in all segments of business. A survey by Graham and Harvey (2001) 
showed that almost three out of four chief financial officers in the US heavily relied on NPV 
estimation to evaluate their investment projects. However, with regard to firm size, they found 
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that large size firms are significantly more likely to use NPV estimates than small firms. On the 
other hand, a survey by Murinde and Ow-Yong (2009) on the non-financial firms listed on the 
London Stock Exchange showed that in general the finance managers of UK firms did not use 
the Discounted Cash Flow analysis to evaluate their investment projects, and that large size 
firms were more likely to use DCF than small ones. They also reported that a significant number 
of large firms relied on more sophisticated estimates to evaluate their projects, such as scenario 
analysis and decision trees.  
However, Carlsson et al. (2005) argue that the lack of application of these two techniques in 
business is partly due to the assumptions underlying the estimates.  More specifically, if we 
consider the different characteristics of potential projects, for example the characteristics of 
Research and Development investment, the estimates do seem to be unreliable. There are 
multiple sources of uncertainty and an R&D investment produces a stream of cash flow after 
many potential stages of research. As a result, Carlsson et al. conclude that DCF and NPV 
techniques provide little explanatory power for the practical behaviour of corporate investment. 
Given the importance of corporate investment decisions in creating more value for stockholders 
and maximizing their wealth, a number of more powerful theories have been developed, such 
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4.3.2.2 Tobin’s Q theory 
Tobin’s Q, developed by Tobin (1969), represents the ratio between the market value of the 
installed capital assets and the replacement costs of these capital assets.   
 
𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
market value of the installed capital assets
replacement costs of capital assets
 
 
Firms with a Q ratio higher than one should invest more, since the market value of their 
underlying assets is greater than the current replacement cost, implying that they are 
overvalued. On the contrary, firms with Q ratio lower than one are undervalued and should 
curtail investment. Accordingly, Hayashi (1982) defined marginal Q, the ratio of the market 
value of a firm’s additional investment to its replacement cost, as a measure that summarises 
all the factors that have an effect on firms’ investment decisions. These decisions should be 
positively related to their marginal Q ratio, which is an increasing function of marginal Q. In 
other words, Tobin’s Q theory indicates that all the factors relevant to expected future 
profitability affect a firm’s investment decisions through their effects on marginal Q. The 
underlying principle of marginal Q is the same as the principle of Tobin’s Q. That is, if marginal 
Q exceeds unity, this indicates that firms should have an incentive to undertake or to expand 
their investment activities, while if the marginal Q value is below unity, firms should reduce 
their existing activities or should reject new investment opportunities. In conclusion, an optimal 
investment level can be reached when the market value of additional investment units is equal 
to their replacement cost, when the marginal Q value is equal to one.  
Empirical studies find that firms’ investment rates and Tobin’s Q are positively related. More 
specifically, and regarding the type of investment that firms are aiming to undertake, the 
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relevance of the Tobin Q effect has been identified as important in a significant number of 
empirical studies. Blundell et al. (1992) found that the Q model does have significant power in 
explaining firms’ rate of investment in tangible assets in the UK. However, other factors, such 
as cash flow and output, should be considered as they have significant power in determining 
firms’ rate of investment. Further, Cuthbertson and Gasparro (1995) show that although this 
model explains the investment rate, the effect of some other factors, such as capital gearing and 
output, should also be considered as important determinants of firms’ investment levels. On the 
other hand, regarding different types of investment, e.g. intangible capital, Klock et al. (1996) 
found that the Q model does have significant power in explaining firms’ investment level in 
intangible assets (R&D in particular) in the US market. It was also found that firms’ financial 
policy plays an important role in their level of investment decisions. 
Bardhan et al. (2010) showed that the effect of intangible assets on firms’ Tobin’s Q is 
positively and statistically significant. Further, Bharadwaj et al. (1999) examined the 
association between intangible investment (IT investment) and firms’ Q value in the US. It was 
found that IT investment does have a statistically significant positive effect on firms’ Tobin’s 
Q value. Similarly, Connolly and Hirschey (2005) and Parcharidis and Varsakelis (2010) show 
that there is a significant effect of R&D capital on firms’ Tobin’s Q value, and that this effect 
seems to be more significant for small firms than large firms. All in all, we conclude that 
markets really value firms that make intangible investment such as R&D, while at the same 
time firms rely on Tobin’s Q value to determine their rate of investment.  
Although some empirical studies have found that firms’ investment rate is positively correlated 
with Tobin’s and marginal Q values, Lensink and Murinde (2006) noted that measurement of 
the marginal Q is problematic, since proxies of it vary across the empirical literature. They 
found that the disappointing performance of Tobin’s Q model of investment is mainly due to 
serious measurement errors. They further argue that this model does not carry all the relevant 
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information concerning investment decisions, as some other factors, such as adjustment costs, 
uncertainty and capital market constraints, play an important role in investment decisions. 
Ferderer (1993), for example, found that the impact of uncertainty on investment is much larger 
than the impact of Tobin’s Q.  He suggested that extending the Tobin’s Q model by including 
uncertainty measures would improve the performance of the model of investment significantly. 
In addition, Dixit and Pindyck (2012) state that the underlying principle of Tobin’s Q model is 
the same as the basic NPV model. The capitalised value of an investment used to determine the 
Tobin’s Q value needs to be calculated as the expected present value of the cash flow stream 
that the investment would yield. 
 
4.3.2.3 Accelerator theory  
The principle of the accelerator theory is based on the idea that there is a constant capital-output 
ratio, and firms engaging in capital investment should endeavour to close the gap between the 
required stock of capital and the existing stock of capital goods (Mairesse and Siu, 1984; 
Shapiro et al., 1986; Sargent, 1989). According to this view, any increase in firms’ sales or 
output requires an appropriate increase in the amount of investment to adjust its stock of capital 
towards the required level. The logic implied in the accelerator model is that any increase in a 
firm’s level of sales indicates that it is likely to make more profits and have greater use of its 
existing capital in the future; consequently, if firms expect the sales stream to last, this would 
encourage them to spend more funds on capital. The increased stock of capital would lead to a 
further increase in sales and profits, causing a multiplier effect. On the other hand, if firms’ 
level of sales decreases, this would reduce their profits and lower the use of stock of capital, 
which would in turn discourage firms from investing, and therefore worsen their perspectives. 
In other words, the level of capital investment is a function of firms’ output. 
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A large number of empirical studies support the relevance of the accelerator model for firm 
investment. For instance, Shapiro et al. (1986) find that firms’ investment is highly sensitive to 
increases in sales, consistent with the main prediction of the accelerator model. Further, based 
on the accelerator model, Bo and Lensin (2005) tested the investment-uncertainty relationship 
on Dutch non-financial firms. They found that investment growth is positively related with the 
sales growth, as expected. Further, Mairesse and Siu (1984) show that an increase in physical 
investments is highly significant and reacts proportionally with a growth of sales.  More 
specifically, and concerning intangible investments (e.g. R&D), Mansfield (1964) shows that 
there is no significant relationship between the level of R&D investment and firms’ sales 
growth. Similar findings were reported by Cohen et al. (1987), who found that the relationship 
between firms’ sales and R&D investment was statistically insignificant.  
However, the accelerator model of investment has been criticised for ignoring the role of other 
factors, for example financial variables, in investment decisions. Lensink (2002) and Lensink 
and Sterken (2000) examined corporate investment behaviour. They reported that the standard 
accelerator model is neither statistically adequate nor economically complete, as it fails to 
capture the roles played by other factors in determining firms’ investment decisions, such as 
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4.3.2.4 Financial constraints theory 
Over the last decades, researchers have constructed models of business investment to identify 
“financing constraints”. Under the Modigliani-Miller proposition, it is assumed that all 
companies have the same access to the capital market, and the response of firms to changes in 
the cost of capital will only differ due to differences in their investment demand. It is also 
assumed that internal funds can be perfectly substituted by external funds, and firms’ 
investments decisions are not characterised by financial structure or their condition. However, 
the Modigliani-Miller proposition fails to take account of information asymmetry in the 
financial market, which causes financial constraints and introduces capital market 
imperfections. To fill this gap, Myers and Majluf (1984) showed that with imperfect capital 
markets, external and internal capital cannot be considered as perfect substitutes. According to 
this view, corporate investment levels will depend on firms’ financial factors, such as access to 
new equity or debt and the availability of internal funds.  
Recognising the results of the previous models, corporate investment decisions can be affected 
by different factors, such as NPV, Tobin’s Q value and sales growth. However, the availability 
of and accessibility to internal and external funds cannot be neglected in corporate investment 
decisions. Due to the costs of these financial sources, researchers indicate that firms prefer to 
rely on internally generated cash flow to finance their investment opportunities rather than other 
external sources, since internal funds are cheaper than new equity finance and debt. Apart from 
NPV, Tobin’s Q value and sales growth, a firm’s level of investment is considered to be 
interdependent with the financing choices; that is, accessibility to new equity or debt and the 
availability of internal finance (Fazzari et al., 1988; Bond and Meghir, 1994; Hubbard, 1997). 
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 4.3.2.4.1 Preferences over external and internal finance 
The link between real investment spending and firms’ financial structure is based on the reasons 
why external and internal finance are not perfect substitutes due to the imperfect capital market 
model. In fact, internal finance could be much more favourable for companies than external 
finance, as it is considered as less costly for reasons such as transaction costs, agency problems, 
asymmetric information, tax advantages, and the cost of financial distress.  
(a) Stock Issues 
New stock issues of listed firms are carried out by underwriters, who purchase blocks of newly 
issued stock and resell them. The cost of new issues, such as the underwriters’ discounts, 
administrative sales expenses, registration fees and taxes, are all deducted from the issuers’ 
gross proceeds. However, such expenses may vary, according to the size of the offering. Fazzari 
et al. (1988) argue that an initial public offering is much more expensive (in terms of indirect 
and direct costs) than a seasoned offering, and the cost of a small offering in both cases is 
relatively higher than a large one. On the other hand, regarding the corporate tax system, 
internal finance has a cost advantage over external equity finance, as in most countries the tax 
rate on dividends is higher than that on the capital gains, implying that tax saving can arise 
when firms’ earnings are retained rather than paid out.   
Further to the above argument, Auerbach (1979) computed the shadow prices for the cost of 
new stock issues (s), and the cost of internal finance (r). He found that s = ρ/(1 − π)(1 − ϑ) 
and  r = ρ(1 − π)(1 − δ), where ρ is defined as the required after-tax return by the capital 
market,  π is the corporate tax rate, ϑ is the tax rate on dividends, and δ is the tax rate on capital 
gain. He states that the tax rate of new stock issues can be formed as s−r
r
= (ϑ − δ)/(1 − ϑ). 
Alternatively, within a Q framework, for the marginal Q to value a project, whether a project 
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should be undertaken depends on how it is being financed28.  Externally financed projects can 
reap profits for shareholders only if their marginal Q exceeds unity, and projects that are 
financed with retained earnings can benefit shareholders only if attain a Q of (1 − ϑ)/(1 −
δ) < 1.  
Regarding the asymmetric information problem, Akerlof (1970) considered that this problem 
would potentially generate a significant cost disadvantage of equity finance. The theoretical 
arguments suggest that if the seller or the issuer of the security has more information about the 
quality of the asset than the buyer, the seller would be unwilling to accept the terms offered by 
the buyers, forcing an asset to be sold at a lower price than would otherwise be the case, if both 
parties had the same information (known as the “lemons”).  
However, assuming that a firm’s managers have more information on their existing capital and 
the return from new investment, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that external investors cannot 
differentiate between the value and quality of firms, forcing them to value firms at the 
population average. Thus, new external investors will demand a premium to offset the losses 
from purchasing stocks of relatively good firms that would arise from funding lemons. 
 
(b) Debt Finance 
 Increasing marginal costs of new debt for leveraged firms is due to agency costs and the cost 
of financial distress. The first costs arise as firm mangers will to some extent have an incentive 
to act in the interests of creditors, due to the limited liability feature of debt. The cost of financial 
distress occurs when firms default on the interest and principal obligation of the debt. Fazzari 
et al. (1988) argue that long-term debt is the cause of the agency problem, whereby managers 
                                                 
28 Marginal Q is a ratio that measures the market value of an additional unit of capital in relation to its replacement 
cost  (Hayashi , 1982). 
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of firms with a high debt-equity ratio are more likely to act in the interests of the debt providers 
rather than those of the firm, believing they could neglect some positive present value 
investment opportunities and adopt negative ones instead. However, such financial inflexibility 
implies that mangers’ choices of investments and financing opportunities are more expensive, 
especially when a firm’s internal fund levels are low. 
Asymmetric information in the debt markets causes the same drawbacks as mentioned 
regarding the equity market. It has the same impact, in that it may raise the cost of new debt, or 
worse, introduce credit restrictions. Jaffee and Russell (1976) indicate that when lenders cannot 
distinguish between good and bad borrowers, the market interest rate must increase and loan 
sizes could be limited. However, when the interest rate rises, marginally good quality borrowers 
will leave the market, making the probability of default on lenders higher and the expected 
profits lower. 
On the other hand, Calomiris and Hubbard (1988) focused on the heterogeneity of firms in 
credit markets, which researchers classify into two types: the “full information” market (e.g. 
commercial papers or bonds) and the “information intensive” market (e.g. bank loans). Credit 
markets sort borrowers in terms of different asymmetric information degrees. Calomiris and 
Hubbard claim that, depending on borrowers’ per capita levels of internal net worth, lenders 
will allocate new funds to these different classes of borrowers. Thus, borrowers could either 
follow the full information credit allocation or information intensive credit allocation, taking 
funds away from high asymmetric information borrowers. Researchers also suggest that banks 
which are specialized in financing firms’ projects that are characterised by severe information 
problems can reduce the average information costs by maintaining long-run relationships. 
 Finally, and according to the various features of firm heterogeneity, Calomiris and Hubbard 
(1988) state that mature and large firms are the only types to face smoothly increasing loan 
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interest rates, and are more likely to have access to the debt market than small and medium 
sized “young” firms, which are less likely to have access to it.  All in all, firms with high 
asymmetric information problems in the credit market will probably face the same problem in 
the equity market and most probably will have to pay a premium to obtain new debt. Thus, 
equity finance cannot be considered as a substitute for debt finance; in general, it cannot solve 
the asymmetric information problems associated with debt.   
The above discussion can be summarized clearly by the finance hierarchy model of the finance 
model, which starts from the assumption that retained profits are relatively less expensive than 
external finance, either stock issues or debt issues. Therefore, firms prefer to rely on internal 
finance when it is available (Bond and Meghir, 1994). However, considering the firms’ 
investment spending, it is easier to consider firms that do not have access to debt financing, and 
only choose between new stock issues and retained profits, in order to observe the consequences 
of their investment spending. This situation is explained in Figure 4-1 below.  
 
Figure 4-1: The hierarchy of finance model with no debt finance (Bond and Meghir, 1994). 
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The required rate of return is denoted by rR, and represents the cost of finance from retained 
earnings; rN is the higher required rate of return, and is the cost of finance from new stock 
issues. D1, D2 and D3 are the sloping lines that represent the three possible positions of the 
firms’ available investment opportunities, reflecting the rate of return that can be earned from 
the chosen investment projects. The firms’ maximum level of investment that can be financed 
from internal sources is represented by the level of investment spending  𝐼 ̅, indicating that firms 
are not willing to reduce their dividend payments any further. This investment level is noted to 
be positively related to the generated cash flow of firms’ existing activities, i.e. internally 
generated cash flow.  
The investment demand curve D1 represents firms with investment opportunities relatively 
lower than their generated cash flow. In this case, they are willing to finance their desired 
investment opportunities, as well as paying out relatively high dividend rates.  Investment 
spending at level I1 will not be affected by the fluctuations in cash flow, in correspondence with  
𝐼 ̅ spending level. 
In the second scenario with the investment demand curve D2, firms’ investment spending is in 
the intermediate position. In this case, they have sufficiently attractive investment opportunities 
for their internal funds. The other remaining projects are not considered to be sufficiently 
attractive to issue new stocks, given the higher rate of return required. Thus, firms in this 
scenario are described as being financially constrained as their investment spending is just tied 
to I̅  spending level financed from retained profits, with the dividend pay-out ratio being 
relatively low or zero. 
In the third scenario, where the investment demand curve is D3, the investment opportunities of 
firms are considered to be relatively higher than the firms’ internally generated cash flow. In 
this scenario, firms find the investment projects sufficiently attractive to issue new stocks, 
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despite the extra cost. Investment spending will be at the I3 level, at which it will not be affected 
by the cash flow fluctuations corresponding to the 𝐼 ̅   spending level. This scenario is 
characterised by new stock issues and low or zero dividend pay-out ratios.    
The firms’ investments in the second scenario can be described as being financially constrained 
for this feasible sense. Any unexpected increase in cash flow, not reflected by any new 
information about the firms’ investment opportunities, will increase their investment. This can 
be explained in the diagram in Fig. 4-1 by the upward shift of the spending level that can be 
financed internally, from  𝐼 ̅ to 𝐼′̅. As a result, there will be a significant increase in the firms’ 
investments, and they will move down the demand curve D2. Note that firms in this scenario 
are financially constrained, in the sense that their investment spending is limited to the 
availability of internal finance, bearing in mind that they have access to equity finance at rN 
cost of issues. 
Investment levels are not significantly affected by the possibility of using other external 
financing sources (i.e. using debt), considering that the effective cost of borrowing increases as 
firms’ borrowing levels increase. One of the most important reasons that makes the effective 
cost of borrowing increase is the risk premium, reflecting the asymmetric information problem 
between lenders and borrowers. The rate of interest charged rises as the probability of firms’ 
default increases. Figure 4-2 illustrates the case in which firms have access to debt finance along 
with equity finance. In such a case, firms’ investment level 𝐼 ̅represents the maximum levels 
that can be financed through internal funds.  
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Figure 4-2: The hierarchy of finance model with debt finance (Bond and Meghir, 1994). 
 
For firms in the first and third scenarios, the implications of investment demand are unchanged 
from the no-debt cases. However, firms in the first scenario may use their internally generated 
funds, as well as debt, to finance their investments, and firms in the third scenario may use new 
stock issues as well as debt for this financing.  
Firms that have used all of their internal funds, but did not issue new stocks, are no longer 
constrained to the investment spending level, 𝐼 ̅. They can finance any further investment 
opportunities through debt borrowing. In this case, firms’ investments are determined by the 
rising cost of debt, producing the I2 spending level. However, these firms are still financially 
constrained, in the sense that they are hampered by the rising cost of debt and the availability 
of internal funds.  Any unexpected increase in cash flow helps investment levels above 𝐼2  to 
be financed at lower borrowing levels. This reduces the effective cost of debt, and produces 
higher investment spending levels at 𝐼2′ . 
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With regard to the external and internal financing choices, Fazzari et al. (1988) documented 
differences in financing patterns regarding firm size, and gave some explanations for the 
imperfect substitution of internal and external finance. Using the market imperfection model, 
firms’ investment model and an individual firm’s access to the capital market, they tested the 
relevance of a firm’s financial structure in relation to its investment decisions, claiming that 
firms that use nearly all of their internal funds, i.e. have a high retention ratio, should be more 
sensitive to cash flow fluctuations than those with a lower retention ratio. Their results indicate 
that financial factors were important for investment decisions at all firm levels, but greater 
investment sensitivity was observed among the high retention ratio firms, implying that capital 
market imperfection creates financial constraints on investment.  
In summary, it clear that a firm’s cost of capital differs according to the different sources of 
funds, and the availability of such sources has an effect on the decisions on the investment level 
of the different types of firms. As presented in the hierarchy of finance diagrams, the availability 
of internal funds makes it easier for firms to undertake their desired investment projects without 
the need for costly external finance, which helps increase their worth by lowering the cost of 
external funding. 
 
4.3.3 Corporate Finance Theories  
The financial structure of firms is highly debated in corporate finance research. Using the 
assumption of perfect capital markets, Modigliani and Miller provide the foundation for modern 
corporate financing theories. They show that in efficient markets, with no asymmetric 
information, taxes and transaction costs, and external and internal funds are considered as 
perfect substitutes for firms to finance their investment opportunities. As a consequence, 
corporate investment decisions are totally independent of the firm’s financial structure and its 
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value. Although the assumption of the perfect capital market has been accepted in theory, the 
focus of research on corporate financing policies has moved towards the real world and the 
level of investment relevant to firms’ financing choices and policies. As corporate financing 
decision-making is one of the most important choices, the remainder of this literature section 
will briefly review the main corporate financing theories which explain corporate financing 
decision-making, namely trade-off, pecking order and market timing theories. 
 
4.3.3.1 The trade-off theory 
By relaxing the assumptions of the perfect capital market theory, the absence of tax and 
bankruptcy costs, the trade-off theory stands on the idea that firms will seek to reach optimal 
debt-to-equity levels in order to maximize their value, by weighing up the costs and benefits of 
obtaining more debt (Myers, 1984). Firms’ optimal debt ratio should be determined based on a 
trade-off between the tax saving benefits of additional debt and its associated costs of 
bankruptcy and financial distress. Since interest on debt is considered as a tax-deductible 
expense for tax paying firms, debt can create a tax shield for them, which can increase their 
value, but additional debt increases firms’ cost of distress. Therefore, they should seek to keep 
moderate levels of debt, meaning the probability of firms’ bankruptcy and financial distress is 
low and the tax benefits of debt are high. However, when levels of debt increase above a certain 
point, a firm's marginal benefit of additional debt decreases, and the marginal cost of additional 
debt increases. Therefore, trade-off theory indicates that an optimal debt-to-equity ratio can 
only be achieved when the marginal cost of additional debt is exactly offset by its marginal 
benefit.   
Graham and Harvey (2001) indicate that the trade-off theory provides a partial explanation of 
the differences in corporate financial structure between firms. They show that 55% of the large 
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surveyed firms had at least somewhat strict target debt-ratios, while just 36% of small firms had 
this target. On the other hand, Fama and French (2002) highlight that the trade-off theory has 
some serious problems, as firms associated with similar levels of operating risk have different 
capital structures. Since the cost of distress is an important determinant of the level of the debt-
equity ratio, firms engaging in high risk projects reduce their financial obligations in order to 
lower the risk of financial distress by limiting the use of debt. More specifically, R&D 
performing firms will find it difficult to achieve a target debt-ratio because of the nature and 
the characteristics of their investment. Switzer (1984) shows that firms making R&D 
investments cannot consider debt as a determinant of their R&D investment, nor as a significant 
source of funds for this investment. Similarly, Hall (1992) and Ho et al. (2004) show that debt 
as a source of external funds is not favoured by firms to finance their R&D investment. Indeed, 
R&D-intensive firms carry marginally less financial leverage compared to others. 
 
4.3.3.2 The pecking order theory 
By relaxing the assumption of no information asymmetry, Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers 
(1984) developed the pecking order theory of capital structure. This theory attempts to explain 
corporate financing behaviour from the perspective of the cost of financing. The principle of 
this model is based on the idea that firm managers know more information about the value and 
risk of their firm than outside investors, so there is an information asymmetry problem. 
Consequently, if a firm tries to issue risky securities, this will be interpreted by outside investors 
as a sign that it is overvalued. As a result, investors will reasonably discount the price of the 
firm’s security, provoking a negative market reaction. Thus, in order to avoid negative market 
reactions, firm managers prefer to finance all their promising investment opportunities by 
internally generated funds, which have a cost preference over external funds and have no 
information asymmetry problems. According to this theory, if the available internal funds are 
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exhausted and external financing is required, firms will first consider debt financing as a source 
of external funds, which is less likely to be affected by information asymmetry problems. Equity 
financing will be considered as the last resort for external finance, as it is more likely to be 
affected by the information asymmetry problem. However, in the presence of asymmetric 
information, and signaling problems associated with external finance, the pecking order theory 
states that firms will prefer to finance their investment opportunities with internal funds, debt 
issuance, and equity issuance in that order, creating a hierarchy of finance (Oliner and 
Rudebusch, 1992).  
 
By introducing the cost of financial distress and the odds of future positive-NPV projects into 
the negative market reaction (adverse selection), Myers (1984) modified the pecking order 
theory, arguing that firms tend to issue new equity before it is needed in order to build up liquid 
assets which will enable them to take advantage of future promising investment opportunities. 
Unlike trade-off theory, according to pecking order theory there is no optimal debt ratio. 
However, supporting the argument of Myers (1984), and considering the special types of firms’ 
investment opportunities (future positive-NPV projects), firms making research and 
development investment prefer to finance their projects through equity issuance rather than debt 
(Wang and Thornhill, 2010; Martinsson, 2010; Brown et al., 2012). Research and development 
is a high-risk venture and so firms reduce their financial obligations in order to minimise the 
risk of financial distress; that is, they try to limit the use of debt. Firms engaging in R&D 
investments find that equity issues are an ideal source of external funds when debt cannot be 
considered as a realistic source fund for such an investment type. Firms use the proceeds of the 
stock issuance to build up a liquid reserve in order to finance this investment in the future (Bates 
et al., 2009; Brown and Petersen, 2011). Shin and Kim (2014) found that R&D performing 
firms issue new equity in order to create a reserve of liquidity to smooth future R&D projects, 
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especially when they face financing issues. Further, Brown and Floros (2012) state that making 
R&D investment is considered to be a key motive for firms to keep precautionary cash reserves. 
These reserves can be built up from the proceeds from the issuing of new stock, which supports 
the view that firms may issue new equity before it is needed in order to build up liquid asset 
reserves, which enable them to undertake promising investment opportunities later.  
 
4.3.3.3 The market timing theory 
By relaxing the assumptions of the perfect capital market, the market timing theory states that 
firms’ capital structure is constructed based on the accumulative attempts of managers at timing 
the capital market (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Baker and Wurgler offer two explanations of 
equity market timing behaviour. They first argue that, based on the adverse selection problem 
introduced by Myers and Majluf (1984), adverse selection costs vary across firms and over 
time, as the degree of information asymmetry also similarly varies. However, adverse selection 
is inversely related to firms’ market-to-book ratio (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Under this 
condition, market timing opportunities emerge because of the changes in the levels of 
information asymmetry between rational investors and firm managers. Second, based on 
managers’ understanding of the time-varying aspect of market mispricing, they will issue stocks 
when they believe that the market is irrationally overvaluing their firms, and will repurchase 
their stocks when they are undervalued. Market timing opportunities emerge as long as firm 
managers believe that their firms are irrationally mispriced in the market. With both 
explanations, it can be said that a firm’s capital structure is based on the cumulative attempts 
of managers at timing the equity market. 
On the other hand, and concerning debt as a source of finance, a survey by Graham and Harvey 
(2001) showed that market timing plays an important role in making corporate financing 
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decisions. They found evidence that firms issue debt in an effort to exploit market interest rates; 
firm managers take on debt when they feel that interest rates are particularly low, or when they 
expect that the rates will fall in the future. Baker and Wurgler (2002) conducted an investigation 
into the relationship between the historical path of the market-to-book ratio and firms’ capital 
structure. Their findings show that managers’ understanding of market timing opportunities, 
which is represented by the ratio of firms’ market-to-book value, has a significant effect which 
helps to explain the differences in corporate capital structure, consistent with market timing 
predictions.    
However, linking the levels of information asymmetry with the types of investment 
(specifically R&D), Chen et al. (2010) investigated firms’ preferences between private 
investment in public equity (PIPEs) and secondary equity offering (SEO). Their findings show 
that when the potential of undervaluation is high (when the levels of information asymmetry 
are high), firms are more likely to turn to private investors; that is, the PIPE mechanism. 
Management is more likely to select the PIPE mechanism over SEO when it offers a relative 
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4.3.4 R&D investment and financing constraints 
4.3.4.1 Investment in assets and working capital with finance constraints 
For firms to optimise returns, they should not keep any unproductive assets and should finance 
their investment with the cheapest sources of funds. In this section, we will discuss why firms 
favour investing in short-term assets and to finance with short-term liabilities. Detailed and 
practical explanations for the existence of the role of working capital assets and liabilities as an 
input and an easily reversible store of liquidity are provided in Appendix 1a and 1b. 
In a world with perfect capital markets, working capital assets and liabilities would not be 
needed. There would be no uncertainty, asymmetry information, nor transaction costs, and no 
financial constraints. The capital market would reflect all available information, and firms 
would lend and borrow at the same interest rate. In such a world, there would be no advantage 
for firms to finance or invest in the short term. Relaxing the capital market irrelevance 
assumption, recent research has shown that a firm’s real investment may depend on financial 
factors. External finance, if accessible, is considered to be more costly than internal finance 
because of asymmetric information, transaction costs, tax advantages and the cost of financial 
distress29.        
Many of the arguments rest on the distinction between insiders or firm managers, who have full 
information regarding existing capital and investment prospects, and outsiders (or investors) 
who cannot differentiate between the value and quality of firms, forcing them to value 
individual firms at the population average. In debt markets, Jaffee and Russell (1976) argue that 
asymmetric information causes lenders to raise the cost of new debt, or to worsen credit 
rationing. They argue that if the lenders cannot distinguish between good and bad borrowers, 
the market interest rate must rise and loan sizes may be limited. However, when the interest 
                                                 
29 For further explanation, see section 4.3.2.4 of the financial constraint model. 
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rate rises, marginally good quality firms will leave the market (adverse selection) or it will 
induce firms to undertake riskier projects (moral hazard), making the probability of default on 
lenders higher and the expected profits lower (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Toivanen and Cressy, 
2002). 
In the equity markets, new outsiders may be less informed than the insiders about firms’ existing 
capital and their new investment prospects. In these circumstances, Akerlof (1970) explains 
why firms can be forced to sell new stock issues at a discount. If insiders, the issuers of the 
equity, have more inside information about the quality of the firm than outsiders, investors or 
buyers, they would not be willing to accept the terms offered by the outsiders, forcing the sale 
of new stocks to be at a lower price than it would have been if both parties had had the same 
information. However, when external funds are available only at a premium, or are rationed, 
fluctuation in internally generated funds may affect firms’ investment.  
These real-world circumstances introduce several problems that firms need to deal with. While 
firms have many available strategies in such circumstances, Scherr (1989) indicates that 
strategies that involve investment and financing with working capital accounts often offer a real 
substantial advantage. He argues that when a firm is faced with uncertainty regarding its 
expected levels of future cash flows, such uncertainty will incur substantial costs for a firm with 
insufficient cash balances to cover expenses. Different strategies could be devised to deal with 
this uncertainty and the substantial costs that it may induce. Among these strategies, some 
employ working capital investment or financing, such as holding a reserve of short-term 
marketable securities or inventories, holding additional cash balances above the expected needs, 
or arranging for the availability of additional use of free capital (trade credit) or additional short-
term borrowing capacity.  
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Scherr (1989) argues that a combination of these strategies, or just one of them, might be the 
lowest cost approach to the problem, and that strategies using working capital accounts are 
some of the most important ways in which firms can respond to problems of financial 
constraints. Cash flow uncertainty gives rise to several strategies that employ working capital 
accounts. Scherr (1989) and Petersen and Rajan (1997) conclude that working capital accounts 
can be used as a means of handling uncertainty, with the management of these accounts playing 
an important role in maintaining a firm's financial health during normal and abnormal courses 
of business. 
  
4.3.4.2 The role of working capital  
Like any other part of firms' stock of capital, working capital is recognised as an important 
component (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993; Ding et al., 2013). Working capital is a common 
measure of a firm's liquidity and efficiency through its net position in liquid assets, both liquid 
and financial. Defined as current assets minus current liabilities, the three main components of 
current assets are cash and equivalents, inventory, and accounts receivable. Current liabilities 
consist chiefly of accounts payable and short-term debt. It has been recognised that working 
capital, along with other elements of a firm’s capital, is one of the key components of firms 
(Scherr, 1989; Hampton and Wagner, 1989; Seidman, 2005; Watson and Head, 2016), and they 
are encouraged to value it.  
 Fazzari and Petersen (1993) argue that inventories are often divided into finished goods, work-
in-process, and raw materials. The last two categories are considered to be more volatile than 
finished goods inventories. Deloof (2003) explains that the components of inventories in 
working capital enter directly into the production function. Researchers argue that firms could 
store up materials to reduce the likelihood of shortages which could slow down production 
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(reducing the risk of running out of stock30), and that they could operate at a high production 
level to achieve economies of scale by using work-in-progress inventories. Other components 
of working capital, such as large finished goods inventories and generous trade credit policy, 
facilitate and may lead to higher sales. Petersen and Rajan (1997) emphasize the role that 
accounts receivable, in particular, can play in facilitating sales to customers, who may 
themselves be liquidity constraints.   
Another component of working capital is accounts payable. Deloof (2003) argues that this 
component allows firms to delay payment to suppliers, as well as allowing them to assess the 
quality of the product that they have bought before paying for it. Accounts payable are also 
considered as an inexpensive and flexible source of finance for firms; suppliers may have a 
significant cost advantage over financial institutions. In this context, Petersen and Rajan (1997) 
indicate that firms can be financed by their suppliers, especially when their access to the capital 
market is limited. They found evidence that when small firms have limited access to capital 
markets, and/or when credit from financial institutions is unavailable, they use more trade credit; 
suppliers tend to lend to constrained firms because they have an implicit equity stake in them, 
and they believe that firms can liquidate assets more efficiently. Finally, cash and equivalents, 
as other components of working capital, allow firms to reduce costs through their liquidity 
position. Adequate cash balances allow firms to reduce their financing costs, allowing them to 
take advantage if they are offered a discount for early payment.  
Fazzari and Petersen (1993) and Weigand and Audretsch (1999) point out that the key 
differences between investments in assets, both tangible and intangible, and working capital are 
the liquidity of the latter and its reversibility31. In contrast to other investments, Fazzari and 
                                                 
30 The risk of running out of stock can be explained (or defined) by a situation in which a firm cannot fulfil the 
demand for products from its current inventory.    
31 A large volume of literature focuses on the impact of the irreversibility of tangible and intangible investments 
on a firm’s behaviour. Irreversibility arises when firms find it costly or difficult to reverse an investment decision, 
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Petersen (1993) and Brown and Petersen (2011) argue that firms can easily adjust their working 
capital. For instance, when firms consume raw materials faster than they are replaced, working 
capital investment can temporarily be at negative levels. Furthermore, by intensive efforts to 
collect accounts receivable or by tightening up the credit policies on new sales, firms can easily 
liquidate working capital. Petersen and Rajan (1997) found that when firms are confronted by 
tight money they make intensive efforts to collect accounts receivable (to cut accounts 
receivable) to overcome their weak liquidity.  Fazzari and Petersen (1993) also found evidence 
that firms use liquid assets as collateral for short-term borrowing, which increases current 
liabilities, leading to a reduction in net working capital. 
 
4.3.4.3 R&D investment smoothing with working capital  
The main distinguishing characteristic of R&D is the size of adjustment costs (see Himmelberg 
and Petersen, 1994; Brown and Petersen, 2011). Because R&D investment is associated with 
high adjustment costs and is financed using volatile sources, firms will find it very expensive 
to adjust the flow of R&D in response to transitory finance shocks. Thus, firms facing binding 
financing constraints may not be able to maintain a relatively smooth path of R&D spending, 
and therefore they should have strong incentives to build up and manage a stock of liquid 
reserves, in the form of working capital for example, in order to dampen the shocks of cash 
flows, and to maintain a relatively smooth path of R&D spending. 
In this context, Fazzari and Petersen (1993) advocate the idea of investment smoothing32 with 
working capital. When there is a negative shock to cash flow, the shadow value of finance will 
rise for firms that are financially constrained. In response, they will reduce their rate of asset 
                                                 
because of the significantly high costs (for example, the difference in costs between the capital purchasing price 
and the resale market price) (Chirinko and Schaller, 2009; Ding et al. (2013). Scholars argue that this problem is 
severe, especially when capital goods are industry-specific or highly specialized.    
32 Please refer to sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4 for more details on R&D investment smoothing. 
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accumulation; firms prefer to cut investment in working capital proportionally more than other 
investments. Firms choose working capital to absorb most of the temporary cash flow 
fluctuation rather than other investments in order to reduce the potential losses and adjustment 
costs that could arise due to the temporary cutting of those already in progress. However, 
because working capital is reversible, it is argued that it can even become a source of funds for 
firms that choose to reduce or even have a temporary negative level of working capital 
investment (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993; Ding et al., 2013). Therefore, the existence of working 
capital can be considered as an alternative source of funds for firms during short-run financing 
constraints. A symmetric argument is applied in response to positive cash-flow shocks.  
Weigand and Audretsch (1999) point out that the extent of investment smoothing depends on 
firms’ stock of working capital33. The higher this is, the lower its marginal value to firms. 
Therefore, firms will be more willing to use it to offset negative shocks to cash flow. If the 
stock of working capital is relatively low, there will be fewer opportunities for investment 
smoothing, and so cash flow shocks will have a marginally higher impact on firms’ investment. 
In this sense, Fazzari and Petersen (1993) conclude that the strength of a firms’ working capital 
position can affect the link between its investments, for example R&D investment, and internal 
and external cash flows. 
A number of studies provide theoretical models showing how the stock of working capital and 
its accounts can benefit firms facing financing constraints. However, as cash holding is a 
component of working capital accounts, Bigelli and Sánchez-Vidal (2012) found empirical 
evidence that firms determine their optimal cash holding based on the trade off between the 
costs of holding liquid assets and the benefits of reducing the need for costly external finance 
                                                 
33 Fazzari and Petersen (1993) and Weigand and Audretsch (1998) argue that firms use working capital as a stock 
of precautionary liquidity, as it provides insurance against future shortfalls in cash. Therefore, the marginal value 
of working capital to firms rises as its stock declines.   
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to fund future investment opportunities. However, with regard to transaction costs and the risk 
of future cash shortfalls, Han and Qiu (2007) found evidence that constrained firms can save 
such costs by increasing their cash holding, especially when they cannot fully diversify the risk 
of future cash flow, as they can trade-off between future and current investments. Almeida et 
al. (2004) point out that the benefit for firms of holding cash can be seen in their ability to 
finance future projects that might arise. If future growth opportunities are expected to be greater 
than the current ones, the more cash firms will store. Acharya et al. (2007) provide empirical 
evidence that constrained firms with high hedging needs prefer to have higher cash balances to 
hedge future investment against future income shortfalls.  
More specifically, with regard to the role of cash holding as a component of working capital 
accounts on R&D smoothing, Brown and Petersen (2011) investigated the role of corporate 
cash holding in buffering R&D investments from transitory finance shocks. They found that 
firms’ paths of R&D investment are less volatile than their key sources of funds, so they smooth 
such investments by drawing down cash holdings in cases when financing is unavailable, and 
build up their reserves when financing is available. Similarly, Guariglia and Liu (2014) found 
that the R&D expenditure of small unlisted Chinese firms was constrained by the availability 
of internal finance, and that firms smoothed their R&D investments by drawing down cash 
holdings when faced with transitory finance shocks. 
 
Trade credit, or accounts payable, is a component of working capital accounts. Petersen and 
Rajan (1997) suggest that trade credit is the most important source of external finance for firms, 
especially young and small ones. They point out that suppliers have advantages for firms over 
traditional lenders (specialized financial institutions); trade credit provides access to capital for 
firms that are unable to raise it through traditional channels. However, they argue that suppliers 
may be better at evaluating and controlling the credit risk of buyers than the traditional 
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specialized financial institutions.  In this sense, Petersen and Rajan found empirical evidence 
that small firms (whose access to the capital markets is limited) use more trade credit, especially 
when credit from financial institutions is unavailable.  
By considering accounts receivable as another component of working capital accounts, Deloof 
(2003) argues that when firms have a shortage of cash balances and do not have access to 
external sources of finance, they reduce their investments in accounts receivable to free up 
liquidity. When they are able to obtain funds at low costs, they increase their investment in 
accounts receivable, increasing their trade credit to firms who are facing limited access to 
traditional lenders or facing higher financing costs. Deloof argues that firms who have better 
financial balances invest more in trade credits, as they are marginally considered as one of the 
most profitable short-term investments. Such a view confirms the findings of Petersen and 
Rajan (1997), who found that firms with limited access to traditional financial institutions rely 
on trade credit as a source of external finance. 
Fazzari and Petersen (1993) found empirical support for the role of working capital in finance 
constraints on fixed investment. They point out that working capital is used by firms as a source 
of liquidity to smooth fixed investment relative to negative cash-flow shocks, and that it is 
considered to be an important use of funds if firms are facing finance constraints.  Furthermore, 
Ding et al. (2013) analyse firm sensitivity to investment in fixed and working capital to the 
fluctuation in cash flow. They found that in the presence of fluctuations in cash flow, large and 
mature firms adjust their investment in fixed capital, while in response to cash flow shocks, 
young and small firms tend to maintain smooth fixed investment levels by adjusting working 
capital. Considering different industries, Weigand and Audretsch (1999) point out that as with 
non-science-based firms, in the presence of cash flow shocks and liquidity constraints, science-
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based firms34 smooth their investment significantly by adjusting their investment in working 
capital.  
A number of studies provide theoretical and empirical support for how working capital and 
related accounts can help firms facing financing frictions to smooth their investments. This 
chapter of the thesis comprises unique research in two important ways. First, we direct 
examining the use of working capital for smoothing R&D investment rather than fixed 
investment (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993). Second, we use working capital rather than one of its 
individual accounts, for example the role of cash holding on R&D smoothing (Brown and 
Petersen, 2011; Guariglia and Liu, 2014). The aim of this work is to examine to what extent the 
AIM-listed firms are able to adjust their working capital instead of their R&D investment in the 
presence of fluctuations in cash flows, to alleviate the effects of cash flow shocks on R&D.  The 
work is similar to that of Fazzari and Petersen (1993), who conducted a similar investigation 
into the role of working capital in finance constraints on the fixed investment of US firms. They 
found that firms are indeed able to dampen the effects of cash flow fluctuation by using working 
capital. 
 To the best of knowledge, this is the first study to explore how the use of external sources of 
finance and active R&D smoothing with working capital influence financing constraints on 
R&D. The lack of evidence for why the sources of finance matter for R&D in the UK is a puzzle, 
and calls into question whether financing constraints play an important role in R&D and 
innovation in the modern economy. A second contribution is that whereas most previous 
empirical studies which have examined the existence and importance of financing constraints 
on R&D were based almost exclusively on testing large and mature firms, this work is more 
                                                 
34 Those firms which are engaged in science-based activities; that is, associated with a high degree of information 
asymmetries and a greater degree of uncertainty, for example R&D performing firms (Weigand and Audretsch, 
1998).  
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focused on young, small listed firms. It could be argued that investigating whether financial 
constraints may play a significant role in the R&D investment of young, small and high growth 
firms can dramatically alter the conclusions regarding the importance of financing constraints. 
This work fills these gaps in the literature by focusing on the case of the UK, with particular 
attention paid to young, small listed firms on AIM. 
The third contribution of this work is that it provides accurate and more decisive tests for the 
presence of financing constraints on R&D investment by employing the overlooked role of 
working capital. In particular, if financing constraints matter for R&D, a negative link between 
it and the changes in net working capital should be observed, implying that firms draw down 
liquidity reserves in form of working capital for R&D smoothing. The present study is the first 
of its kind that tests the role of working capital in R&D smoothing, emphasizing its importance 
for a firm’s financial policies. The fourth contribution is that a large number of researchers rely 
on either firm age or size, or the firm’s dividend pay-out ratio criteria, to separate the sample 
into constrained and unconstrained35 firms; this research aims to contribute to the literature by 
considering the three mechanisms of dividing firms into the two categories. This approach will 
add a more precise classification to the sample firms, and will eliminate any potential biases in 





                                                 
35 Researchers argue that small or young firms are more prone to financing constraints (having high levels of 
information asymmetric) than large or mature firms, and firms with zero dividend pay-outs are more financially 
constrained than firms with positive dividend pay-outs (Fazzari and Petersen., 1993; Weigand and Audretsch., 
1999; Brown and Petersen., 2011). 
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4.3.5 Hypothesies development  
Taking into consideration the role of external and internal financing for R&D expenditure, 
together with the findings of previous empirical studies, this section presents this study’s four 
testable hypotheses on the effect and the role of each financial tool on the level of R&D 
investment.  
 
R&D investment helps firms to attain better performance through developing new services and 
products (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). Firms keep certain levels of R&D investment to generate 
new products and develop new production processes which provide some differentiation that 
leads to competitive advantages over competitors (Bosworth et al., 1993). The most important 
characteristic of R&D investment is the size of adjustment costs36. R&D investment, rather than 
any other type of investment, can be differentiated in terms of riskiness, collateral value and the 
cost of adjustment. R&D is considered much more risky than other investments, and offers little 
or no collateral value ((Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Wang and Thornhill, 2010). Firms’ 
sources of funds are internally and externally generated. Internally generated funds are in the 
form of internally generated cash flow, while externally generated funds are in form of cash 
generated through stock and debt issues. Due to financial market imperfections, external 
sources of funds are considered to be more expensive than internal sources (Myers and Majluf, 
1984).  These imperfections are adverse selection (when two parties have different information 
sets prior to a deal) and moral hazard (asymmetry in information due to the inability to observe 
behaviour after the deal). Moral hazard is empirically the more dominant of the two (Toivanen 
and Cressy, 2002). Equity finance incurs sizable flotation costs for initial offerings, with a 
lemon premium for new stock issues (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Debt finance incurs interest 
                                                 
36 Adjustment costs in this context are defined as the costs associated with making any changes or cuts in R&D 
investment at the firm level (e.g. the costs of hiring and training new employees, or the costs of lost production in 
the case of having to lay off knowledge workers). 
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expenses (financial obligations), and increases the risk of financial distress (Wang and 
Thornhill, 2010). Thus, funds generated from stock and debt issues are considered to be 
expensive, especially for young and small firms. R&D-intensive firms use significantly little or 
no debt to finance their R&D investments, and prefer equity financing if needed to reduce the 
risk of financial distress and bankruptcy (Wang and Thornhill, 2010; Brown and Petersen, 
2011). Although firms could rely on external sources of funds if they had the choice, they prefer 
not to invest at the margin if the rising costs of external funding are too high, and prefer internal 
cash flow as the source of funding. As summarized in the pecking order theory (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984; Oliner and Rudebusch, 1992), the availability of internal funds 
makes it easier for firms to undertake desirable investment projects without the need for 
expensive external funds, which enhances firms’ worth by lowering the cost of funds (the 
availability of internal cash flow allows firms to invest more cheaply) (Bond and Meghir, 1994). 
Because of the cost preference for internal funds over external funds, this paper suggests that 
internal funding should be considered as the first source of finance for R&D investment (Fazzari 
and Petersen, 1993; Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Martinsson, 2010; Brown and Petersen, 
2011; Brown et al., 2012). It is therefore proposed that: 
 
Hypothesis 1.  There is a positive relationship between R&D investment and 
financing through internally generated cash flow. 
 
R&D investment is risky by nature, and yields uncertain returns (Hall, 2002; Ho et al., 2004) 
as the success of its output is not guaranteed, and will only generate cash profits with a time lag 
in the case of success (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Brown and Petersen, 2011; Brown et 
al., 2012). R&D-intensive firms would need to reduce their financial obligations in order to 
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reduce the risk of financial distress and bankruptcy. Because their financial obligations are 
represented by interest expenses, this chapter assumes that R&D-intensive firms would try to 
limit their use of debt. Despite the fact that the success of R&D investment may lead to better 
financial performance (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Fazzari and Petersen, 1993), generating a 
stream of cash flows that would make financing through debt relatively cheaper, firms place 
more emphasis on factors that might threaten their survival. Therefore, firms with high levels 
of R&D investment will reduce their reliance on financing through debt to reduce the risk of 
financial distress and bankruptcy. According to the transactional cost economy, the asset-
specificity of R&D investment has a lower resale value, which would shackle firms’ access to 
debt financing (Wang and Thornhill, 2010). Although debt providers can intervene in the 
conduct of management to avoid risky decisions, and firm managers will to some extent have 
an incentive to act for the debt providers (Fazzari et al., 1988), debt providers will seek 
protection against these types of risk. They may require a higher interest rate, they may select 
firms with higher asset resale values, or they may refuse to lend to firms with high levels of 
R&D investment that cannot serve as collateral (Wang and Thornhill, 2010). Hence, R&D-
intensive firms with more specific assets will face difficulties in securing debt.  Based on these 
facts, a negative relationship between R&D investment and debt financing is expected. 
Hypothesis 2.  There is a negative relationship between R&D investment and 
financing through long-term debt. 
Common stocks do not require firms to pay fixed interest. Fewer financial obligations are in 
the interest of firms that heavily invest in R&D. This type of investment is risky by nature (Ho 
et al., 2004). Innovation helps firms to attain better performance by developing new products 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1989), which are subject to both technological and market uncertainties 
(Fazzari and Petersen, 1993). Market uncertainty makes it difficult to decide whether 
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competitors’ actions and customers’ tastes will affect the value of the newly generated products 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Ho et al., 2004). Technological uncertainty makes it hard to know 
if the R&D expenditure will result in new products or services (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993), 
and this expenditure will expose businesses to risk (Ho et al., 2004). Reduced financial 
obligations through common stock financing will help R&D-intensive firms buffer expected 
failures in R&D projects. However, R&D investment is considered as resource-consuming. 
Scholars have explained that reduced financial obligations through common stock financing 
can be considered as supportive sources for R&D investment (Martinsson, 2010; Brown et al., 
2012). The benefits to the common stockholders are the residual profits of the firm (Auerbach, 
1979) which may be raised through R&D investment. Success of such investment helps firms 
build their specific resources (Ho et al., 2004), thus leading to improvement in performance. 
The risk attached to R&D investment could expose the holders of common stocks to losses, 
although they can mitigate this unsystematic risk through portfolio diversification (Brenner and 
Smidt, 1978). Accordingly, this chapter suggests that common stock is an ideal financing means 
for both R&D-intensive firms which have exhausted all of their internally generated cash flow, 
and for their common stock investors. 
Hypothesis 3.  There is a positive relationship between R&D investment and 
financing through common stock issues. 
 
The most important characteristic of R&D investment is the size of adjustment costs. R&D is 
considered much more risky than other investments, and offers little or no collateral value 
(Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Wang and Thornhill, 2010). Such investment includes wage 
payments to highly skilled and trained workers, who require considerable firm-specific training. 
These workers cannot be made redundant in the case of any temporary cutting back on R&D 
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activity in response to any financing shocks. If the cut in the R&D is temporary, firms should 
bear the additional costs of hiring and training new workers in the future. Potentially more 
costly is the fact that these workers know valuable information and firm-specific commercial 
secrets, which firms do not intend to transfer or share with their competitors. The dissemination 
of information that a fired worker may transfer to competitors is considered too costly for firms, 
as such a situation would damage the value of innovation being undertaken by them. This 
investment is often conducted in teams, and continual turnover of workers would lead to 
undesirable and costly disruptions in the process. These reasons suggest that R&D investment 
has a higher adjustment cost than other types of investment (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; 
Brown et al., 2012; Brown et al., 2013). For firms to minimise these significant adjustment 
costs, they should maintain a smooth R&D path (Brown and Petersen, 2011). For unconstrained 
firms, smoothing R&D investment is straightforward, as there are multiple sources of finance 
(such as stock issues) that can be used to recompense for internal finance shocks. On the other 
hand, for constrained firms with high R&D intensity, other sources of external funds may be 
extremely costly or may be unavailable for them to dampen the shocks of internal finance, 
especially during periods of negative shocks (Bond and Meghir, 1994). Another potential 
source of funds for smoothing could be debt, but the asset-specificity of R&D makes smoothing 
with debt problematic (Wang and Thornhill, 2010). Both external and internal financing sources 
are volatile (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). For these constrained firms, the strategy of smoothing 
R&D is to not rely on external sources of funds, but to build and manage a reserve of liquidity, 
for example in a form of working capital. The key differences between R&D and working 
capital investments are the liquidity of the latter and its reversibility (Fazzari and Petersen, 
1993; Weigand and Audretsch, 1999). During negative cash flow shocks, firms prefer to cut 
investment in working capital proportionally more than other investments because of its 
liquidity and reversibility (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993). Firms choose working capital 
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investment to absorb most of the temporary cash flow fluctuation effects, in order to reduce the 
potential losses and adjustment costs that could arise due to temporary cutting back on projects 
in progress (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Ding et al., 2013). Constrained firms can offset the short-
run effect of cash flow fluctuation on R&D investment by adjusting working capital (Fazzari 
and Petersen, 1993; Chan, 2008). Although this action may lead to a negative net working 
capital position, it would release short-run liquidity, and would allow firms to offset cash flow 
shocks and smooth their R&D investment activities. Based on the above discussion, this chapter 
suggests that working capital is the last resort for smoothing R&D investment if firms are facing 
binding cash flow shocks and financial constraints. 
Hypothesis 4.  In financially constrained firms, working capital acts as the last 
resort for smoothing R&D investment. A decrease in working capital will result 
in an increase in R&D investment. 
Based on our predictions, in the case of firms that are facing binding financial constraints, 
working capital investment competes with R&D investment for the available pool of finance. 
In these circumstances, working capital investment as a variable in the R&D investment 
regression should have a negative coefficient sign (i.e. a reduction in working capital frees 
liquidity for R&D smoothing). However, for firms not facing binding financial constraints, 
there is no role for working capital on smoothing R&D. Accordingly, the expected sign for the 
working capital coefficient in the model should be negative and significant for constrained 
firms, and positive and insignificant for unconstrained ones.   
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4.4 Data and preliminary analysis 
4.4.1 Data and measurement  
In order to empirically examine the determinants of firms’ R&D expenditure, the existence of 
financial constraints on R&D, and the role that working capital plays in smoothing R&D, we 
estimate a general equation for R&D investment.  Our sample comprises all surviving and non-
surviving (inactive) firms that were listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) at any 
time between 1999 and 2014, with coverage on the Worldscope database and the official site 
of the London Stock Exchange. We collected annual data from the Worldscope database via 
DataStream and Thomson One Banker Analytics database, and the London Stock Exchange 
official site. Only the listed firms in manufacturing (two-digit SIC 20-39) and service (two-digit 
SIC 73) industries were included in the sample, since R&D investment mainly takes place in 
these areas.   
Based on our data, as of December 2014, 1859 firms had been listed firms on AIM, of which 
933 were delisted. After inspection, 746 firms were considered to be our target population, all 
in the manufacturing and service industries. However, 379 firms from our dataset were inactive, 
having been delisted from the market at some time during the period 1999 to 2014. The data 
forms an unbalanced panel, on which not all of the firm-year observations were available for 
our firms during the entire testing period. This unbalanced panel was formed to avoid 
survivorship bias37. A summary of these results is given in Figure 4-3. 
 
                                                 
37 Elton et al. (1996) defined survivorship bias as the tendency to exclude failed (inactive) firms from a sample 
study because they no longer exist. This bias often causes the obtained results to be skewed higher as a result of 
only including active or surviving firms. However, further investigations on the breakdown reasons for delisting 
is required, based on the investigation by Pour and Lasfer (2013),  significant number of AIM-firms’ delisting was 
recorded as a voluntary. 
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Figure 4-3: Summary of all listed firms on AIM between 1999 and 2014 and the target 
population. 
 
Our target population was divided into two groups, based on whether firms were undertaking 
R&D expenditure or not in our given sample period. It is worth noting that the firms reporting 
no R&D were in industries which traditionally do little or no R&D, that is, firms listed in the 
textile products, apparel, furniture, lumber, printing and publishing industries.  
This research will primarily focus on the R&D reporting firms, while non-R&D firms will be 
excluded from the sample as they are not useful in the analysis of the determinants of firms’ 
R&D investment expenditure model (these excluded firms do not report any information on 
R&D expenditure; that is, R&D reports are missing rather than zero), while they are useful for 
understanding how the level of financial variables differs across firms. This chapter covers the 
period of 1999 to 2014 because the Alternative Investment Market was launched in 1995, and 
information of the listed firms for the years 1995-1998 are not available on the databases. Table 
4-1 gives a brief description of the main variables used in this chapter. 




TOTAL LISTED FIRMS ON AIM (BETWEEN 
1999 AND 2014)
Of which 379 are 
inactive Firms
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 Table 4-1: Description of the main variables used in this chapter a 
 
R&D it: The ratio of the research and development expenses of firm i at time t divided by the 
book value of total assets at the end of time t-1. b  
MktBook it: The ratio of the market value of the total assets of firm i at time t-1 divided by the 
book value of total assets at time t-1. 
SGr it: The change in net sales of firm i between the end of time t and the end of time t-1, divided 
by the value of net sales at the end of time t-1. 
CF it: The ratio of the gross internally generated cash flow of firm i at time t divided by the 
book value of the total assets at the end of time t-1, where the gross cash flow is defined as after 
tax income before extraordinary items and preferred dividend, plus depreciation, depletion and 
amortisation expenses and research and development expenses c. 
Stk it: The net cash raised from the stock issues of firm i at time t divided by the book value of 
total assets at the end of period t-1, where net cash raised from stock issues is equal to sales or 
the issuance of common and preferred stocks, minus the purchase of common and preferred 
stocks. 
LTD it: The net cash raised from the long-term debt issues of firm i at time t divided by the book 
value of total assets at the end of period t-1, where net cash raised from long-term debt issues is 
equal to long-term debt issues minus long-term debt reductions. 
∆WC it: The change in the stock of net working capital of firm i  between the end of time t and 
the end of time t-1, divided by the book value of total assets at the end of time t-1, where net 
working capital is current assets, defined principally as cash and equivalents, inventory and 
accounts receivable, minus current liability, chiefly accounts payable and short-term debt. 
 
Notes:  
a. The measurement of variables and definitions are based on the existing literature. 
b. The data were collected from Datastream and Worldscope via Thomson One Banker 
Analytics. 
c. Since firms treat R&D as an expense, R&D has been added back into the usual accounting 
definition of cash flow (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Brown and Petersen, 2011). 
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4.4.2 Summary statistics  
 
As noted previously, the presence of outliers in the datasets can strongly affect the parameter 
estimates. Verardi and Croux (2009) and Brown and Petersen (2011) point out that the values 
of the Cash flow-to-Total assets and R&D investment-to-Total assets ratios and the Market-to-
Book values outside the 1st and the 99th percentile range may affect the parameter estimates, 
and so should be screened to reduce the potential influence of outliers on the parameter 
estimates. Therefore, we winsorized the sales growth (SGr) and cash flow (CF) of the 
explanatory variables in our analysis at 1st and the 99th percentiles of their respective 
distribution. The winsor transformation specifically set all observations below the 1st percentile 
equal to the 1st percentile, and set observations above the 99th percentile equal to the 99th 
percentile. Such transformation reduces the potential impacts of the outliers, as well as allowing 
usage of the full data set. 
Panel A of table 4-2 presents the summary statistics of the main variables for the firms reporting 
no R&D, and Panel B shows the statistics for those which did report R&D. These statistics are 
based on firm-year observations, and all investment and finance values are scaled by the book 
value of total assets at the end of period t-1.  The no R&D reporting sample is almost two-thirds 
in size as the sample of R&D reporting firms. 
Apart from the absence of R&D in panel A, and considering the results of the means equality 
tests shown in table 4-3, there are three noteworthy differences between the descriptive statistics 
reported in the two panels. The first difference is that the mean value of cash flow (CF) of the 
no R&D reporting firms is negative and significantly lower than the R&D reporting firms, at -
5% compared to 1% for the no R&D firms. The negative CF mean value of the no R&D 
reporting firms could indicate that these firms are not profitable enough to engage in R&D 
investments (Brown and Petersen, 2011). Alternatively, it could be that a large number of these 
firms are newly listed and so expecting a negative mean of cash flow. 
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Table 4-2: Summary statistics for the main variables used in this chapter a. 
  
The second difference is that the no R&D firms issued little stock compared to the R&D 
reporting firms, 20% compared to 28% for the R&D firms. On average, this supports the 
argument of Myers (1984) in the pecking order model. R&D performing firms prefer to finance 
their projects through stock issuance rather than debt (Brown et al., 2012; Wang and Thornhill, 
2010; Martinsson, 2010); firms engaged high risk projects would need to reduce their financial 
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obligations in order to reduce their risk of financial distress. Finally, and the most important 
difference to note, is that the mean value of the net working capital of the R&D firms is 
relatively high compared to the no R&D group. This observation may suggest that firms with a 
high need for investment smoothing carry more assets in the form of current accounts, which 
might be used in periods with cash flow fluctuation/shortfalls in the future.  
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Table 4-3: Results of the independent means-equality t-test between firms with R&D expenditure and those without. 
  Variable Name 
 Levene's test of 
equality of variances a 
 t-test for equality of means   
95% confidence interval 
of the differences    
F 
 
P-value  Lower Upper  
Equal variance assumed  1.0422 0.3319 0.1394 4412 0.8892 0.27 1.9371 -3.5278 4.0678 
Equal variance not assumed   0.1395 4401.37 0.8891 0.27 1.9357 -3.5250 4.0650 
Equal variance assumed  1.0787 0.0888 -1.2036 4045 0.2288 -0.1 0.0830 -0.2628 0.0628 
Equal variance not assumed   -1.2048 4043.96 0.2283 -0.1 0.0830 -0.2627 0.0627 
Equal variance assumed  1.8194 0.0000 -3.7580 4121 0.0002 -0.06 0.0159 -0.0913 -0.0286 
Equal variance not assumed   -3.7859 3893.49 0.0002 -0.06 0.0158 -0.0910 -0.0289 
Equal variance assumed  2.8137 0.0000 -1.4615 3966 0.1439 -0.08 0.0547 -0.1873 0.0273 
Equal variance not assumed   -1.4806 3353.99 0.1388 -0.08 0.0540 -0.1859 0.0259 
Equal variance assumed  10.9408 0.0000 0.3182 3764 0.7503 0.01 0.0314 -0.0516 0.0716 
Equal variance not assumed   0.3256 2302.96 0.7447 0.01 0.0307 -0.0502 0.0702 
Equal variance assumed  32.8017 0.0000 -1.1401 4101 0.2543 -0.13 0.1140 -0.3535 0.0935 
Equal variance not assumed   -1.1615 2223.41 0.2456 -0.13 0.1119 -0.3494 0.0894 
Note:  
a The null hypothesis of Levene’s test is that there is equal variance (homogeneity of variance) between the two groups - the no R&D reporting 
firms and the R&D reporting firms.   
 
However, considering the summary statistics of panel B (R&D reporting firms), there are two figures that are particularly important. First, the 
mean value of new stock issues, 0.28, is larger than the mean value of internally generated cash flow, 0.01, showing the importance of new stock 
issues as a source of funds. Second, the mean value of the change in net working capital is well above the internally generated cash flow, and 
relatively lower than stock issues, showing that firms have an intent to maintain liquidity that can potentially be used to offset future finance shocks 
and buffer R&D investment. 
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4.4.3 Correlation coefficients 
Table 4-4 shows the pair-wise correlation matrix of the main variables used in this chapter after 
excluding the no R&D firms. It shows that the four sources of funds (CF, Stk, LTD and the 
∆WC) are significantly correlated with one another.   
 
Table 4-4: Correlation coefficient matrix of the variables used in this chapter. 
Variable R&D  MktBook  SGr CF   Stk LTD ∆WC 
R&D 1.00       
MktBook 0.1068 
***b 
1.00      
SGr 0.1354 
*** 







1.00    


































a. The reported figure in each cell is the pair-wise Pearson correlation coefficient between 
variables. 
b. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
R&D is significantly correlated with all of the sources of funds, which is entirely consistent 
with the implications of the determinants of the R&D investment expenditure framework. It 
also shows that the sales growth is positively and significantly correlated with R&D investment, 
and the MktBook ratio is significantly correlated with R&D, the controls for the investment 
demand in our model.   
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However, after excluding the no R&D reporting firms from our tested sample, the total number 
of R&D reporting firms becomes 423. Further, we require firms to have at least six records for 
the essential variables from 1999-2014, namely R&D, total assets, cash flow, new stock and 
debt issues, since we are using the system-GMM estimators that rely on the variables’ lagged 
values as instruments. Excluding firms with no R&D reports and firms with fewer than four 
records of the essential variables leaves us with a final sample of 235 firms. 
 
4.5 The dynamic model of R&D investment  
4.5.1 Methodology 
One of the core assumptions in regression analysis is that explanatory variables should not be 
correlated with the disturbance term (𝑢𝑖). 
                                                  𝑦𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖                                              (1) 
E (𝑋𝑖 𝑢𝑖 ) = 0 
 However, in reality such an assumption can be violated, as there could be some endogenously 
determined variables or variables measured with errors on the right-hand side of the equation, 
which results in biased and inconsistent estimations of the OLS estimator. Wooldridge (2010) 
argues that the standard approach to such a problem of "endogeneity" can be overcome by using 
instrumental variable regression. This approach works by finding a set of variables that is 
correlated with the original explanatory variables, but not with the disturbances in the main 
equation. However, Baum et al. (2003) and Wooldridge (2010) state that the key approaches 
using instruments to remove the effect of residual and variable correlations are the Two-Stage 
Least Squares (2SLS) and the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators. 
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According to Wooldridge (2010), the two-stage least squares estimator is considered as a 
special case of instrumental variable regression. The procedure works in two distinct stages. 
The first stage is carried out to find the proportion of the exogenous and endogenous variables 
that can be assigned to the instruments. This stage involves running an OLS regression for each 
of the endogenous variables on the set of instruments. The second stage is the regression of the 
original equation, where all the variables are replaced by the fitted values obtained from the 
first stage regressions.  The coefficients acquired from the second stage are the 2SLS estimates. 
Let us denote the matrix of instruments as Q, and the explanatory and dependent variables as X 
and Y. The linear 2SLS objective function is given by: 
                                         φ(β) = (𝑦 − 𝑋β)′𝑄(𝑄′𝑄)−1𝑄′(𝑦 − 𝑋β)                            (2) 
 Then the acquired coefficients from the two-stage least squares regression are presented by 
                                    𝛽2𝑆𝐿𝑆 = (𝑋′𝑄(𝑄′𝑄)−1 𝑋′𝑄)−1𝑋′𝑄(𝑄′𝑄)−1𝑄′𝑦                       (3) 
and the coefficients' standard estimated covariance matrix can be calculated using 
                                                ∑ =2SLŜ S2(𝑋′𝑄(𝑄′𝑄)−1𝑋′𝑄)−1                                  (4) 
where S2 is the regression squared standard error (estimated residual variance). 
                                                        S2 = ∑ 𝑢t2/(𝑇 − 𝐾)Tt                                            (5) 
K in the estimated residual variance equation represents the unknowns, while (𝑇 − 𝐾) 
represents and refers to the degree of freedom. 
The regression residuals ût are calculatied as follows:  
                                                   ût = yt − Xt′β̂2SLS                                                 (6)  
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These regression residuals are different from the second stage ones, which we can obtain if we 
run the two-stage least squares estimator separately. The second stage residuals can be obtained 
by:  
                                                         ut̃ = yt̂ − Xt̂′β2SLS                                          (7) 
where the Xt̂ and  yt̂ are the obtained fitted values from the first-stage regressions. 
However, in the area of corporate finance, dynamic panel models play a natural role in this area 
of research because most corporate decisions involve inherently dynamic interactions. The 
2SLS estimator is considered to be a biased estimator for many reasons. Flannery and Hankins 
(2013) argue that such dynamic models that empirically investigate corporate decisions require 
the use of firm-fixed effects to control for differences across firms (i.e. to control for unobserved 
time-invariant effects). Since 2SLS estimates ignore the dynamic panel structure of the data, 
Flannery and Hankins argue that applying the 2SLS estimator, in the presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity, in dynamic panels produces an upward-biased coefficient estimate for the lagged 
dependent variable. The biased coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is due to the 
correlation between it and the fixed effect. For these reasons, the system GMM estimator has 
become a widely used approach in estimating dynamic panel data in the area of corporate 
finance. The system GMM estimator contains large sample properties that are easy to describe 
and make comparisons easier. Another reason make GMM is widely used by researchers is that 
they have found that constructing the GMM estimator can be approached without specifying 
the full data generating process (Hansen, 2010).        
Theoretically, the instrumental variable estimator is a special case of the GMM technique 
(Hansen and Singleton, 1982; Baum et al., 2003). The assumption of exogeneity of the 
instruments 𝑄𝑖 can be expressed as E (𝑄𝑖 𝑢𝑖) = 0. The L instruments provide a set of L moments, 
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                                      gi(β)̂ = 𝑄𝑖′?̂?𝑖 = 𝑄𝑖′(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖β̂)                                                 (8) 
where gi is L × 1. The instruments' exogeneity means that there are orthogonality conditions, 
or L moment conditions, that will be content at the true value of β: 
                                                 E{gi(β)} = 0                                                               (9) 
Each of the L moment equations is consistent with a sample moment; these L sample moments 
can be written as: 









t=1 (𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖β̂) =
1
n
𝑄′?̂?               (10) 
The purpose of using the GMM procedure is to obtain an estimator for β that solves g̅(β̂) = 0. 
If L = K, then equations are called to be exactly identified, and so we have as many equations 
as we have unknowns. In such a circumstance, it is possible to find β̂ that solves g̅(β)̂ = 0, and 
this GMM estimator is exactly the same as the 2SLS estimator. In the case of the over-identified 
equations (i.e. L > K), then we do have more equations than we have unknowns, where 
generally speaking it will be impossible to find  β̂ that solves g̅(β)̂ = 0. In this circumstance, 
we use the L × L weighting matrix (W) to construct a quadratic form in the moment conditions. 
The GMM objective function in this case can be expressed as: 
                                                          j(β̂) = ng̅(β̂)′Wg̅(β̂)                                     (11) 
A β̂ that minimizes j(β̂) is the GMM estimator for β; the GMM estimator can be obtained by 
solving and deriving the K first-order conditions, and can be expressed as: 
                                                  β̂GMM = (𝑋′𝑄𝑊𝑄′𝑋)−1 𝑋′𝑄𝑊𝑄′𝑦                          (12) 
Flannery and Hankins (2013) and Roodman (2009) argue that the system GMM estimator is 
designed for panel data analysis, and is considered as the best econometric methodology to use 
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in estimating dynamic models in corporate finance. The system-GMM estimator is designed to 
cope with the different assumptions about the data-generating process. This estimator is 
designed to cope with the dynamic generating process; that is, when lagged dependent variables 
influence the realization of the current dependent variable. Second, it copes with the presence 
of unobserved heterogeneity and controls for unobserved time-invariant effects. Third, this 
methodology is designed to cope with the endogeneity problem associated with the explanatory 
variables. Fourth, it is specially designed to deal with panels that are characterized by few time 
periods and many individuals (small T and large N), and also to cope with the assumption that 
good instruments are not available outside the immediate data set; that good instruments are 
only available (internally) based on the lags of the instrumented variables.   
However, this chapter will investigate the connection between R&D investment and all 
financial variables, namely internally generated cash flow, net stock issues, and net debt issues 
(Brown and Petersen, 2011; Brown and Floros, 2012). The focus will be on the changes in net 
working capital to examine the role that working capital (as a source of funds rather than a use 
of funds) plays in buffering the path of R&D spending from transitory finance shocks in a 
standard dynamic investment model. However, the variables that control for a firm’s investment 
demand (namely market-to-book ratio and the sales growth) are also included in the model. The 
form of our empirical model is as follows: 
𝑹&𝑫𝒊,𝒕 = 𝜷𝟏𝑹&𝑫𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑹&𝑫
𝟐
𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟑𝑴𝒌𝒕𝑩𝒐𝒐𝒌𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑺𝑮𝒓𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑪𝑭𝒊,𝒕 +
𝜷𝟔𝑪𝑭𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟕𝑺𝒕𝒌𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟖𝑺𝒕𝒌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟗𝑳𝑻𝑫𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎𝑳𝑻𝑫𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟏𝟏∆𝑾𝑪𝒊,𝒕 +
                                                    𝜷𝟏𝟐∆𝑾𝑪𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝒇𝒊 + 𝒅𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕                                      (13) 
 
Based on the dynamic optimisation “Euler condition”, this model includes the quadratic term 
of the lagged dependent variable 𝑹&𝑫𝟐𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 which controls for the desired level of R&D 
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investment in the presence of adjustment costs. R&D is highly persistent; accordingly, we 
expect the coefficient of 𝑹&𝑫𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  be close to one, while we expect the coefficient of the 
𝑹&𝑫𝟐𝒊,𝒕−𝟏to be negative.  This model also includes the firm-fixed effects (𝒇𝒊), to control for 
all unobserved determinants of R&D at the firm-specific level (e.g. industrial and technological 
characteristics), year-fixed effects (𝒅𝒕) to control for any shocks that may influence R&D 
demand (e.g. macroeconomic fluctuations), and 𝜺𝒊,𝒕 (which denotes white noise disturbances). 
Table 4-5 summarizes the expected effect of each of the explanatory variables on R&D 
investment in empirical results according to the existing literature. The expected signs of each 
of the explanatory variables are consistent with the main predictions of our stated hypotheses 
and the existing literature. Table 4-5 summarises all the variables used in the literature on R&D 
investment; each row of the table shows the name of the researcher/researchers, the variables 
used and the results obtained. Based on the main expected relation of each of the explanatory 
variables with R&D investment, a tick () has been used to indicate that this variable has been 
used by previous researchers, and that the finding of this variable is consistent with the 
theoretical prediction. Furthermore, a cross () has also been used to indicate that the variable 
has been used by previous researchers, but that the findings of this research were not consistent 
with the theoretical predictions as expressed in the expected signs row.   
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Variable Explanatory Variables  



















term debt issues 
(LTD) 





(+) (+) (+) (+) (-) 
(-) constrained firms 
(+)unconstrained 
firms 
 Grabowski (1968)         
 Link (1982)         
 Switzer (1984)         
 Hall (1992)         
 Himmelberg & Petersen (1994)         
 Bhagat and Welch (1995)         
 Bond et al. (1999)         
 Czarnitzki (2006)         
 Piga and Atzeni (2007)         
 Brighi and Torluccio (2009)         
 Wang and Thornhill (2010)         
 Martinsson (2010)         
 Brown and Petersen (2011)         
 Brown et al. (2012)         
 Brown and Floros (2012)         
 Borisova and Brown (2013)         
 Shin and Kim (2014)         
 Guariglia and Liu (2014)          





Variable Explanatory Variables  



























(+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
(-) - constrained 
firms 
(+) - unconstrained 
Firms 
 Fazzari and Petersen (1993)         
Weigand and Audretsch (1999)         
Ding et al. (2013)         
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Given the potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables38 and the dynamic structure of the 
R&D investment model, we estimate our empirical model using the System Generalized 
Methods of Moments (system-GMM) estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998). This estimator forms a system by combining an equation in 
differences of the variables with another equation of the levels of variables, in which the lagged 
differences will be used as instruments for the equation in levels and the lagged levels will be 
used as instruments for the equation in differences. The use of instruments in the system 
estimator addresses the weak instrument problem and is considered as a solution to the 
endogeneity problem (a causal connection between the independent and dependent variables). 
In the application of the system-GMM estimators, we have a choice of using one-step or two-
step estimation. The difference between the two estimations is that the one-step method assumes 
homoscedastic errors, while the two-step assumes heteroscedastic errors.  Roodman (2009) 
states that the two-step estimator is asymptotically more efficient than the one-step. However, 
Roodman further states that the reported standard errors tend to be downward biased in the two-
step estimation, and so it important to apply the finite-sample correction to the standard errors 
in the two-step estimations to correct the downward bias. Therefore, to estimate the dynamic 
equation of firms’ R&D investment, we applied the two-step system-GMM estimators with 
finite sample correction to the standard errors.  
All the financial variables, including ∆𝑾𝑪, were treated as potentially endogenous, and we 
used lagged differences dated t-2 as instruments for the regression in levels, and lagged levels 
dated t-3 to t-6 for the regression in differences. However, given the fact that the consistency of 
                                                 
38 Since there is a causal connection between firm-level investment and the source of financing (internal or 
external), we treated all financial variables in our empirical model (including the change in working capital) as 
potentially endogenous ones (Bond and Meghir, 1994; Fazzari et al., 1988; Flannery and Hankins, 2013). For 
example, a decision to raise funds through external sources is endogenous and jointly determined by the decision 
on where and how to spend the funds; further, a decision on the level of R&D investment is endogenous and jointly 
determined by the sources and levels of funds.  
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the system-GMM estimator depends on the assessment of the instruments’ validity and the 
autocorrelation of the error terms, the instrument validity was checked by the Hansen J-test of 
over-identifying restrictions, and Arellano and Bond’s (1991) test of autocorrelation.  
According to the corporate finance literature, a large number of researchers rely on firm age or 
the firm size, apart from firm dividend pay-out ratios, to divide firms into groups which are 
either financially constrained or unconstrained. Since we are dealing with young and small 
firms, according to the previous literature these are considered to be more likely to be 
financially constrained, which is an important issue.  We considered three ways of splitting the 
group, since we are already dealing with young and small firms. Fazzari et al. (1988) and 
Fazzari and Petersen (1993) argue that firms which are more likely to face financing frictions 
will have zero dividend pay-outs, while firms that are less likely to face these frictions will have 
positive dividend  pay-outs.  
Accordingly, the firms of our sample were classified into two groups, based on the dividend 
pay-out ratio. Firms with zero dividend pay-outs were classified as constrained firms, while 
those with positive pay-outs were classified as unconstrained39. The logic of this classification 
criterion is that when the marginal cost of external finance is considered much higher than the 
opportunities cost of internal funds, firms which exhaust their internal funds will be more 
susceptible to face binding finance constraints. In this case, firms will tie their investment 
spending to the level of their available internal funds (Fazzari et al., 1988; Fazzari and Petersen, 
1993).  
                                                 
39 In this chapter we have classified our firm sample into two groups based on the dividend pay-outs criterion 
mainly because the age and the size techniques of splitting the sample have already been applied to the type of 
firms that we are dealing with (i.e. since the Alternative Investment Market was launched in 1995 and the cut off 
period of our research is 2014). This means our sample firms from the young firm group are based on the age 
classification and all the  sample listed firms are considered as small firms, based on the number of employees 
classification (i.e. fewer than 500 employees). 
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However, considering the three ways of splitting the group, there is a more precise classification 
for the sample firms. This would eliminate any potential biases in the previous techniques 
applied, which could affect the empirical results and the conclusions drawn. Table 4-6 presents 
the estimated model of the determinants of R&D investment of the young, small and high 
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4.5.2 Results 
The regression estimates of the dynamic R&D investment model are shown in table 4-6 for the 
full sample, the constrained and unconstrained groups. In all the regressions we can see that the 
lagged R&D has a significantly positive effect on the current levels of firms’ R&D (reflecting 
the persistence in R&D investment), and the coefficient of the square lagged R&D is negative 
and less than minus one, as expected, based on the specification of the Euler equation model 
and the findings of Bond and Meghir (1994) and Brown and Petersen (2011). The negative 
coefficient of the square lagged R&D implies that the presence of adjustment costs increases 
the distance between the current level of R&D investment and the target level (i.e. the chosen 
new level in presence of adjustment costs will be lower than the target level). This gives the 
incentive for firms to spread these costs out over several periods, generating a continuous and 
smooth adjustment towards their long-run target (Bond and Söderbom, 2013).  
The coefficient of the market-to-book value (MktBook) is significant in all regressions but the 
unconstrained group, which is not at all surprising, as this ratio (average Q) does not contain all 
the investment information relevant to investment demand. Other factors, such as adjustment 
cost and capital market constraints, play an important role in investment demand apart from the 
market-to-book value (Ferderer, 1993; Lensink and Murinde, 2006). Furthermore, in the 
presence of stock prices bubbles, average Q could be poorly measured using stock market 
valuation, leading to a disappointing performance of this measure. On the other hand, the 
coefficients of sales growth (SGr) are statistically significant in the unconstrained group and 
insignificant in the full sample and constrained groups, which is consistent with the findings of 
Mansfield (1964), Lensink and Sterken (2000) and Lensink (2002). 
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Table 4-6: System-GMM estimation results for the dynamic R&D equation. 
In these dynamic R&D regressions, we treated all the financial variables, including ∆𝑾𝑪, as potentially endogenous variables, and we used 
lagged differences dated t-2 as instruments for the regression in levels, and lagged levels dated t-3 and t-6 for the regression in differences. 
The firm fixed effect and time effect are included in all the regressions. Standard errors are robust to within firm serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity.     
Dependent 
Variable: R&D 
   
Sample split a  Full Sample b  Constrained Firms c  Unconstrained Firms d 
R&D i,t-1 0. 924*** e 0.880*** 0.922*** 
 (11.47)f (8.58) (10.24) 
    
R&D i,t-12 -0. 475*** -0.405*** -0.698*** 
 (-5.44) (-3.74) (-12.36) 
    
MktBook i,t 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 
 (5.68) (5.94) (0.53) 
    
SGr i,t 0.000 -0.000 0.048** 
 (0.32) (-0.00) (2.41) 
    
CF i,t 0.060* 0.052 0.127*** 
 (1.82) (1.26) (3.20) 
    
CF i,t-1 -0.055*** -0.033 -0.080*** 
 (-3.55) (-1.58) (-3.71) 
    
Stk i,t 0. 079* 0.081* 0.114* 
 (1.87) (1.95) (1.84) 
    
Stk i,t-1 -0. 013 -0.014 -0.017** 
 (-1.08) (-0.78) (-2.56) 
    
LTD i,t  0. 067* 0.092** -0.117** 
 (1.79) (2.50) (-2.24) 
    
LTD i,t-1 -0.012 -0.015 -0.014 
 (-0.85) (-1.09) (-0.70) 
    
∆WC i,t  -0. 021 -0.031 -0.065 
 (-0.72) (-0.79) (-1.47) 
    
∆WC i,t-1 -0.052*** -0.057*** -0.040* 
 (-4.00) (-3.40) (-1.77) 
    
No. of Firms  235 132 103 
No. of 
observations 
1286 592 694 
No. of Instruments 94 88 94 
Arellano-Bond test 









    
Arellano-Bond test 
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Notes: 
a.  Based on the dividend pay-out ratio, firms have been split to two groups (constrained firms and 
unconstrained firms). 
b. This sample contains all the firm-year observations for the full sample (constrained and unconstrained 
firms). 
c.This sample contains all the firm-year observations for the constrained firms (firms with zero dividend pay-
outs). 
d. This sample contains all the firm-year observations for the unconstrained firms (firms with positive 
dividend pay-outs). 
e. * indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** 
significant at the 1% level. 
f. Values reported in parentheses are the t-statistics. 
g. The Arellano-Bond test is designed to test the serial correlation in the  first-difference errors in order to 
remove the unobserved firm-specific effect. First order autocorrelation in the first differences is expected, as 
the ∆εit = εit − εit−1  could correlate with ∆εit−1 = εit−1 − εit−2 since they share the εit−1  term. The null 
hypothesis of the Arellano-Bond test is that there is no serial correlation in the first differenced equation. 
h. Rejecting the null hypothesis at the second order condition implies that the model is misspecified. 
i. The Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions is designed to deduce whether the instruments as a group 
are exogenous. The Sargan statistics under the two-step robust GMM estimation are not robust to 
heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation, while the Hansen j-statistics are robust. 
 
 
The coefficient of the current cash flow (CF) is positive and statistically significant in the full 
sample and the unconstrained regressions, which is consistent with the main prediction of 
Hypothesis 1. According to the pecking order theory, firms prefer to use their internally 
generated funds to finance their investment rather than use costly external sources (Bond and 
Meghir, 1994; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Brown and Petersen, 2011). Furthermore, the 
lagged cash flow CFt-1 is negative and statistically significant. This is consistent with the 
findings of Brown and Petersen (2009), and can be explained by the significance of the lagged 
change in net working capital, reflecting the low or negative levels of internal earnings, and 
thus producing a negative coefficient sign of the lagged cash flow. 
However, the coefficient of the cash flow of the constrained group is statistically insignificant, 
indicating that the R&D investment of this group is not determined by the availability of internal 
finance unlike the unconstrained group. The insignificancy is consistent with the findings of 
Del Canto and Gonzalez (1999) and is explained by the fact that the constrained group of small 
firms are generating less or negative cash flow. This is because they are young and have had 
less time to generate internal earnings.    
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However, considering the external sources of finance, the coefficients of the new stock issues 
Stkt are positively and statistically significant in all three regressions. This indicates that firms 
rely heavily on stock issues to finance their R&D, suggesting the importance of and the strong 
link between stock issues and R&D for the small and young firms. Unconstrained firms rely 
more on internally generated cash flow, and on stock issues rather than debt finance, to finance 
their R&D. These findings are, however, consistent with the main prediction of Hypothesis 3, 
which considers common stocks as an ideal financing tool to finance firms’ R&D investment, 
especially for those who have exhausted all their internally generated cash flow. In addition, 
the lagged values of stock issues (Stk)t-1 are negatively and statistically significant for the 
unconstrained group at the 5 percent significance level.  
Further, long-term debt issues have a significant positive effect on the R&D investment of the 
constrained group and the full sample, suggesting that these firms do rely on this source of 
external funding to finance their R&D investment. While on the other hand, debt issue has a 
negative effect on unconstrained firms, reflecting their keenness to reduce their financial 
obligations in order to reduce their risk of financial distress and bankruptcy (Himmelberg and 
Petersen, 1994; Wang and Thornhill, 2010). These findings are inconsistent with Hypothesis 2, 
and do not support the argument that R&D-intensive firms give more emphasis to factors that 
could reduce their risk of bankruptcy or financial distress, unlike the unconstrained firms.    
The results of the effect of stock and debt issues on the R&D investment of the constrained 
firms indicate that, in the absence of internally generated funds, these firms follow the pecking 
order theory, preferring to finance their investments by debt and equity financing in that order, 
reducing the presence of asymmetric information effect on external means of finance (Oliner 
and Rudebusch, 1992). These firms rely more on long-term debt to finance R&D investment 
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than stock issues, as suggested by the two variable coefficients, 0.092 and 0.081, for debt and 
stock issues respectively.       
Most importantly, the coefficients of the current and the lagged change in net working capital 
(∆WC) are negative and statistically significant for all three regressions, with negative signs of 
-0.052, -0.057 and -0.040 respectively. This indicates that when firms are facing financing 
frictions, they rely on working capital as a source of funds to finance and smooth their R&D 
investment. The negative coefficient indicates that firms who are likely to face financing 
friction will rely on working capital (as a store of liquidity) by drawing down liquidity to absorb 
the shocks of the cash-flow variations in the short run.  
However, the coefficient of the change in net working capital of the unconstrained group has a 
statistically negative effect. This shows that this group of firms is more likely to face financing 
problems and the negative sign is unexpected, according to Hypothesis 4 (Fazzari and Petersen, 
1993). These results of the estimated coefficients of the financial variables for the unconstrained 
group suggest that this group of firms relies on working capital to smooth R&D in the periods 
when they are facing high financing frictions.   
Accordingly, the results of this research present evidence that firms are all financially 
constrained, regardless of the criteria used. Indeed, the dividend pay-out criteria helped to 
differentiate the financing preference between small and young financially constrained firms 
listed on AIM, providing a more precise picture of the R&D financing menu of the two different 
groups.    
Beside the coefficient estimates, the results shown in table 4-6 suggest that our dynamic R&D 
investment model performs well. The results of the Arellano-Bond test of the first-difference 
errors at the second order show no auto-correlation, indicating that our model is well specified 
in the three regressions. Further, the results of the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions 
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confirm the validity of our instruments of both first-difference and level equations used in the 
system-GMM estimation, for all three regressions.    
 
4.5.3 Robustness tests and results 
To check the robustness of the system-GMM estimations, three alternative estimation 
approaches were run to test the determinants of the R&D investment of the young, risky and 
high growth firms listed on AIM. First, we re-estimated our dynamic model using an alternative 
estimation procedure, the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator with control for the year fixed 
effect. Second, we re-estimated our dynamic model with a yearly and firm fixed effect (FE). 
Although the OLS and FE estimations are not reliable and the two-step estimator is 
asymptotically more efficient than the OLS estimations, Borisova and Brown (2013) states that, 
the reported OLS and FE estimations are useful in providing a boundary test for the coefficient 
of the GMM estimations.  In the presence of the correlation between the firm fixed effect and 
other explanatory variables in the model, OLS estimations on the lagged dependent variable are 
expected to be upward biased. On the other hand, a downward bias in the FE estimations is 
expected, due to the correlation between the firm fixed effect and lagged dependent variable 
(Nickell, 1981; Hsiao, 1985; Flannery and Hankins, 2013).  
As reported in table 4-7, apart from sales growth, all the explanatory variables are significantly 
consistent with the expectations of the research. However, the OLS estimations present an 
upward bias of the lagged and squared lagged dependent variables in the full sample, the 
constrained and unconstrained groups, as shown in columns 1, 2 and 3 in table 4-7. Controlling 
for the firm fixed effect, the FE estimates in table 4-8 are very similar in nearly all respects to 
the OLS results reported in table 4-7. In particular, we continue to find a statistically significant 
effect of all the explanatory variables apart from sales growth and net change in working capital. 
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However, the magnitude of the lagged dependent variable is almost halved, representing 
downward bias, which is expected and caused by the estimations of the dynamic models with 
firm fixed effect (Borisova and Brown, 2013). It is noted, however, that the magnitudes of the 
lagged dependent variable of the GMM estimations lie in-between the OLS and FE estimations, 
providing robustness to the main findings of this research that is, the reported GMM estimations 
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Table 4-7: Ordinary least square estimation results for the dynamic R&D equation. 
Dependent 
Variable: R&D 
   
Sample split a  Full Sample b  Constrained Firms c  Unconstrained Firms d 
R&D i,t-1 1.014*** e 1.071*** 1.051*** 
 (28.93)f (20.32) (30.62) 
    
R&D i,t-12 -0. 422*** -0.407*** -0.629*** 
 (-13.40) (-8.53) (-13.65) 
    
MktBook i, t 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 
 (5.74) (4.25) (-0.80) 
    
SGr i,t -0.000 0.000 -0.042*** 
 (1.46) (0.74) (6.19) 
    
CF i,t 0. 058*** 0.052*** 0.126*** 
 (5.70) (3.39) (8.77) 
    
CF i, t-1 -0. 069*** -0.050*** -0.113*** 
 (-6.80) (-3.18) (-9.57) 
    
Stk i, t 0. 071*** 0.072*** 0.107*** 
 (9.09) (6.15) (8.74) 
    
Stk i,t-1 -0. 031*** -0.036*** -0.031*** 
 (-5.53) (-4.15) (-5.26) 
    
LTD i,t 0. 070*** 0.079*** 0.109*** 
 (11.48) (9.14) (-7.20) 
    
LTD i,t-1 -0. 023*** -0.032*** -0.002 
 (-3.58) (-3.42) (0.16) 
    
∆WC i,t -0. 018* -0.027* -0.060*** 
 (-1.86) (-1.89) (-5.08) 
    
∆WC i,t-1 -0.054*** -0.056*** -0.024** 
 (-7.17) (-5.00) (-2.13) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
No. of Firms  235 132 103 
    
No. of 
Observations 
1286 592 694 
    
R-Squared 0.7215 0.6985 0.7762 
Notes: 
a.  Based on the dividend pay-out ratio, firms were split into two groups (constrained and unconstrained). 
b. This sample contains all the firm-year observations for the full sample (constrained and unconstrained 
firms). 
c.. This sample contains all the firm-year observations for the constrained firms (firms with zero dividend 
pay-outs). 
d. This sample contains all the firm-year observations for the unconstrained firms (firms with positive 
dividend pay-outs). 
e. * indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** 
significant at the 1% level. 
f. Values reported in parentheses are the t-statistics. 
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Table 4-8: Firm fixed effect estimation results for the dynamic R&D equation. 
Dependent 
Variable: R&D 
   
Sample split a  Full Sample b  Constrained Firms c  Unconstrained Firms d 
R&D i,t-1 0.518*** e 0.521*** 0.529*** 
 (9.92)f (6.44) (7.93) 
    
R&D i,t-12 -0. 232*** -0.222*** -0.384*** 
 (-6.10) (-3.74) (-6.36) 
    
MktBook i, t 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000* 
 (3.27) (2.33) (1.94) 
    
SGr i,t -0.000 0.000 0.055*** 
 (1.52) (0.98) (7.85) 
    
CF i,t 0. 058*** 0.046*** 0.119*** 
 (5.36) (2.81) (8.34) 
    
CF i, t-1 -0. 044*** -0.029 -0.072*** 
 (-4.00) (-1.63) (-5.86) 
    
Stk i, t 0. 056*** 0.058*** 0.099*** 
 (7.01) (4.75) (8.10) 
    
Stk i,t-1 -0. 010 -0.003 -0.011*** 
 (-1.45) (-0.25) (-3.18) 
    
LTD i,t 0. 082*** 0.089*** -0.102*** 
 (13.27) (10.14) (-6.55) 
    
LTD i,t-1 -0. 007 -0.009 -0.011 
 (-1.07) (-1.03) (-0.394) 
    
∆WC i,t -0. 004 -0.009 -0.055*** 
 (-0.40) (-0.62) (-4.69) 
    
∆WC i,t-1 -0.056*** -0.067*** -0.019 
 (-6.42) (-4.53) (-1.63) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
No. of Firms  235 132 103 
    
No. of 
Observations 
1286 592 694 
    
R-Squared 0.6359 0.5936 0.7029 
Notes: 
a.  Based on the dividend pay-out ratio, firms were split into two groups (constrained and unconstrained). 
b. This sample contains all the firm-year observations for the full sample (constrained and unconstrained 
firms). 
c. .This sample contains all the firm-year observations for the constrained firms (firms with zero dividend pay-
outs). 
d. This sample contains all the firm-year observations for the unconstrained firms (firms with positive 
dividend pay-outs). 
e. * indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** 
significant at the 1% level. 
f. Values reported in parentheses are the t-statistics. 
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Finally, where this research follows the homogenous purposeful sampling technique, requiring 
firms to be listed in industries with two-digit SIC (20-39 and 73), reporting positive R&D 
expenditure and to have at least six observations, resulting in a sample of 235 firms, and where 
the research of the third chapter adopted the purposeful sampling technique, requiring firms to 
be listed in industries with two-digit SIC (20-39 and 73) and to have at least two observations, 
resulting in a sample of 630 firms. The results of this chapter are more prone to the selection 
bias problem as it does not account for the decision to carry out R&D expenditure or not. It 
only focuses on the positive R&D reporting firms and not for all firms.    
As a consequence, in the robustness tests of this chapter, we considered re-estimating our 
dynamic model in two stage procedure. The first is by calculating the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) 
from the selection equation that predicts the firms’ probabilities to invest in R&D (as of the 
third chapter). Second, entering IMR into the second stage of the model that estimates the 
determinants of R&D investment using GMM estimations.  
As reported in table (4-9), the new GMM estimations after adding the IMR into the model are 
very similar in nearly all respects to the reported results in table 4-6.  In particular, we continue 
to find significant effect of stock issues and debt issues on R&D of the constrained group, and 
similar significant link between the change in net working capital (∆WC) and R&D. Similarly, 
for the unconstrained group, the two stages estimations continue to show a significant effect of 
cash flow, stock issues and the change in net working capital (∆WC) on R&D. The Arellano-
Bond and Hansen tests suggest that our regressions are well specified, and that the instruments 
used are significantly valid. The findings of the two-stage procedure as in table (4-9) support 
the initial ones in table 4.6, that regardless of the dividend pay-outs as a criteria of splitting 
firms into constrained and unconstrained groups, firms of this research sample are all financially 
constrained. 
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Table 4-9: Two-stage estimation results for the dynamic R&D equation (Including the Inverse 
Mills Ratio). 
In these dynamic R&D regressions, we treated all the financial variables, including ∆𝑾𝑪, as potentially endogenous variables, and we used 
lagged differences dated t-2 as instruments for the regression in levels, and lagged levels dated t-3 and t-6 for the regression in differences. 
The firm fixed effect and time effect are included in all the regressions. Standard errors are robust to within firm serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity.     
Dependent 
Variable: R&D 
   
Sample split a  Full Sample b  Constrained Firms c  Unconstrained Firms d 
R&D i,t-1 0. 908*** e 0.870*** 0.898*** 
 (10.52)f (8.44) (9.67) 
    
R&D i,t-12 -0. 445*** -0.400*** -0.711*** 
 (-5.09) (-3.81) (-12.53) 
    
MktBook i,t 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 
 (7.68) (6.43) (0.63) 
    
SGr i,t 0.000 -0.000 0.049** 
 (0.20) (-0.07) (2.48) 
    
IMR i,t g -0.059 -0.104 0.046 
 (-0.58) (-0.80) (-0.96) 
    
CF i,t 0.063* 0.055 0.111*** 
 (1.83) (1.32) (2.79) 
    
CF i,t-1 -0.051*** -0.030 -0.056*** 
 (-2.97) (-1.27) (-3.25) 
    
Stk i,t 0. 086** 0.082 0.116* 
 (2.19) (1.80) (1.70) 
    
Stk i,t-1 -0. 014 -0.015 -0.013** 
 (-1.00) (-0.77) (-2.08) 
    
LTD i,t  0. 079*** 0.089** -0.123** 
 (3.03) (2.55) (-2.21) 
    
LTD i,t-1 -0.008 -0.013 -0.022 
 (-0.66) (-0.95) (-1.00) 
    
∆WC i,t  -0. 028 -0.034 -0.062 
 (-0.95) (-0.89) (-1.28) 
    
∆WC i,t-1 -0.060*** -0.061*** -0.050** 
 (-4.25) (-3.61) (-2.29) 
    
No. of Firms  234 131 103 
No. of 
observations 
1279 586 693 
No. of Instruments 94 88 94 
Arellano-Bond test 










for AR(2) in first 
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Notes: 
a.  Based on the dividend pay-out ratio, firms have been split to two groups (constrained firms and 
unconstrained firms). 
b. This sample contains all the firm-year observations for the full sample (constrained and unconstrained 
firms). 
c.This sample contains all the firm-year observations for the constrained firms (firms with zero dividend pay-
outs). 
d. This sample contains all the firm-year observations for the unconstrained firms (firms with positive 
dividend pay-outs). 
e. * indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** 
significant at the 1% level. 
f. Values reported in parentheses are the t-statistics. 
g. The Inverse Mills Ratio calculated from the selection equation that predicts corporate probabilities to invest 
in R&D, as in the third chapter. 
h. The Arellano-Bond test is designed to test the serial correlation in the  first-difference errors in order to 
remove the unobserved firm-specific effect. First order autocorrelation in the first differences is expected, as 
the ∆εit = εit − εit−1  could correlate with ∆εit−1 = εit−1 − εit−2 since they share the εit−1  term. The null 
hypothesis of the Arellano-Bond test is that there is no serial correlation in the first differenced equation. 
i. Rejecting the null hypothesis at the second order condition implies that the model is misspecified. 
j. The Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions is designed to deduce whether the instruments as a group 
are exogenous. The Sargan statistics under the two-step robust GMM estimation are not robust to 





To the best of knowledge, this is the first study to examine the determinants of R&D 
expenditure, the existence of financing constraints and the role of working capital on R&D 
smoothing of the young, small and high growth firms listed on the AIM market. The research 
has included the change in net working capital as a source of funds, along with other financial 
variables, to emphasize the importance for financially constrained firms to smooth R&D when 
faced with transitory finance shocks. To formally test the use of these financial variables on 
R&D investment for the firms listed on the alternative investment market, we used the system-
GMM estimator to estimate our dynamic R&D investment model, which included firms’ source 
of finance (cash-flow, new stock issues or long-term debt issues) and the change in net working 
capital as explanatory variables. For financially constrained firms with zero dividend pay-outs, 
we find strong evidence that the determinant of R&D investment is the level of previous R&D 
investment, and that firms rely on stock issues to finance this investment. Moreover, our results 
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show that constrained firms rely heavily on debt issues to finance this type of investment, but 
do not rely on internally generated funds as a source of finance. Further, we find strong evidence 
that working capital is used by firms to finance their R&D investment when they are likely to 
face financing frictions, as they rely on working capital (as a store of liquidity) and draw down 
liquidity to absorb the shocks of cash flow variations in the short run, in order to maintain a 
smooth flow of R&D spending in the presence of finance shocks. 
On the other hand, our findings show that the level of R&D investment of the unconstrained 
firms (firms with positive dividend pay-outs) is greatly determined by the previous levels of 
R&D, and that firms rely mostly on internally generated funds to finance this type of investment. 
Unlike constrained firms, unconstrained ones do not rely on new long-term debt issues to 
finance their R&D investment, but rather rely partially on new stock issues. Further, our results 
show that a change in working capital does have an impact on the level of R&D for 
unconstrained firms; in contrast to this research expectation, these firms were assumed to be 
















 The Impact of the Disposal of Fixed Asset Proceeds on 
R&D expenditure: Evidence from the AIM Market 
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5 The Impact of the Disposal of Fixed Asset Proceeds on 
R&D expenditure: Evidence from the AIM Market 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Over the last decades, attention has been paid to investigating corporate investment and 
financing decisions, and the effect of financing constraints on firms’ investment activities, with 
regard to both tangible and intangible assets.  A firm’s manager faces the decision of how to 
raise finance. Current research mainly focuses on firms’ choices between internal and external 
financing channels, these being those internally generated funds, issuing equity and obtaining 
debt. Consequently, various theories classifying different vital factors for a firm’s external 
financing decisions have emerged. By relaxing the assumptions of the perfect capital market 
model of no information asymmetry, the pecking-order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) and 
Myers (1984) argues that corporate external financing is favoured as it exhibits the least 
information asymmetry.  
Similarly, concerning the existence of tax and bankruptcy costs, the trade-off model states that 
firms would seek to reach optimal debt-to-equity levels in order to maximize their value, by 
weighing the costs and benefits of having more debt; that is, the reduction in the agency cost of 
equity and tax shields (Myers, 1984). The market-timing model claims that firms’ capital 
structure is based on the accumulated attempts of managers to time the securities market (Baker 
and Wurgler, 2002). Baker and Wurgler suggest that managers are in favour of selling securities 
when mispricing is greater.  
The literature claims that, because of capital market imperfection and severe information 
asymmetries, corporate investment expenditure is greatly affected by the available sources of 
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finance. Consistent with the view that corporate investment expenditure is correlated with the 
means of financing it, corporate expenditure is influenced by a firm’s financial structure and 
financial constraints (Fazzari et al., 1988; Bond and Meghir, 1994; Hubbard, 1997; Borisova 
and Brown, 2013; Guariglia and Liu, 2014). While there is solid research on corporate financing 
through issuing securities, another core source of finance is the proceeds of selling tangible 
assets40, which has not been examined in detail.  
Hite et al. (1987) investigated motives for corporate asset sales and stated that “in several cases, 
management indicated that assets were being sold to raise capital for expansion of existing lines 
of business or to reduce high levels of debt. In other words, selling assets was viewed as an 
alternative to the sale of new securities”. Other researchers have found that management sells 
assets for a financing motive, providing the cheapest available funds to pursue their objectives 
(Brown et al., 1994; Lang et al., 1995; Borisova et al., 2013). Hovakimian and Titman (2003) 
show that sales of tangible assets lead to increased corporate investment, and Borisova and 
Brown (2013) found that financially constrained firms sold assets to finance R&D investment, 
suggesting that asset sales are mainly undertaken to raise cheap capital. Maksimovic and 
Phillips (2001) and Edmans and Mann (2013) also report that companies sell assets in response 
to financial constraints.  
The vast majority of the related research mainly focuses on fixed capital investment, and 
ignores other firm activities, some of which are critical drivers for firm expansion and general 
macroeconomic growth, in particular R&D investment. The characteristics of R&D 
investment41, make it more susceptible to financing difficulties. It is of great importance to 
                                                 
40 Tangible assets in this context are defined as assets which are insignificant for the firm’s operations (non-core 
tangible assets). However, they act as spare finance if needed and can often be sold; they can also contribute to the 
business but are not vital for its success. 
41  R&D investment is mainly characterised by offering low collateral value, associated with asymmetric 
information problems, and risky and uncertain investment, as the success of its output is not guaranteed, and only 
generates profits with a time lag if successful. 
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provide more information on how R&D expenditure is affected by capital market imperfections 
(Brown and Floros, 2012; Guariglia and Liu, 2014). 
Despite the fact that R&D investment plays an important role in firms’ growth and is prone to 
financing constraints, few studies have focused on the effects of financing constraints on R&D 
investment for young, small and high growth firms. For such firms, financing constraints can 
lead to a considerably lower level of R&D investment than what would be optimal. If financing 
constraints are binding firms’ level of R&D investments, such constraints will lead to lower 
growth levels.  
The lack of research on the financial constraint effect on the R&D activities of young and small 
firms has motivated this research. This chapter fills this gap, which is an overlooked issue in 
the current literature. More precisely, this research attempts to make progress in testing the 
sensitivity of investment in R&D to cash proceeds from the sale of tangible fixed assets of AIM-
listed firms.    
 
5.2 Research aim and objectives 
Despite the fact that R&D investment has a significant positive effect on the growth of firms 
and economies at both aggregate and disaggregate levels (Arrow, 1962; Cohen and Levinthal, 
1989; Romer, 1990) relatively little is known about the determinants of firms’ expenditure on 
R&D activities, either in the UK or in other developed countries. This chapter aims to explore 
this important issue, frequently overlooked in the existing literature, to identify the impact of 
financial constraints on R&D investment. In the chapter, we aim to examine directly the role 
that the disposal of tangible asset proceeds has on the level of R&D expenditure of firms listed 
on AIM. 
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Young, small and high growth firms mainly turn to stock markets to finance their growth 
opportunities, in particular their R&D activities. R&D active firms suffer from little or no access 
to debt financing, since R&D offers little or no collateral value and is associated with a high 
degree of uncertainty (Piga and Atzeni, 2007; Brighi and Torluccio, 2009; Wang and Thornhill, 
2010). Firms’ internally generated funds are considered to be too volatile as sources to finance 
R&D investment in the early stages (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Bhagat and Welch, 1995). 
Stock issues are the main source of additional funds for firms to finance R&D (Brown and 
Petersen, 2009; Chen et al., 2010; Brown et al., 2012). R&D expenditure is almost exclusively 
financed from volatile sources, internally generated funds and stock issues. Investigating 
whether capital market imperfection significantly affects expenditure on the R&D investment 
of the young and small firms listed on AIM can dramatically change the existing view on 
financing constraints. Thus, this study falls within one of the current lines of research into the 
impact of financial constraints on R&D investment, emphasising the role that disposal of 
tangible assets has on determining the level of expenditure on this investment. 
The role of the disposal of fixed asset proceeds in R&D expenditure has been overlooked and 
virtually no attention has been paid to young and small listed firms. This research attempts to 
fill this gap in the literature and provide a clearer view of the determinants that influence 
corporate expenditure on R&D investment. From a policy perspective, the findings should help 
design strategies, taking into account the accessibility to various sources of funds, to assist 
AIM-listed firms make R&D investment expenditure.  
To the best of knowledge, no investigation has been made on the sensitivity of firm investment 
in R&D to cash raised from the sales of fixed assets due to the financing constraints on R&D. 
One contribution of this chapter is that no such study has been made on a developed country 
(in this case, the UK). The proportional lack of evidence on whether the sources of finance 
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matter for R&D in the UK is a puzzle, and calls into question whether financing constraints are 
of considerable importance for R&D expenditure in the UK. 
A second contribution is that, whereas most previous empirical studies have been almost 
exclusively based on testing large and mature firms, this work is devoted to focusing on young, 
small AIM-listed firms and their financing of R&D expenditure. A third contribution of this 
research relates to the applied methodology. A vast number of studies rely on either the firm’s 
age or size or its dividend pay-out ratio to categorise them as financially constrained or 
unconstrained42. We considered three ways of separating the firms, since we are already dealing 
with young and small ones. For robustness, we follow Hovakimian and Titman (2003) and 
Borisova and Brown (2013) and estimate the likelihood of financial regimes for each firm based 








                                                 
42 Researchers argue that small or young firms are more prone to financing constraints (have high levels of 
information asymmetry) than large or mature firms, and firms with zero dividend pay-out are more financially 
constrained than firms with positive dividend pay-outs (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993; Weigand and Audretsch, 1999; 
Brown and Petersen, 2011). 
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5.3  Theoretical framework and hypotheses derivation  
5.3.1 Introduction 
By relaxing the perfect capital market assumptions proposed by the work of Modigliani and 
Miller (1958), and later Miller and Modigliani (1961), we consider corporate investment in 
risky intangible investments that is, R&D (please refer to section 4.3.1 for further and deeper 
details). The remainder of the chapter will proceed as follows. Section 5.3.2 briefly reviews 
possible financing constraints and asset sell-off motives and section 5.3.3 reviews the corporate 
motives for investment smoothing. Section 5.3.4 will briefly review the role of the disposal of 
fixed asset proceeds on R&D investment, while section 5.3.5 reviews the development of the 
hypothesis of the role of disposal of fixed asset proceeds on R&D expenditure. However, it is 
worth mentioning that the core theories of corporate investment and corporate finance can be 
found in the previous chapter (specifically in section 4.3.2 and 4.3.3).   
  
5.3.2  Financing constraints and asset sell-off motives 
While the main objective of any individual firm is to achieve the best possible return for its 
owners, it should dispose of unneeded assets, as well as concentrating on financing its 
promising activities with the cheapest available source of finance. This section will discuss why 
firms favour the disposal of tangible assets, which enables current activities to be continued. 
In a world with perfect capital markets, firms would not face any pressure to undertake any 
voluntary asset sell-offs. In such a world, there would be no transaction costs, asymmetric 
information, uncertainty, and no financial constraints. The money markets would reflect all 
available information, and firms would borrow and lend at the same interest rate. Previous 
studies have claimed that a firm’s expenditure on real investment depends on financial factors. 
176 | P a g e  
 
External finance, if accessible, is considered to be costlier than internal finance due to 
asymmetric information, transaction costs, tax advantages and the cost of financial distress.        
Many of the arguments rest on the difference between firm managers having more information 
about the firm’s investment horizons and existing capital than investors, who cannot distinguish 
between the quality and value of firms. The different information sets force outsiders to value 
individual firms according to the population average. In debt markets, Jaffee and Russell (1976) 
claim that severe information asymmetry causes lenders to raise the cost of new debt, and/or 
ration credit. Jaffee and Russell argue that if distinguishing between the quality of borrowers is 
a difficult process for lenders, the market reaction will result in increasing interest rates and/or 
limiting loan sizes. As a consequence, if the interest rate rises, marginally good quality 
borrowers will leave the market (adverse selection) or firms will undertake riskier projects 
(moral hazard), making the probability of default on creditors higher and expected profits lower 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984; Toivanen and Cressy, 2002). 
In the equity markets, new investors may be less knowledgeable compared to insiders about 
firms’ new investment opportunities and their existing capital. In such a state of affairs, Myers 
and Majluf (1984) point out that investors may not be able to differentiate between the quality 
and value of firms, forcing outsiders to value a particular firm at the population average. In 
these circumstances, Akerlof (1970) explains why firms sell new stocks at a discount. He states 
that if stock issuers have more information than investors about the quality of the firm, insiders 
would not be in favour of accepting the terms offered by outsiders, forcing the new stock issues 
to be sold at a lower price than would have been the case if the outsiders had had full access to 
the same information as the insiders. However, when the external fund channels are only 
available at a premium, or are rationed, the fluctuations in the internally generated funds 
(internal finance) will affect firms’ investment.  
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Brown et al. (1994) and Hovakimian and Titman (2003) indicate that strategies that involve 
investment with financing from the disposal of tangible asset proceeds offer a real substantial 
advantage over others. When firms are faced with uncertainty concerning their expected levels 
of future cash flows, incurring extra costs for those with insufficient cash balances to cover 
expenses, several strategies need to be considered. Among these strategies, selling-off tangible 
assets is an option.   
Hite et al. (1987) and Hovakimian and Titman (2003) claim that this strategy might be the 
lowest cost approach to the problem of uncertainty and its costs. Researchers argue that 
strategies involving the selling-off of tangible assets is one of the most efficient ways in which 
firms can respond to many of the problems that have been caused by the imperfections of the 
real-world. Like any other sources of financing, it is clear that economists have recognised the 
disposal of fixed asset proceeds as an important source of finance for financially distressed 
firms.   
Previous research provides two main explanations for why healthy firms frequently sell-off 
tangible assets. Hite et al. (1987) and Ofek (1993) state that a firm’s voluntary sell-off of assets 
can be motivated by the need for a restructuring process. The sale of assets allows firms to 
achieve the best operational efficiency by selling assets to improve productive departments or 
by selling assets that generate negative synergies to other core departments. Hovakimian and 
Titman (2003) argue that this motivation, asset sell-off, will mainly influence the corporate 
expenditure of firms that face financial constraints.   
The second motive, as stated by Brown et al. (1994) and Hovakimian and Titman (2003), is 
mainly present in financially constrained firms, as the assets sale is an internally and privately 
negotiated transaction. In addition, it may represent the cheapest source of finance compared to 
external equity and debt sources for firms that face severe information asymmetry problems. 
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Financially constrained firms may have a strong motive to sell off assets to raise funds for 
alternative promising investments. In both cases, we would expect there to be a strong 
relationship between investment and asset sales for financially distressed firms (Lang et al., 
1995). 
 
5.3.3 Investment smoothing 
Several empirical studies have found evidence for the effects of constraints on a firm’s capital 
structure (see, for example, Fazzari et al., 1988; Oliner and Rudebusch, 1992; Bond and Meghir, 
1994). These studies have ignored the possibility that financially constrained firms may choose 
to smooth their investments relative to transitory cash-flow shocks due to adjustment costs. In 
this context, Lucas (1967) proposed the idea of investment smoothing, by which the marginal 
adjustment costs of acquiring and obtaining capital rise as the rate of investment increases. 
Thus, if the marginal adjustment costs rise, firms with any long-term path of capital 
accumulation will tend to reduce these costs by maintaining a stable path of investment over 
time. Another motivation, identified by Fazzari and Petersen (1993), shows that firms cannot 
hold or delay investment projects without incurring costs, as in fast-growing industries, firms’ 
innovations continuously generate new investment opportunities. These projects should be 
undertaken as they arise, or their value will sharply decline because of the appropriability43 
problem, and the short product life cycle. Furthermore, Brown et al. (2012) support the idea of 
firms’ investment smoothing (specifically for R&D investment), as those firms engaged in this 
                                                 
43  Appropriability is defined as the environmental factors that govern an innovator's ability to obtain profits 
generated from its inventions or innovations (Lopez, 2009) 
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type of investment have a strong incentive to keep R&D smooth in order to avoid the associated 
high adjustment costs44. 
Finally, whereas investment spending measures take place continuously, promising investment 
projects often take time to complete and will only generate profits with a time lag. Thus, it may 
be costly for a firm to make any changes to the expenditure on projects in progress when faced 
with financing shocks or any temporary shortfalls in cash flow.  Large changes in employment 
or capital stock are considered too costly, and high adjustment costs give firms an incentive to 
spread out adjustment costs over time.  
 
5.3.4 The role of the disposal of fixed asset proceeds in R&D investment  
Among other investments, R&D is characterized by high adjustment costs (Himmelberg and 
Petersen, 1994; Brown and Petersen, 2011). The activity consists of high wage payments to 
trained and highly skilled workers, for example scientists, engineers and technology workers. 
These expert workers often require a lot of firm-specific training, which makes their laying-off 
a costly decision, even if the cutting back on R&D activity is temporary and due to transitory 
binding financing shocks. If such a temporary cutting back is required, firms have to consider 
the costs of such a decision; for instance, the cost of hiring and training new workers in the 
future. Cutting R&D expenditure in the short run and laying off workers creates extra hiring 
and training costs in the future. 
Researchers state that, although these costs are very high for firms, the more costly drawbacks 
can be in relation to the fact that laid-off workers know firm-specific commercial secrets and 
                                                 
44 Adjustment costs in this context are defined as the costs associated with making any changes or cuts in R&D 
investment at the firm level (e.g. the costs of hiring and training new employees, or the costs of lost production in 
the case of having to lay off knowledge workers). 
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valuable information, which could be transferred to competitors. This information may damage 
the value of the innovation in process, which is considered to be too costly for firms 
(Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Brown et al., 2012; Brown et al., 2013).  
Another important characteristic of corporate R&D investment can be viewed from the aspect 
that this activity is hard to finance through external funding channels, but equity appears to be 
the only realistic source of finance (Switzer, 1984; Hall, 1992; Wang and Thornhill, 2010). The 
first reason can be explained by the fact that R&D is a risky investment and is considered to be 
uncertain. This is due to the output of such activities not being guaranteed, and its income 
inflows can only be generated with a time lag in cases of success. The second reason that makes 
equity the only realistic source of external finance is that R&D is associated with high levels of 
information asymmetry. Furthermore, when the R&D activities offer little or no collateral value, 
it makes it problematic for R&D expenditure to be funded by debt financing. Finally, as R&D 
is a risky and uncertain investment, firms attempt to reduce their financial obligations to avoid 
increasing the risk of financial distress, a problem that can be extremely severe for R&D 
performing firms.     
External and internal equity have more advantages over debt as sources of finance for R&D 
investment. Equity by its nature does not impose financial obligations on firms; for example, 
making fixed interest payments. However, internally generated funds and external equity 
cannot be considered as perfect substitutes (Myers and Majluf, 1984). External equity financing 
incurs sizable flotation costs, as well as requiring a “lemon premium”. Thus, internally 
generated funds are more preferable for firms compared to the external equity channel, as they 
are less costly (Akerlof, 1970). 
Because external and internal sources of finance are considered volatile sources of funds, and 
as internal financing is associated with a high degree of variability, researchers conclude that 
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equity issues are the main marginal external source of finance for R&D activities (Brown et al., 
2009). However, considering the size of the R&D performing firm, researchers point out that 
issuing equity appears to be more volatile because of market timing45. As they are volatile 
sources of finance for the R&D expenditure of small and young firms, which need to avoid high 
adjustment costs, they must consider all options. Firms facing binding financing constraints 
may have a strong motive to voluntarily sell off tangible assets as a last resort, when considered 
as the cheapest available source of finance in order to finance their R&D activities.      
In this context, Brown et al. (1994) have advocated the idea of investment financing with the 
selling off of tangible assets. Brown et al. point out that firms consider asset sales as a way of 
resolving financial distress. In an attempt to examine the motives and the consequences of the 
asset sales of financially constrained firms, it has been suggested that they consider asset sales 
as an important way of resolving financial distress. Creditors have a significant influence on 
the disposal of assets by financially distressed firms and the proceeds of the disposal of assets 
are more likely to be used for paying off creditors.  Similarly, investigations by Lang et al. 
(1995) and by Shin (2008) on the use of asset sales proceeds suggest that firms sell assets when 
funds are needed to continue with long-term projects and when alternative means are either 
unavailable or too expensive. 
More recently, pioneering work by Hovakimian and Titman (2003) examines whether proceeds 
from voluntary asset sales have an influence on corporate investment expenditure, especially 
for firms that are more likely to be financially constrained. Their findings suggest that firms’ 
investments are significantly determined by the cash inflows from the sales of fixed assets and 
that this relationship is significantly stronger for firms that are more likely to be financially 
                                                 
45 Several studies show that stock market mispricing substantially affects the cost of issuing new external equity 
and has a considerable impact on firms’ use of external equity finance (Graham and Harvey, 2001; Baker and 
Wurgler, 2002)  
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constrained. These results lend support to the financing hypothesis and the conclusions of Lang 
et al. (1995) and Shin (2008).   
A number of other studies provide theoretical models and empirical evidence to show how firms 
can finance their investment expenditure through asset sales, for example Edmans and Mann 
(2013). They find empirical evidence that the financing motive for firms to allow asset sales 
occurs when selling equity takes place at a discount. More specifically, and concerning the role 
that the disposal of asset proceeds plays in determining the level of expenditure on R&D 
investment, the recent pioneering work by Borisova and Brown (2013) provides evidence that 
there is a significant relationship between corporate R&D expenditure and the cash inflow 
proceeds from the disposal of fixed assets. However, this positive link is only observable among 
constrained firms (i.e. the ones most likely to face binding financing frictions). 
A number of studies have provided theoretical rigour and empirical results on how the selling 
off of tangible assets can benefit firms facing financing frictions, and how the disposal of 
proceeds plays a role in determining corporate investment expenditure. However, few have 
investigated the role of the disposal of proceeds in the R&D by small and young firms listed on  
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5.3.5  Hypothesis development 
Considering the relationship between internal and external financing and corporate R&D 
activities, this section will formulate a testable hypothesis on the association between the 
proceeds from the disposal of fixed assets and corporate R&D expenditure.  
Management’s objective is to maximise value for their shareholders. R&D activities help firms 
achieve a better performance by generating new products and developing new services (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1989). The outcome of R&D helps to provide firms with some differentiation 
that creates opportunities in the market, thus increasing firms’ competitive advantage over 
competitors (Bosworth et al., 1993). R&D by its nature is a risky and uncertain investment, 
making it more susceptible to financing constraints. In contrast, fixed assets value a firm’s size. 
Managers will have less incentive to sell assets, unless required funds cannot be raised cheaply 
on the capital market. Firms’ motives for raising funds can be viewed by their need to reduce 
the possibility of financial distress, to undertake promising investments, increase their working 
capital accounts and to pay dividends (Scherr, 1989; Lang et al., 1995). If firms need to raise 
funds to pursue R&D activities but cannot obtain debt financing because of the riskiness and 
the little or no collateral value that R&D investment offers (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; 
Wang and Thornhill, 2010), outsiders will know that the firms needs external funds, though 
they will find it difficult to access the capital market because of adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems (Toivanen and Cressy, 2002). Equity as a financing channel will incur a lemon 
premium for new stock issues (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and debt finance will incur high 
interest expenses for R&D expenditure, if available (Wang and Thornhill, 2010). If firms are in 
need of external funds to finance risky and uncertain investments, capital providers will require 
a higher rate of return or will impose a restriction on the use of funds (Fazzari et al., 1988). 
Several reasons make asset sales more preferable as a source of finance for firms than the capital 
markets. For example, the information asymmetry problem would be less important for the 
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asset that is intended to be sold than for the firm as whole. Selling assets to provide funds would 
potentially impose fewer restrictions on firms to pursue their R&D activities. Finally, asset sales 
may have an advantage in avoiding/saving on the recapitalization costs that would be required 
to be paid to raise funds (Lang et al., 1995). Because of the lower cost of asset sales over 
external funds, this chapter suggests that funds from the disposal of fixed assets should be 
considered as a significant source of finance for R&D investment (Lang et al., 1995; 
Hovakimian and Titman, 2003; Shin, 2008; Edmans and Mann, 2013; Borisova and Brown, 
2013). Thus we state that 
Hypothesis 1.  There is a positive relationship between R&D investment and 
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5.4 Data and preliminary analysis 
5.4.1 Data and Measurement  
To examine the role that the disposal of fixed asset proceeds has on the level of R&D 
expenditure of small and young firms, a dataset has been constructed of all active and inactive 
firms listed on AIM. The unbalanced dataset comprises all publicly listed firms and was 
obtained from the Worldscope database and the London stock exchange official website 
covering the period from 1999 to 2014. We only focus on the listed manufacturing and service 
firms, with two-digit SICs of 20-39 and 73, as R&D activities mainly take place in these 
industries.  
The total number of AIM-listed firms, both surviving and non-surviving, was 1858. There were 
746 listed firms in manufacturing and services with two-digit SICs of 20-39 and 73, of which 
379 firmed were delisted during the period 1999 to 2014. The delisted firms ceased trading and 
were not involved in mergers or acquisition.  
Since this research uses the system-GMM estimators which rely on lagged values as 
instruments, we required firms to have at least six consecutive observations over the period 
1999 to 2014. Excluding firms reporting no R&D and firms with fewer than six records of the 
essential variables, the final sample of the research comprised 235 firms. Before moving to 
preliminary analysis of the role of the disposal of fixed asset proceeds on R&D expenditure, it 
is important to define the main variables used in the analysis. Table 5-1 briefly describes the 
main variables and their data sources. 
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Table 5-1: Description of the main variables used in this chapter. 
Variable Name Description a Source b 
R&D it The ratio of research and development expenses at time t 
divided by the book value of total assets at the end of time 
t-1.  
Worldscope 
Market to Book it  
(MktBook) 
The ratio of the market value of total assets at time t-1 
divided by the book value of total assets at time t-1. 
DataStream 
Sales Growth it  
(SGrowth) 
The change in net sales between the end of time t and the 
end of time t-1, divided by the value of net sales at the end 
of time t-1. 
Worldscope  
Cash Flow it 
(CF) 
The ratio of the gross internally generated cash flow at time 
t divided by the book value of total assets at the end of time 
t-1, where the gross cash flow is defined as after tax income 
before extraordinary items and preferred dividend plus 
depreciation, depletion and amortisation expenses, 
proceeds from disposal of fixed assets plus research and 
development expenses c. 
Worldscope 
Stock Issues it  
(StkIssues) 
The net cash raised from stock issues in time t divided by 
the book value of total assets at the end of period t-1, where 
net cash raised from stock issues is equal to the sales or 
issuance of common and preferred stocks minus the 
purchase of common and preferred stocks. 
Worldscope 
Long-Term Debt 
Issues it  
(DbtIssues ) 
The net cash raised from long-term debt issues at time t 
divided by the book value of total assets at the end of 
period t-1, where the net cash raised from long-term debt 




Change in Net 
Working Capital it  
(DWC) 
The change in net working capital between the end of time 
t and the end of time t-1, divided by the book value of total 
assets at the end of time t-1, where net working capital is 
the current assets (principally cash and equivalents, 
inventory and accounts receivable) minus current liability 
(chiefly accounts payable and short-term debt). 
Worldscope 
Disposal of Fixed 
Assets it  
(DFA) 
The net cash proceeds from the sale of tangible assets 
(property, plant and equipment) at time t divided by the 
book value of total assets at the end of period t-1.  
Worldscope 
Notes: 
a. The measurement of variables and definition is based on the current literature. 
b. The data were collected from Datastream and Worldscope via Thomson One Banker Analytics. 
c. Since firms treat R&D as an expense, R&D is added back into the usual accounting definition of cash flow (Himmelberg and 
Petersen, 1994; Brown and Petersen, 2011). 
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5.4.2  Summary Statistics  
In order to avoid bias in the estimate of parameters and significant test statistics, Yuan and 
Bentler (2001) and Verardi and Croux (2009) warn about the presence of outliers in the datasets.  
Consequently, we screened some of our explanatory variables to reduce their potential influence 
on the estimate parameters. We winsorized the explanatory variables, namely Sales Growth 
(SGrowth) and Cash Flow (CF), at the 1 per cent level of their respective distribution. The 
winsor transformation mechanism simply works by setting all observations in the top 1% equal 
to value corresponding to the 99th percentile, with a similar process applied to the bottom 1%. 
The significant importance of this process is that it reduces the impact of outliers on the estimate 
parameters, as well as allowing for the full use of the data set. 
Table 5-2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the main variables. The statistics show that 
the mean of R&D is slightly higher than its median, indicating that it is skewed to the right; 
similarly, the means of MktBook, SGrowth, StkIssues, DbtIssues, the change in net working 
capital (DWC), and the cash raised from the disposal of fixed assets (DFA) are all skewed to 
the right, with mean values higher than the median. The mean of Cash Flow (CF) is lower than 
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Table 5-2: Summary statistics of the main variables employed in this empirical chapter. 
  
The potentially constrained and unconstrained groups were split according to the dividend pay-
outs ratio. Panel A of table 5-3 presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables for firms 
reporting positive dividend pay-outs, while panel B presents the descriptive statistics for firms 
that report zero dividend pay-outs. As shown in the figures, apart from the fact that firms 
reporting positive dividend pay-outs are almost two-thirds the size of firms with zero dividend 
pay-outs, there are six noteworthy differences between the two groups. 
First, in contrast to the literature expectations, for example the financial constraint model, the 
mean value of R&D of the constrained group (firms with zero dividend pay-outs) is three times 
higher the mean value of the unconstrained group, at 19% compared to 6%.  The second 
difference presented by the figures is that the sales growth of the constrained group is almost 
eight times higher than that of the unconstrained one. This difference might be explained by the 
189 | P a g e  
 
difference in R&D expenditure between the two groups. Firms with high R&D expenditure 
might have more product and process innovations, thus increasing their sales growth, especially 
if compared to firms with lower R&D expenditure.  
Table 5-3: Summary statistics of the main variables for constrained and unconstrained groups. 
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The third important difference to note is that the mean value of the cash flow of the constrained 
group is large and negative compared to the unconstrained group, -13% compared to 12%. The 
mean of the cash flow might indicate that, although constrained firms have higher sales growth, 
they might be not profitable enough due to the nature of their investment (R&D) or alternatively 
because a large number of these firms are newly listed, so have had little time to generate 
internal cash flows (Brown and Petersen, 2011). 
Fourth, in line with the expectations of the pecking order theory, the constrained group issues 
more stocks compared to the unconstrained group. This gives support to the argument of Myers 
(1984) that in the need for external sources of finance, R&D performing firms prefer to finance 
their R&D activities through stock issues rather than debt. Fifth, in contrast to research 
expectations, the constrained group with high means of R&D expenditure issue more debt than 
the unconstrained group, suggesting that unlike the constrained group, unconstrained firms are 
the ones that insist on reducing their financial obligations in order to reduce their probability of 
bankruptcy or financial distress (Wang and Thornhill, 2010; Martinsson, 2010; Brown et al., 
2012).   
Finally, the mean value of the change in net working capital shows that constrained firms insist 
more on the short-term buffering sources of finance, as the mean value of this group is six times 
higher than that of the unconstrained group. This however, is logical, especially if considering 
the negative mean value of cash flow of this group.           
Table 5-4 presents the pair-wise correlation matrix of the variables. The figures show that the 
dependent variable (R&D) is significantly correlated with all the explanatory variables, but not 
with the disposal of fixed assets (DFA). The correlation signs are not entirely consistent with 
the implication proposed in the prior sections, for example the correlation signs with Cash Flow 
(CF) and with the disposal of fixed assets (DFA). The higher coefficient values were observed 
191 | P a g e  
 
in the change in net working capital (DWC) and the stock issues (StkIssues), the cash flow (CF) 
and the new stock issues (StkIssues) and in sales growth (SGrowth) and new debt issues 
(DbtIssues) respectively.       
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CF   
 
StkIssues   
 
  DbtIssues 
 
DWC   
 




R&D 1.000 a                
 
 
MktBook 0.1068*** b 1.000        
 
 
SGrowth  0.1354*** 0.0060 1.000       
 
 
CF  -0.2221*** -0.0588**c -0.0065 1.000      
 
 
StkIssues 0.6691***b 0.0673*** 0.0711*** -0.2595*** 1.000     
 
 
DbtIssues -0.2023*** -0.0094 0.2243*** -0.0754*** 0.1340*** 1.000    
 
 
DWC 0.4005*** -0.0946*** 0.0544** 0.1380*** 0.7513*** 0.0823*** 1.000   
 
 
DFA -0.0144 -0.0081 -0.0269 -0.1028*** -0.0011 -0.0041  0.0337 1.000  
Notes: 
a The reported figures are the pair-wise Pearson correlation coefficients between variables. 
b Statistically significant at the 1% level; c  statistically significant at the 5% level; d statistically significant at the 10% level.
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5.5 The dynamic model of R&D investment  
5.5.1 Methodology 
Expenditure on R&D activities can be determined by numerous factors. Most of the previous 
research conducted on the expenditure levels on R&D investment have focused on firms’ 
sources of external finance and the availability of internally generated funds, neglecting the 
cash raised from the disposal of fixed assets and its connection with R&D investment. In order 
to investigate this connection, the dynamic nature of decisions must be considered.  
Flannery and Hankins (2013) state that in corporate dynamic models, the unobserved time-
invariant effects need to be controlled for, in particular differences across firms (the firm 
effects). They argue that applying the least squares dummy variable estimator in dynamic 
panels, in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, produces a downward bias for the lagged 
dependent variable coefficient estimate. Bias in the coefficient estimate is caused by the 
correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the firm-fixed effect. For these reasons, 
the system-GMM estimator has become a widely used approach in the area of corporate finance 
using dynamic panel data (Hansen, 2010).  
Roodman (2009) and Flannery and Hankins (2013) state that system-GMM is an estimator that 
has been specially designed for panel data analysis. It is considered to be the best estimator for 
use in estimating dynamic models in corporate finance and is designed to cope with the different 
assumptions about the data-generating process ( please refer to section 4.5.1 for more details).  
Following Hovakimian and Titman (2003) and Borisova and Brown (2013), we investigate the 
connection between R&D investment and the cash raised from the disposal of fixed assets to 
examine the role that disposal proceeds, as source of funding, play in determining the level of 
R&D spending in a standard dynamic investment model. The general form of our empirical 
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model is presented below, with controls for investment demand, namely sales growth and the 
market-to-book ratio. 
 
𝑹&𝑫𝒊,𝒕 = 𝜷𝟏𝑹&𝑫𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑹&𝑫
𝟐
𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟑𝑴𝒌𝒕𝑩𝒐𝒐𝒌𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑺𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑪𝑭𝒊,𝒕 +
𝜷𝟔𝑪𝑭𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟕𝑺𝒕𝒌𝑰𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟖𝑺𝒕𝒌𝑰𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟗𝑫𝒃𝒕𝑰𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒊,𝒕 +
𝜷𝟏𝟎𝑫𝒃𝒕𝑰𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑫𝑾𝑪𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟐𝑫𝑾𝑪𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟏𝟑𝑫𝑭𝑨𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟒𝑫𝑭𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝒇𝒊 +
𝒅𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕                                      (1) 
 
 
In this model, we control for the unobserved determinants of R&D at the firm-specific level by 
including the firm-fixed effect (i.e. to control for industrial and technological characteristics). 
Furthermore, we include the year fixed effect46 to control for any shocks that may influence 
R&D demand, for example macroeconomic fluctuations. Table 5-5 summarizes the expected 







                                                 
46 In implementing the GMM estimations, errors are assumed to be correlated within individuals only, and not 
across them. Therefore, Roodman (2009) indicates that time dummies should be included in the model in order to 
remove the time-related shocks from the errors.  
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Considering the potential endogeneity among the variables47 of our empirical model, and the 
dynamic structure of the R&D investment model, we estimate our research regression using the 
System Generalized Methods of Moments estimator (System-GMM), developed by Arellano 
and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). This estimator simply works by forming a 
system, combining an equation in differences with another equation in levels of variables, in 
which lagged differences are used as instruments for the equation in levels and lagged levels 
are use as instruments for the equation in differences. The use of instruments in such a way 
addresses the weak instrument problem of endogenous variables, and is considered as a solution 
to the endogeneity problem. The financial variables, including the cash raised from the disposal 
of fixed assets (DFA), are all treated as potentially endogenous variables. 
 
5.5.2 Results 
Table 5-6 presents the dynamic R&D regression results using ordinary least squares (OLS), 
least square dummy variable or firm-fixed effects (LSDV), difference-Generalized Method of 
Moment (Diff-GMM), one-step System GMM (One-GMM) and two-step System GMM (Two-
GMM) on the full sample.  
The first column presents the results of the OLS regression on the pooled firm-year observations 
with a control for the year-fixed effect. The second column presents the within-firm regression 
estimates with a control for yearly and firm-fixed effects. In the first regression estimates, all 
the explanatory variables are statistically significant, apart from the disposal of fixed assets and 
sales growth. Except for long-term debt, all the coefficient signs are consistent with 
                                                 
47 Since there is a causal connection between firm-level investment and the source of financing (internal or 
external), we treated all the financial variables in our empirical model (including the disposal of fixed asset 
proceeds) as potentially endogenous variables (Fazzari et al., 1988; Bond and Meghir, 1994; Flannery and 
Hankins, 2013). For example, the decision to raise funds through external sources is endogenous and jointly 
determined with the decision on where and how to spend the funds; further, the decision on the level of R&D 
investment is endogenous and jointly determined with the sources and the levels of funds.  
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expectations. In the second regression, apart from sales growth, net change in working capital 
and disposal of fixed assets, all the other variables have a statistically significant effect. The 
signs of the coefficient estimates are the same as those obtained from the OLS estimates, but 
the magnitude of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is almost halved. This fall in 
magnitude is consistent with the downward bias indicated by Flannery and Hankins (2013) 
when estimating dynamic data with the firm-fixed effect.  
The sign of the squared lagged dependent variable is negative and statistically significant. This 
is consistent with the specification of the Euler equation model and the findings of Bond and 
Meghir (1994) and Brown and Petersen (2011). The market-to-book ratio is significantly and 
positively associated with R&D expenditure, consistent with its role as a control for investment 
demand.  The coefficients of sales growth are statistically insignificant in both regressions, 
suggesting a poor control for R&D spending via the accelerator model. 
The results of the OLS regression show that cash flow, stock issues and debt issues are all 
positively associated with spending on R&D. The positive sign of debt issues is consistent with 
some of the literature, but at odds with the research focus, with firms not recognising debt as a 
source for financing R&D to reduce the risk of default. However, the negative sign of the 
change in net working capital is consistent with our expectations, reflecting firms’ use of their 
liquid assets to smooth R&D activities, as explained in the previous empirical chapter. Finally, 
the sign of the disposal of fixed assets is negative and statistically insignificant. However, these 
results are not reliable, as the correlation between lagged dependant variables and the 
unobservable fixed effect is not zero, making the regression estimates inconsistent. 
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Table 5-6: Estimation results of the dynamic R&D regression (R&D sensitivity to the disposal of fixed asset proceeds). 
 (OLS) (LSDV) (Diff-GMM) (One-GMM) (Two-GMM) 
 RD RD RD RD RD 
R&D i,t-1 1.015*** 0.535*** 0.053 0.952*** 0.941*** 
 (29.17) (10.16) (0.67) (11.87) (12.60) 
      
R&D i,t-12 -0.420*** -0.239*** -0.099 -0.477*** -0.475*** 
 (-13.40) (-6.28) (-1.06) (-5.62) (-5.97) 
      
Mkt/Book i,t 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (5.81) (3.33) (2.90) (7.85) (8.67) 
      
SGrowth i,t 0.0016 0.0013 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 
 (1.58) (1.20) (1.50) (0.33) (0.60) 
      
CF i,t 0.0583*** 0.0583*** 0.0612** 0.0645* 0.0617** 
 (5.70) (5.35) (2.09) (1.82) (2.01) 
      
CF i,t-1 -0.0679*** -0.0453*** -0.0226 -0.0534*** -0.0570** 
 (-6.59) (-4.06) (-1.35) (-3.29) (-3.06) 
      
StkIssues i,t 0.0714*** 0.0571*** 0.0447 0.0860** 0.0873** 
 (9.14) (7.03) (1.26) (2.14) (2.52) 
      
StkIssues i,t-1 -0.0315*** -0.0115 -0.0084 -0.0146 -0.0162 
 (-5.66) (-1.54) (-0.60) (-1.09) (-1.05) 
      
DbtIssues i,t 0.0710*** 0.0828*** 0.0975*** 0.0789*** 0.0739** 
 (11.53) (13.13) (5.13) (2.93) (2.33) 
      
DbtIssues i,t-1 -0.0247*** -0.0079 -0.0218 -0.0082 -0.0099 
 (-3.75) (-1.20) (1.48) (-0.60) (-0.72) 
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DWC i,t -0.0183* -0.0041 0.0130 -0.0263 -0.0224 
 (-1.88) (-0.41) (0.48) (-0.88) (-0.88) 
      
DWC i,t-1 -0.0507*** -0.0539*** -0.0408*** -0.0598*** -0.0537*** 
 (-6.68) (-6.15) (-2.67) (-4.56) (-3.25) 
      
DFA i,t -0.0382 0.0238 -0.0584 -0.0341 -0.038 
 (-0.63) (0.36) (1.07) (-0.66) (-1.10) 
      
DFA i,t-1 -0.221*** -0.119*** -0.0483 -0.2025*** -0.172*** 
 (-5.46) (-2.92) (-1.11) (-5.07) (-4.57) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
      
No. of 
observations 
1283 1283 1029 1283 1283 
      
No. of Firms  235 235 199 235 235 
R-Squared 0.7266 0.6480    
      
No. of 
Instruments 
  81 97 97 






      






      






t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Consequently, as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), the difference Generalized Method 
of Moment estimator (diff-GMM) is specially designed to eliminate the firm-specific effect by 
taking the first difference. Although this procedure removes the firm-fixed effect problem, it 
cannot eliminate the correlation between lagged dependent variables and the disturbances. 
Therefore, instruments that are correlated with the independent variables but not with the error 
term are required to treat the endogeneity problem. Therefore, we use lagged levels of all the 
explanatory variables (dated t-2 to t-6) as instruments for the equation in differences. The results 
are presented in the third column of table 5-6 and the coefficient of the lag and the squared lag 
of the dependent variable and the stock issues all become insignificant. Blundell and Bond 
(1998), however, state that the difference-GMM estimator suffers from the weak instrument 
problem that arises because of the weak correlation between the instruments and endogenous 
variables in the model. This makes the results of the difference-GMM inconclusive.  
However, Blundell and Bond have improved the GMM estimator by combining the moment 
conditions of the level equation with those for the difference equation, producing the System-
GMM estimator. The application of this estimator allows us to choose between using one-step 
or two-step estimation. The main difference between these estimations is that the one-step 
estimator assumes homoscedastic errors, while the two-step one assumes heteroscedastic errors.  
Roodman (2009) points out that the second estimator is asymptotically more efficient than the 
one-step estimator. However, he further points out that the standard errors of the two-step 
estimation tend to be downward biased, so it is important to use finite-sample correction of the 
standard errors. Consequently, in the estimation of this model, we consider applying finite 
sample correction for the applied two-step system-GMM estimator. In the system specification, 
we use lagged differences dated t-2 as instruments for the equation in levels, and lagged levels 
dated t-3 to t-6 as instruments for the equation in differences.  
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Columns 4 and 5 of table 5-6 present the one-step and two-step estimates respectively. The 
results of the two estimates are very similar in significance but slightly different in magnitude. 
In both regressions, the lagged dependent variable has a statistically significant positive effect 
on the current levels of R&D expenditure. Furthermore, the coefficient of the square lagged 
level of R&D is significantly negative, which is entirely consistent with our expectations and 
the findings of previous research (for example, Bond and Meghir, 1994; Brown and Petersen, 
2011). 
In comparison with the previous three regressions, the coefficient of the market-to-book ratio 
is statistically significant and positively associated with R&D expenditure, while the 
coefficients of sales growth are positively insignificant.  
The significance of the cash flow variable was consistent with what was expected according to 
pecking-order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984). However, the insignificance of 
lagged cash flow was contrary to this research expectation. One explanation could be that the 
youngest firms have had less time to generate internal funds, or worse, have had negative 
internally generated cash flows (Del Canto and Gonzalez, 1999).  
The strong link between stock issues and R&D investment indicates that firms rely heavily on 
this funding to finance their R&D, which is consistent with expectations. However, the 
significant positive association between debt issue and R&D expenditure is unexpected, 
although consistent with previous research, as suggested by trade-off theory (Myers, 1984). 
Finally, the association of both change in net working capital and disposal of fixed assets and 
R&D expenditure are statically insignificant which is against expectations. However, the lagged 
values were negatively and statistically significant. The consistency of the system-GMM 
estimator was verified by Hansen’s J-test of over-identifying restrictions, and the 
autocorrelation test of Arellano and Bond (1991).  
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The model presented in Table 5-6 was estimated for the full sample. However, classifying the 
data into two sub-samples48, reflecting constrained and unconstrained firms, could provide a 
better picture of the association between explanatory variables and the R&D expenditure of 
AIM-listed firms. Using the dividend pay-out criteria, columns 1 and 2 of table 5-7 present the 
regression results for constrained and constrained firms.  
  
                                                 
48 According to the corporate finance literature, a large number of researchers rely on firm age, firm size or the 
firm’s dividend pay-out ratio to split their study samples (i.e. to split their samples into groups of firms which are 
less likely to be financially constrained and those that are more likely to be financially unconstrained). In this 
chapter, as we are dealing with young and small firms in particular, which, according to the previous literature, 
are considered to be more likely to be financially constrained (more prone to information asymmetry problems) 
(Brown and Petersen., 2011; Brown and Floros., 2012), we considered the dividend pay-out ratio as the way for 
splitting groups.  Fazzari et al. (1988) and Fazzari and Petersen (1993) argue that firms which are more likely to 
face financing frictions will have zero dividend pay-outs, while firms that are less likely to face financing frictions 
will have positive dividend  pay-outs.  
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Table 5-7: Estimates from the two step System-GMM for firms based on their classification. 
 (No-Div) (Div) 
 RD RD 
R&Di,t-1 0.9477*** 0.9496*** 
 (9.76) (8.89) 
   
R&D i,t-12 -0.4434*** -0.7340*** 
 (-4.69) (-11.21) 
   
Mkt/Book i,t 0.0002*** -0.0005 
 (7.45) (0.53) 
   
SGrouth i,t 0.0000 0.0466*** 
 (-0.19) (2.34) 
   
CF i,t 0.0611 0.1161*** 
 (1.45) (2.81) 
   
CF i,t-1 -0.0369 -0.0765*** 
 (-1.27) (-3.02) 
   
StkIssues i,t 0.0888** 0.1130* 
 (2.04) (1.96) 
   
StkIssues i,t-1 -0.0151 -0.0189** 
 (-0.68) (-2.59) 
   
DbtIssues i,t 0.0880** -0.1166** 
 (2.05) (-2.38) 
   
DbtIssues i,t-1 -0.0160 -0.0099 
 (-0.90) (-0.53) 
   
DWC i,t -0.0324 -0.0652 
 (-0.81) (-1.55) 
   
DWC i,t-1 -0.0570*** -0.0411* 
 (-2.82) (-1.55) 
   
DFA i,t -0.0574 0.0625 
 (-0.36) (1.66) 
   
DFA i,t-1 -0.3419*** -0.0631* 
 (-3.73) (-1.67) 
   
Year dummies Yes Yes 
   
No. of observations 590 693 
   
No. of Firms 132 103 
   
No. of Instruments 89 95 












   
 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
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For both regression equations, the lagged level of R&D is positively and significantly associated 
with the current level of R&D expenditure, reflecting the persistence in R&D investment. The 
coefficient of the square lagged R&D is significantly negative, being close to one for both 
groups. These results are consistent with the previous findings of Bond and Meghir (1994) and 
Brown and Petersen (2011). The negative coefficient on the square lagged R&D implies that 
the presence of adjustment costs increases the distance between the current level of R&D 
investment and the target level.  
The coefficients of the market-to-book value (MktBook) are positively and significantly 
associated with the level of R&D for the constrained group, but not for the unconstrained firms. 
On the other hand, sales growth for R&D investment, as with the accelerator model, is 
positively and statistically significant for the unconstrained group, but not for the constrained 
one. The difference in the results for the control variables is due to the information relevant to 
investment demand, with other factors such as capital market constraints and adjustment costs 
playing an important role in determining investment demand. 
The coefficient of cash flow is positive and statistically significant in the second regression but 
not the first (i.e. firms with zero dividend pay-outs), which is consistent with the pecking order 
model. This suggests firms prefer to use internally generated funds to finance their investment 
first, rather than using costly external sources of funds. However, the insignificance of the first 
regression can be partially explained by the fact that the youngest firms have had less time to 
generate internal funds, or worse, have negative internally generated cash flows (Bond and 
Meghir, 1994; Del Canto and Gonzalez, 1999; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Brown and 
Petersen, 2011).  
Considering external sources of finance, the coefficients of the issues of new stock are 
positively and statistically significant in both regressions. These findings are consistent with 
the previous literature and confirm that common stocks are an ideal financing means for funding 
205 | P a g e  
 
R&D investment.  In addition, the issue of long-term debt, as an external source of finance, is 
statistically significant with a positive sign for the constrained group and negative for the 
unconstrained one.  
The negative sign of the unconstrained regression suggests that these firms do not rely on this 
source of external funding to finance their R&D investment, whereas they insist more on 
reducing their financial obligations in order to reduce their risk of financial distress and 
bankruptcy (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Wang and Thornhill, 2010). On the other hand, 
the positive and statistically significant effect of debt issues on R&D investment for the 
constrained group reflects that, in the absence of internally generated funds, these firms follow 
the trade-off theory in structuring their capital, which is contrary to our research expectation, 
but consistent with the previous literature. The coefficient of the change in net working capital 
is negatively but not statistically insignificant in both regressions, in contrary to their lagged 
values, being statistically significant. The negative coefficient sign indicates that firms rely on 
working capital as a store of liquidity, by drawing it down to absorb the shocks of cash flow 
variations in the short run.  
Most importantly, the coefficient of the disposal of fixed assets is statistically significant in 
both regressions, with a negative sign, in contrast to what was expected. The significance of the 
lagged values indicates that when firms are voluntarily selling off their fixed assets, they reduce 
their expenditure on R&D investments; in contrast to the previous research findings, there is no 
positive association between the disposal of fixed asset proceeds and the R&D expenditure of 
the AIM-listed firms. The results suggest that the selling off of fixed assets, as a source of funds 
to finance R&D investment, does not take place. The negative sign may be explained by the 
fact that selling off assets reduces the value of firms, and may increase the firm’s level of risk 
if the proceeds are devoted to more risky investments. An alternative explanation may be related 
to the characteristics of the AIM-listed firms that are small and young. Selling off tangible 
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assets to avoid binding financing constraints presents a negative shrinking in size to firms. As 
a result, this requires firms to reduce and restructure their sources of risks (R&D) accordingly, 
in order to increase their probability of survival. 
These results present evidence that, regardless of dividend pay-outs as the splitting criterion, 
both groups of firms (with positive and no dividend pay-outs) are financially constrained. 
However, this criterion has helped to differentiate the financing preferences of the two groups 
in the financing menu of their R&D activities. 
5.5.3 Robustness tests and results 
To check for the robustness of the system-GMM estimation results, we considered a number of 
alternative specification and estimation approaches to test the connection between the disposal 
of fixed asset proceeds and the level of R&D expenditure of AIM-listed firms. We re-estimated 
our dynamic model with an alternative estimation procedure, the one-step GMM estimator. 
Although finite-sample correction was employed to address the downward bias of the two-step 
estimations, Roodman (2009) states that the reported standard errors from the two-step 
estimator tend to be downward biased in small samples. However, we re-estimated the model 
using a one-step estimator to check the robustness of our results. The one-step estimates given 
in table 5-8 are similar in nearly all aspects to the reported results in table 5-7. In particular, we 
continue to find a significant positive effect for the stock and debt issue variables for the 
potentially constrained group. There is a similar significant link between the net change in 
working capital, disposal of fixed asset proceeds and R&D. However, for the unconstrained 
group (firms with positive dividend pay-outs), the one-step estimations continue to show a 
positive significant effect of stock issues and cash flow on R&D, and a negative association 
with debt issues. The Arellano-Bond and Hansen tests indicate that our regressions are well 
specified, and that the instruments employed are valid. 
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Table 5-8: One-step System-GMM estimates of the constrained and unconstrained groups. 
 (No-Div) (Div) 
 RD RD 
R&D i,t-1 0.9448*** 0.9485*** 
 (10.10) (9.04) 
   
R&D i,t-12 -0.4354*** -0.7326*** 
 (-4.96) (-11.37) 
   
Mkt/Book i,t 0.0002*** -0.0005 
 (7.40) (0.53) 
   
SGrouth i,t -0.0000 0.0475** 
 (-0.03) (2.31) 
   
CF i,t 0.0579 0.1169*** 
 (1.39) (2.74) 
   
CF i,t-1 -0.0343 -0.0762*** 
 (-1.61) (-2.99) 
   
StkIssues i,t 0.0887* 0.1161* 
 (1.92) (1.95) 
   
StkIssues i,t-1 -0.0167 -0.0192*** 
 (-0.92) (-2.79) 
   
DbtIssues i,t 0.0883*** -0.1216* 
 (3.76) (-2.31) 
   
DbtIssues i,t-1 -0.0160 -0.0122 
 (-1.23) (-0.65) 
   
DWC i,t -0.0336 -0.0662 
 (-0.91) (-1.45) 
   
DWC i,t-1 -0.0609*** -0.0422* 
 (-3.64) (-1.97) 
   
DFA i,t -0.0370 0.0729 
 (-0.25) (1.38) 
   
DFA i,t-1 -0.3409*** -0.0672 
 (-3.85) (-1.63) 
   
Year dummies Yes Yes 
   
No. of observations 590 693 
   
No. of Firms 132 103 
   
No. of Instruments 89 95 












   
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
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5.6 Conclusion 
This is the first study that investigates the sensitivity of R&D expenditure to proceeds from the 
disposal of fixed assets for AIM-listed firms. Along with the other financial variables, we 
included the disposal of fixed asset proceeds as a source of funds to emphasize its role in 
determining R&D expenditure. Several approaches were employed to estimate the dynamic 
R&D investment model.  
For the financially constrained group, we find strong evidence that R&D expenditure is 
determined by the level of previous R&D investment, and that this group of firms relies on 
stock issues as a source of funds to finance this investment. In contrast to expectations, our 
results show that constrained firms rely on debt issues to finance R&D investment, but do not 
rely on internally generated funds as a source of finance. We further find evidence that the 
constrained group uses working capital as a source of funds to finance their R&D investment 
in the short run when they are likely to face binding financing constraints. Most importantly, in 
contrast to the previous literature, we find a negative association between R&D expenditure 
and the proceeds from the disposal of fixed assets. We argue that this negative association is 
observed because the selling off of tangible assets overcomes binding financing constraints, 
reduces a firm’s value and increases the level of risk if proceeds are devoted to more risky 
investment. Therefore, firms are required to adjust their risky R&D investment in order to 
increase their survival chances in the market.  
On the other hand, our findings show that the level of R&D investment of the unconstrained 
firms is largely determined by the previous levels of R&D, and firms rely mostly on internally 
generated funds and stock issues to finance their R&D activities. Unlike constrained firms, the 
R&D expenditure of the unconstrained firms is negatively associated with new debt issues, 
suggesting that this group of firms insists more on reducing their financial obligations in order 
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to reduce their risk of financial distress and bankruptcy. Finally, our results show that there is 
an impact of working capital accounts and the proceeds from the disposal of fixed assets on 
R&D expenditure; in contrast to prior expectations, this group of firms is less likely to face 
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6 Conclusion   
6.1 Summary 
In this thesis we have attempted to investigate some of factors that affect the probability of 
firms undertaking R&D investment, as well as the determinants that have an effect on the level 
of expenditure on this activity in the presence of financial constraints, using a panel dataset of 
the manufacturing and service firms listed on AIM. It is one of the first studies to focus on the 
AIM  in the UK. It sheds more lights on the effects of the UK government’s policies on R&D 
activities, and helps to solve the puzzle of whether financing constraints have a significant 
impact on the R&D and innovation of the young and small firms listed in the UK. 
Drawing on a literature survey, we aimed to enrich the existing body of knowledge on the 
determinants of R&D investments by offering evidence from AIM for the period 1999 to 2014. 
In the analysis of the thesis, we attempted to build on and improve the previous work in each 
of the three stand-alone chapters, as well as attempting to improve the estimation techniques to 
lessen the disadvantages of applying inadequate statistics that may affect the conclusions drawn 
from each investigation.  
This chapter aims to conclude the thesis by briefly summarizing the key findings and 
conclusions, highlighting the observed gaps and the research contributions. The practical 
implications of the findings are discussed and the research limitations and ideas for future 
research are presented. 
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6.2 Key findings and conclusions 
6.2.1 Incentives for corporate decisions to make R&D investment 
A survey of the literature shows that, although much effort has been devoted to investigating 
the determinants of R&D activities, industrial and financial factors have typically been 
considered and examined separately, rather than together. Hence there has been no overview of 
R&D determinants. However, researchers have recently started to consider both types of factors 
when modelling decisions to undertake R&D expenditure. The estimation approaches which 
have been taken in the current literature are mainly OLS, Logit and Probit, and the models are 
in a static form.   
According to the review of the literature, there was a gap on the government fiscal impact on 
R&D activities. Chapter 3 analysed the micro, meso and macro level factors on R&D 
investment. Specific hypotheses where derived with reference to the literature and tested on a 
sample of 630 firms listed on AIM between the periods 1999 to 2014. The dynamic form of 
undertaking such investment decisions was estimated, avoiding the biased results achieved by 
testing static models; we applied the dynamic logistic estimation approach, which controlled 
for the initial condition problem. 
In addition to the lagged dependent variable, the main results suggest that large-sized firms are 
better at stimulating innovative activities. This result can be explained by the fact that large 
firms are more able to diversify their R&D projects. A large firm can make the results of its 
R&D activities more profitable in a larger market, and cover the cost of hiring highly skilled 
workers (Nelson, 1959; Cooper, 1964; Graves and Langowitz, 1993; Vaona and Pianta, 2008; 
Herrera and Sánchez-González, 2013). 
 The results also suggest that age is negatively associated with the probability of carrying out 
R&D activities, which means that young firms tend to have the highest probability of investing 
213 | P a g e  
 
in R&D. In addition, competitive markets were found better at stimulating innovative activities, 
which is in contrast to the Schumpeterian hypothesis. Finally, in contrast to the literature on the 
impact of fiscal policies on innovation, this work suggests that corporate tax rates have a 
positive impact on R&D investment. This finding can be explained by the fact that firms tend 
to allocate more of their resources to projects in which they can avoid paying taxes, since R&D 
expenditure is tax deductible. The higher the corporate tax rate, the higher the degree of risk 
sharing with the government. 
   
6.2.2 Corporate R&D financing menu 
Recent theoretical research explains that corporate investment expenditure is based on several 
investment theories and models; for example, Tobin’s Q model, the accelerator model and the 
financing constraint model. Apart from Tobin’s Q and the accelerator models, the financial 
constraint model considers sources of finance as the key determinants for investment. 
Accordingly, the second chapter of this research investigated the determinants of R&D 
expenditure on AIM; the effect of financing constraints on R&D investment; and the role that 
working capital plays in smoothing the path of R&D in the presence of financial constraints.   
Due to the high adjustment costs associated with R&D investment, and the need for smoothing 
such an investment to avoid associated costs, researchers have considered the role that 
precautionary cash holding accounts may play in smoothing the path of R&D spending for firms 
that are facing binding financing constraints. For example, Brown and Petersen (2011) and 
Guariglia and Liu (2014) found evidence that constrained firms can maintain a relatively 
smooth path of R&D spending by drawing down their precautionary cash holdings accounts. 
However, little research has considered the role that working capital accounts may play in 
smoothing R&D spending in the presence of financing constraints. This work emphasizes the 
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overlooked role of working capital as an input and an easily reversible store of liquidity in R&D 
smoothing.  
Four testable hypotheses where proposed and tested on a panel data-set of the 235 UK firms 
listed on the AIM, over the period 1999 to 2014. The system-GMM estimator was used to 
estimate the model due to the dynamic nature of the model, to control for the biases that may 
occur because of the dynamic generating process, the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, 
the unobserved time-invariant effects and the endogeneity of explanatory variables.  
For constrained firms, we found strong evidence that the sources of finance that determine R&D 
investment are the proceeds from stock issues and long-term debt issues, but not the internally 
generated funds. However, in the presence of financing constraints, firms draw down liquidity 
from working capital accounts to absorb the shocks of cash flow variations in the short run, 
maintaining a smooth path of R&D spending, and avoiding the high adjustment costs associated 
with it.   
On the other hand, unlike constrained firms, the results suggest that the determinants of R&D 
spending for unconstrained firms (firms with positive dividend pay-outs) are internally 
generated funds and the proceeds from stock issues, but not the new long-term debt issues. 
Finally, the results suggest that working capital accounts have an impact on R&D expenditure 
for unconstrained firms, which is in contrast to this research expectation that firms with positive 
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6.2.3 Financing constraints, disposal of fixed assets and the impact on R&D 
expenditure 
The comprehensive review of the literature also shows that, although firms rely on stock issues 
to finance their R&D investment, they do suffer from the capital market imperfection. These 
real world imperfections introduce several problems that firms need to deal with. For example, 
they can face uncertainty over their expected levels of future cash flows, and such uncertainty 
would incur extra costs for firms with insufficient cash balances to cover expenses. Several 
strategies need to be introduced, among them the selling off of tangible assets.   
Hite et al. (1987) and Hovakimian and Titman (2003) claim that this strategy might be the 
lowest cost approach to the problem of uncertainty and its costs. The selling-off of tangible 
assets is one of the most important ways in which firms can respond to financing problems 
caused by the imperfections of the real world. Like any other source of financing, it is clear that 
economists have recognised the disposal of fixed asset proceeds as an important source of 
finance for financially constrained firms.   
This work, however, has been devoted to examining the importance of financial constraints on 
R&D expenditure by directly examining the role that the disposal of fixed asset proceeds plays 
in determining the level of R&D spending. To the best of knowledge, this is the first study of 
its kind to emphasize the importance of financing constraints on R&D investment for AIM-
listed firms. A hypothesis on the impact of the disposal of fixed asset proceeds was devised and 
tested on a panel of 235 firms, over the period 1999 to 2014.  
In contrast to the current literature, this research found a negative association between R&D 
expenditure and cash raised from voluntary asset sales, indicating severe binding financing 
constraints. Using several estimation approaches, we did observe a negative association 
between the cash raised from the disposal of fixed assets and R&D investment. The selling off 
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of tangible assets overcomes binding financing constraints but reduces a firm’s value and 
increases its level of risk if the proceeds are devoted to more risky investments. This suggests 
that firms need to reduce and restructure their sources of risks to increase their chances of 
continuation and survival in the market. 
 
6.3 Research contributions  
The thesis analyses the factors that influence corporate decisions on undertaking R&D 
investment, and the determinants that affect the level of expenditure, with reference to the 
manufacturing and services firms listed on AIM. The first empirical chapter is original, as it 
uses a dynamic logistic model that covers the theoretical incentives of making R&D investment, 
including fiscal policy factors. Furthermore, the second and the third empirical chapters are 
pioneering as they emphasise the role of working capital accounts and the disposal of fixed 
asset proceeds in the presence of binding financial constraints. Conducting such research makes 
important contributions that may enrich the existing literature and improve understanding of 
the intangible corporate activities that contribute to the growth of economies, that is, R&D 
investment.        
More specifically, the contributions of this thesis are categorised based on each of the stand-
alone chapters. In chapter 3, while most empirical research on the incentives that influence a 
firm’s decision to make R&D investment has considered the effect of market environmental 
factors and firm-specific factors, this analysis was mainly devoted to empirically investigating 
the effect of fiscal policy on undertaking such investment. 
 Such an investigation is of great importance, especially for policymakers, as it sheds light on 
whether these government incentives have a significant impact on motivating firms to carry out 
R&D activities in the UK. A second contribution is that most previous empirical research has 
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been almost exclusively based on investigating large and mature firms. In this work we aim to 
contribute by investigating the determinants and the incentives of carrying out R&D activity of 
small and young firms. Owing to their different characteristics, importance and contributions 
to the economy, it is important to observe what influences firms on AIM, and further to assess 
the generous schemes offered by the UK government to this type of firm.  
The third contribution of this work concerns the applied methodology. Previous research has 
ignored the dynamic process of undertaking such investment decisions, and has failed to control 
for the initial condition issues. However, this work contributes to the knowledge by building its 
results on the estimates of the dynamic logistic model which controls for the initial condition 
issues with unobserved heterogeneity.  
Chapter 4 focused on R&D investment and its association with high adjustment costs and 
financing with volatile internal and external sources. It is argued that firms which are facing 
binding financing constraints may not be able to maintain a smooth path of R&D spending. 
Therefore, researchers have found evidence that corporate cash holding plays a role in this 
process, and provide evidence of corporate financial constraints. Drawing on an intensive 
survey of the literature, few studies have considered the potential role of working capital 
accounts as a source of liquidity in smoothing R&D investment in the presence of R&D 
financing constraints.  
The contributions of this work are fourfold. First, this is one of the first studies to use UK data. 
The proportional lack of evidence that sources of finance matter for R&D in the UK is a puzzle, 
and calls into question whether financing constraints have a significantly important role in R&D 
and innovation in this modern economy. A second contribution is that, whereas most of the 
previous empirical studies that examine the existence and importance of financing constraints 
on R&D have been based almost exclusively on testing large and mature firms, this work is 
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more focused on young, small listed firms. Considering this group in particular can dramatically 
alter the conclusions regarding the importance of financing constraints.  
A third contribution is that this work provides more accurate and more decisive tests for the 
presence of financing constraints in R&D investment by employing the overlooked role of 
working capital. In particular, if financing constraints matter for R&D, a negative link between 
R&D and the changes in net working capital should be observed, implying that firms draw on 
liquidity reserves (in the form of working capital) for R&D smoothing. This study is the first 
of its kind to test the role of working capital on R&D smoothing and to emphasize its importance 
for firms’ financial policies.  
A large number of studies rely on either the firm age or size, or dividend pay-out ratio criteria 
to split their samples into financially constrained and unconstrained firms. This work considers 
a combination of all three mechanisms. A precise classification of the sample firms helps to 
eliminate biased estimations, which could affect the empirical results and conclusions reached. 
In chapter 5, it is suggested that asset sales are mainly undertaken to raise cheap capital for 
financially constrained firms. However, only a few studies have examined the impact of the 
disposal of proceeds on R&D investment. This thesis has aimed to fill the gap. To the best of 
the knowledge, no such investigation have been made to explore how the sensitivity between 
firm investment in R&D and cash raised from the sales of fixed assets influences the existence 
of financing constraints on R&D.  The second contribution is that no such investigation has 
been made on the UK, a developed country. And the third contribution is that this work is 
devoted to focusing on young, small listed firms in particular. Such an investigation of this type 
of firm can dramatically alter the conclusions regarding the importance of financing constraints.   
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6.4 Implications of the research findings 
The research findings and conclusions will contribute to the existing academic knowledge. 
However, the broader practical implications may help policy makers, corporate managers and 
investors. 
6.4.1 Implications for policy-makers 
Since this thesis is mainly devoted to empirically investigating the corporate tax incentives of 
R&D and the financing of R&D for UK listed firms, we first consider the practical 
implementation for policymakers. First, the results suggest that the corporate tax rate is 
positively and significantly associated with R&D investment. The rationale is that, since R&D 
expenditure is tax deductible, it is a tax shield for firms to allocate more of their resources 
towards R&D projects, through which they can avoid paying taxes. Therefore, in practice, 
policymakers should consider the nature of the target business before setting tax policies. To 
encourage R&D expenditure, increasing the tax rate could be the right step, representing a 
degree of risk sharing by the government.  
Second, where the empirical results show that the R&D investments of the AIM-listed firms 
are more likely to be financial constrained, it is argued that financially less constrained firms 
would be better at stimulating such investments compared to financially constrained firms. 
Previous research, for example Bond et al. (2003), has characterised the UK financial system 
as a highly challenging market in channelling investment capital towards firms with high 
growth opportunities because of the information asymmetry dilemma. This results from the 
arm’s-length relationship between firms and finance providers. Therefore, an implication for 
policymakers is the need to mitigate the degree of information asymmetry. In this way, a highly 
motivating environment for corporate financing and investment can be created.     
        
220 | P a g e  
 
6.4.2 Implications for corporate managers 
In addition to the implications for policymakers, the findings and conclusions of this research 
are relevant for corporate managers. First, there is an insignificant role of R&D tax relief, and 
according to the HMRC office, there is a small number of regular claimants. This implies that 
corporate decision makers need to consider the cost benefit of this relief, and consequently this 
may increase their probability of being engaged in the process.   
Second, the empirical evidence suggests that UK firms are likely to be financially constrained, 
which presents a profound implication for corporate managers in ensuring smooth levels of 
R&D expenditure. The empirical findings suggest that, in the presence of financial constraints, 
firms draw down liquidity from working capital accounts to absorb the shocks that may affect 
the required smooth path of spending on R&D, or otherwise bear high adjustment costs. 
Managers therefore need to consider various cash flow possibilities, and also consider 
emergency action on the management of working capital accounts in such cases.  
For example, when firms are faced with negative cash flow shocks, managers might be better 
off adjusting current asset accounts, thereby freeing liquidity to smooth R&D spending levels. 
More precisely, managers can draw down cash holdings, tighten up their credit sales and/or 
consume their raw materials faster than they are replaced. Similarly, managers can adjust their 
current liabilities accounts; for example, by delaying the payments on accounts payable and/or 
increasing their use of trade credit (considering free financing means in the short run).  
In addition, managers might consider the use of short-term debt, which in some cases can be 
collateralized with credit sales accounts. Contrary management strategies are applied to 
working capital accounts when firms are faced with positive cash flow shocks, or have access 
to the capital market, through which they can build up their liquidity positions that might be 
easily liquidated into cash in emergencies, and generate profits in the normal circumstances. 
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 However, it worth noting that strategies involving the management of working capital accounts 
are considered as short-term buffering strategies to smooth corporate R&D activities.  Finally, 
managers may be advised to consider a market-timing strategy to ensure a strong working 
capital position and in this way to assure a successful escape in the presence of financial 
constraints in the short run. 
          
6.4.3 Implications for investors 
In addition to the implications for policymakers and corporate managers, the findings and 
conclusions of this thesis may also have implications for investors. While general investors 
consider the dividend pay-out ratio as a sign of a good corporate management and operations, 
they generally have more sentiment towards investing in firms with high dividend pay-out 
ratios. In practice, however, investors may not consider the interaction that might exist between 
the dividend pay-out ratio, the level of investment and financing sources. In fact, this ratio is 
greatly and directly affected by the corporate level of investment and the accessibility to sources 
of finance. In addition, it is highly affected by the type of business, and the nature of the industry 
in which it competes.  
Subsequently, if investors give more weight to the dividend pay-out ratio when considering 
their investment decisions, this might direct corporations towards investing in less risky and 
low net present value projects. Therefore, an implication would be that investors should 
consider that the dividend pay-out ratio does not always reflect a true picture of firms, and a 
company with a high ratio is not always the best for shareholders. This ratio needs to be 
considered in the context of the firm's nature, investment opportunities and its financing 
abilities.     
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Further, risk averse investors may prefer to invest in large, mature firms rather than young, 
small ones, as they are considered to be less risky as they are more established.  Young, small 
firms mainly turn to stock markets for funding purposes, to finance their growth opportunities. 
Considering the economic logic of “Small Is Beautiful” would be an important implication for 
investors, especially if small firms suffer from little or no access to debt and limited amounts 
of internally generated funds to finance their R&D activities. 
   
6.5 Research limitations and ideas for further research 
Like any other research, this thesis has faced a number of limitations that need to be addressed. 
First, to test the theoretical hypotheses of each chapter, this research has mainly relied on 
empirical research methodology. Second, the conclusions were drawn from the accumulated 
evidence obtained from the dataset. Therefore, a key limitation is the definition of the variables, 
the form of the models and the estimation techniques.  In addition, considering that the vast 
majority of the data employed are financial and accounting statistics, the findings and 
conclusions of the research might also be sensitive to possible managerial manipulation of the 
data. Second, where the data-set of the research only covers  SMEs listed on AIM, the findings 
are prone to selection bias, when the rest of population (unlisted SMEs) are not covered.    
Third, although this research is classified under the corporate finance/financial economics 
category and is devoted to investigating the incentives for innovation, the financing menu of 
R&D and the financing constraints on the AIM-listed firms in the UK, some other factors, for 
example corporate governance ones, which may play a role in these investigations, are not 
addressed in this thesis, owing to their lack of availability and accessibility.  Fourth, as this 
thesis includes three stand-alone chapters, which are all focused on R&D types of investment 
and employ similar theories, it is observed that there is some overlap. This, however, has been 
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minimised where possible, but has necessarily been accepted to achieve the flow and maintain 
the status of each of the empirical chapters.  
Finally, in the first empirical research of this study, it is important to acknowledge that the 
results are prone to endogeneity bias, due to potential level one endogeneity between firm-level 
covariates, for example the potential reverse causality between firms’ financial structure and 
their decision to engage in R&D investment. Therefore, further improvements to the 
Wooldridge approach to handling the initial condition problem and level one endogeneity need 
to be considered in similar future research. 
The literature review and the empirical findings have suggested a number of promising ideas 
for further research. For example, existing research on the corporate cash-holding role in R&D 
investment has found evidence that firms smooth their R&D investments by drawing down their 
precautionary cash accounts in cases where financing is unavailable and build up their reserves 
when financing is available (Brown and Petersen, 2011; Guariglia and Liu, 2014). Similarly, 
this research investigates the overlooked role of working capital accounts in R&D in the 
presence of financing constraints. 
A promising research idea could be to investigate cash and non-cash working capital accounts 
with narrower classifications, that is, the role of non-cash working capital accounts and cash 
holdings. This would give more insight into the role that payable accounts may play in the 
process, and would give a clearer idea of the various reasons for cash holding accounts, and 
whether this variation is a consequence of the presence of financing constraints.  
Moreover, investigating the different types of R&D would be a promising research idea; for 
example, the determinants and the financing menu of product development and process 
development. Such an investigation might give a more precise image of the determinants and 
sources of finance for different R&D types.  Further, considering the corporate governance 
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view in explaining firms’ innovation; for instance, the role that ownership structure and board 
characteristics may play in undertaking such investment decisions, could be considered a 
significant contribution to the knowledge in this area of investigation. 
In addition, it is worth considering or examining the connections between public policies in 
stimulating R&D activities at the firm level, the outputs of such activities and corporate 
productivity, as well as examining the links between corporate R&D activities, corporate capital 
structure and dividend pay-out policies. Finally, the possible connection between R&D 
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Appendixes  
Appendix 1a: Numerical example clarifying how working capital accounts can be used as sources of finance by constrained firms, and to explain 
how onlt the use of cash holding may not be enough to explain all the sources of funds for smoothing R&D investment (in the case of a positive 
change in cash holding). 
  Total Assets = Total Equity + Total Liabilities 
  
Non-current 
Assets + Current Assets = Equity + Current Liabilities + 
Long-term 
Liabilities 
  NCA + Inventory + AR + Cash = Capital/Equity + AP + 
S.T 
Debt + L.T Liab 
Opening 
Balance Transactions 10000   2100   1200   700   7200   1300   1500   4000 
300 units of inventory  sold for £600   -300      300       
(£500 in cash)        500          
(£100 in AR)     100           
AP reduced by £100 from cash balance       -100    -100     
S.T debt reduced by £100 from cash       -100      -100   
    10000   1800   1300   1000   7500   1200   1400   4000 
  Balance 14100  = 14100 
400 units of inventory sold for £1000 (cash)    -400    1000  600        
The firm collected £100  from its AR in cash      -100  100         
£200 paid to creditors (AP)       -200    -200     
£400 paid for S.Tdebt       -400      -400   
    10000   1400   1200   1500   8100   1000   1000   4000 
  Balance 14100  = 14100 
The firm has a £1000 short-term loan (collateralized 
with AR)       1000      1000   
The firm bought inventory on account of £800   800        800     
600 units of inventory  sold for £700 (£500 in cash and £200 in AR)  -600  200  500  100       
£100  from cash balance paid for S.T debt       -100      -100   
    10000   1600   1400   2900   8200   1800   1900   4000 
  Balance 15900  = 15900 
£2000 has been used for R&D (drawn from cash)       
-
2000  -2000       
£400 collected from AR and paid for S.T Debt     -400        -400   
300 units of inventory  sold for £400 (in cash)   -300    400  100       
£200 paid to creditors (AP)       -200    -200     
    10000   1300   1000   1100   6300   1600   1500   4000 
  Balance 13400  = 13400 
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After reviewing leading books on the management of working capital (such as Modern Working 
Capital Management by Scherr (1989), Working Capital Management by Hampton and 
Wagner (1989), Economic Development Finance by Seidman (2005) and Corporate Finance: 
Principles & Practice by Watson and Head (2016), and the leading literature on how each of 
the working capital components can be used as a source of finance for constrained firms (for 
example, Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Deloof, 2003; Ding et al., 2013), a simple numerical 
example was created to show how working capital components can be used as a source of 
finance rather than a use of finance by firms (especially when they are facing finance constraints 
and need to offset the short-run effect of the cash flow fluctuation or finance shocks). 
Furthermore, this was done to show why net working capital (as a variable) should be used 
rather than net cash holdings in our model, in contrast to the previous literature on RD 
investment smoothing (Brown and Petersen, 2011; Guariglia and Liu, 2014); that is, raising the 
importance of the non-cash working capital components as sources of funds for firms. 
It is assumed that ABC is an R&D performing firm listed on a public market (AIM). As in the 
example, it is also assumed that the above transactions took place during the year 2004, and 
that the firm in that particular year was facing cash flow fluctuations and financing frictions. 
However, to deliver the idea of this example, only the principal and chief accounts of current 
assets and liabilities49 are mentioned. Furthermore, static balances of the non-current assets and 
long-term liabilities are assumed in order to focus on the working capital accounts. In addition, 
the cost of inventory sold and purchased is fixed at £1 per unit. As shown in the example above 
(appendix 1A), the opening balances of the current assets were £2100, £1200 and £700 for the 
inventory, accounts receivable and cash accounts respectively, and the opening balances of the 
current liabilities were £1300 and £1500 for the accounts payable and short-term debt accounts 
                                                 
49 Working capital is defined as the current assets less current liabilities, the main three components of the current 
assets are principally cash and equivalents, inventory and account receivable, and the current liabilities consist 
chiefly of account payable and short-term debt. 
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respectively. During the first quarter of 2004, ABC firm made several transactions, as follows. 
The firm sold 300 units of its inventory (at an original cost of £1 per unit) for £600 (£500 in 
cash and £100 in AR), and paid off £100 of its trade credits (AP), reducing its short term debt 
by £100 (from its cash account). The transactions of this first quarter resulted in an increase in 
the cash balances by £300, reducing the AP by £100, and reducing the short-term debt by £100. 
During the second quarter, the firm sold another 400 units of its inventory (originally worth of 
£400) for £1000 (cash), and collected £100 (cash) from its AR. Furthermore, it paid off £200 
for its creditors, and £400 for its short-term debt. As a result, the cash balance increased by 
£500, the accounts receivable (AR) balance was reduced by £100, accounts payable (AP) 
decreased by £200, and short-term debt decreased by £400. 
In the third quarter, and in order to increase the precautionary cash balances, the firm obtained 
a short-term loan of £1000, collateralized with its accounts receivable, and bought 800 units of 
inventory (for £800) on account to maintain the role of trade credit. During this quarter, the 
firm sold 300 units of its inventory (at an original cost of £1 per unit) for £700 (£500 in cash 
and £200 in accounts payable), and paid off £100 of its short-term debt from its cash balance. 
These transactions yielded an increase in the inventory by £200, an increase in the accounts 
receivable of £200, and most importantly, an increase in the cash account by £1400. On the 
other hand, the current liabilities accounts increased by £800 and £900 for the accounts payable 
and short-term debt respectively.  During the fourth quarter, the firm was facing a binding cash 
flows shock. As a result, it had to draw £2000 from it cash account to smooth its R&D 
investment path. Where the accounts receivable served as collateral for its short-term debt, the 
firm collected £400 from its debtors, and paid off £400 to reduce its short-term debt. Finally, it 
sold 300 units of its inventory (at an original cost of £1 per unit) for £400 (in cash), and paid 
off £200 to its creditors. The closing balances at the end of 2004 were £1300, £1000, and £1100 
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for the inventory, accounts receivable, and cash accounts respectively, and £1600 and £1500 
for the accounts payable and short-term debt respectively.   
The aim of this example is to show how the firm employed all its current asset and liabilities 
accounts to dampen the shocks of cash flow and to maintain a presumably smooth path of R&D 
spending. As we can see, the firm reduced its investment in inventory from £2100 to £1300 
during the year, and reduced its investments in accounts receivable from £1200 to £1000 (i.e. 
it tightened up its credit policies) to free liquidity. However, the firm relatively increased its 
cash holding from £700 to £1100 as a precaution to hedge against any potential future risks of 
cash shortfalls. On the other hand, it increased its investment in trade credits (AP) from £1300 
to £1600 and kept a static level of short-term debt to crucial its financial obligations.   
However, as we have identified that the net working capital is current assets less current 
liabilities (thereafter, NWC), we can note that the change in NWC between the beginning of 
the year and the end of the year was -£900 (that is, £300-£1200), and the change in net cash 
holding (thereafter, NCH) was £400 (that is, £1100-£700).  Accordingly, researchers of the 
effect of financial constraints on R&D investment, and the role that cash holding plays in 
smoothing R&D (for example, Brown and Petersen, 2011 and Guarling and Liu, 2014) should 
have used net working capital as source of smoothing rather than cash holding as a variable in 
their models, in which the NWC reflects more the total sources of funds that firms can use in 
the short run to smooth their R&D investment from any cash flow shocks, instead of using one 
of the working capital components (i.e. cash holding). 
 In this example, the ABC firm was financially constrained, and used most of its working capital 
components to free up liquidity to smooth its R&D. If cash holding (as the variable) was used 
as the only source of smoothing, based on this example we can see that the levels of cash 
increased rather than decreased to free up liquidity, but using net working capital (as the 
252 | P a g e  
 
variable) reflects the full information about the use of all available sources of short-term funds 
to smooth R&D. According to this example, the firm chose to cut investment in working capital 
proportionally more than in R&D investment, because working capital is reversible and 
relatively liquid. That is, it chose working capital investment to absorb the effect of the 
temporary cash flow shocks rather than R&D investment, in order to reduce the potential losses 
and adjustment costs that could have arisen due to the temporary cutting back on R&D. In 
conclusion, the existence of working capital for firms can be considered as a way of relaxing 
sources of funds during financing constraints, whereas in our simple example we show that the 
firm freed up a total of £900 from its working capital to smooth its R&D.   
Regarding the role of cash holding as a component of working capital on smoothing R&D 
investment, the second example shown below (appendix 1B), shows how a firm’s cash account 
does have a role in buffering the transitory cash flow shocks along with the other components 
of working capital, but not alone. Similar to the previous example, it is assumed that XYZ is an 
R&D performing firm and that the transactions below took place during the year 2004, and that 
the firm in that particular year was facing cash flow fluctuations and financing frictions. 
Similarly, static balances of the non-current assets and long-term liabilities are assumed in order 
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Appendix 1b: Numerical example clarifying how working capital accounts can be used as sources of finance by constrained firms, and to explain 
how the use of cash holding only may not be enough to explain all the sources of funds for smoothing R&D investment (in the case of a negative  
change in cash holding). 
  Total Assets = Total Equity + Total Liabilities 
  
Non-current 
Assets + Current Assets = Equity + Current Liabilities + 
Long-term 
Liabilities 
  NCA + Inventory + AR + Cash = Capital/Equity + AP + 
S.T 
Debt + L.T Liab 
Opening 
Balance Transactions 10000  1900  800  1300  7200  1300  1500  4000 
100 units of inventory  sold for £200   -100      100       
(£100 in cash)        100          
(£100 in AR)     100           
AP reduced by £100 from cash balance       -100    -100     
S.T debt reduced by £100 from cash       -100      -100   
    10000   1800   900   1200   7300   1200   1400   4000 
  Balance 13900   13900 
400 units of inventory sold for £800 (cash)    -400    800  400        
The firm collected £100£  from its AR in cash      -100  100         
£200 paid to creditors (AP)       -200    -200     
£400 paid for S.T debt       -400      -400   
    10000   1400   800   1500   7700   1000   1000   4000 
  Balance 13700   13700 
The firm has a £1000 short-term loan (collateralized 
with AR)       1000      1000   
The firm bought £800 of inventory on account    800        800     
600 units of inventory  sold for £700 (£500 in cash 
and £200 in AR)   -600  200  500  100       
£100  from cash balance paid for S.T debt       -100      -100   
    10000   1600   1000   2900   7800   1800   1900   4000 
  Balance 15500   15500 
£2000 used for R&D (drawn from cash)       
-
2000  -2000       
£300 collected from AR and paid for S.T debt     -300        -300   
300 units of inventory  sold for £700 (in cash)   -300    400  100       
£200 paid to creditors (AP)       -200    -200     
    10000   1300   700   1100   5900   1600   1600   4000 
  Balance 13100   13100 
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As shown in the example above (appendix 1B), the opening balances of the current assets were 
£1900, £800 and £1300 for the inventory, accounts receivable and cash accounts respectively, 
and the opening balances of the current liabilities were £1300 and £1500 for the accounts 
payable and short-term debt accounts respectively. During the first quarter of 2004, XYZ firm 
made several transactions as follows. It sold 100 units of its inventory (at an original cost of £1 
per unit) for £200 (£100 in cash and £100 in AR), and paid off £100 of its trade credits (AP), 
reducing its short term debt by £100 (from its cash account). The transactions in this first quarter 
resulted in a decrease in the cash balance of -£100, an increase in the AR balance of £100, a 
decrease in the AP balance of £100, and a decrease in the short-term debt of £100. During the 
second quarter, the firm sold another 400 units of its inventory (at an original cost of £1 per 
unit) for £800 (in cash), and collected £100 (in cash) from its AR. Furthermore, it paid off £200 
to its creditors, and £400 for its short-term debt. As a result, the cash balance increased by £300, 
the accounts receivable (AR) balance was reduced by £100, accounts payable (AP) decreased 
by £200, and short-term debt by £400. 
In the third quarter, and in order to increase the precautionary cash balances, XYZ firm obtained 
a short-term loan of £1000, collateralized with its accounts receivable balance, and bought 800 
unit of inventory (for £800) on account to maintain the role of trade credit. During the third 
quarter, the firm sold 600 units of its inventory (at an original cost of £1 per unit) for £700 
(£500 in cash and £200 in accounts payable), and paid off £100 of short-term debt from its cash 
balances. These transactions yielded an increase in the inventory of £200, an increase in the 
accounts receivable of £200, and, most importantly, an increase in the cash account of £1400. 
On the other hand, the current liabilities accounts increased by £800 and £900 for accounts 
payable and short-term debt respectively.  During the fourth quarter, the firm was facing a 
binding cash flows shock. As a result, it had to draw £2000 from it cash account to smooth its 
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R&D investment path. As the accounts receivable balance served as collateral for short-term 
debt, £300 was collected from its creditors to pay for its short-term debt. Finally, the firm sold 
300 units of its inventory (at an original cost of £1 per unit) for £400 (in cash), and paid off 
£200 to its creditors. The closing balances at the end of 2004 were £1300, £700, and £1100 for 
the inventory, accounts receivable, and cash accounts respectively, and £1600 and £1600 for 
the accounts payable and short-term debt respectively.   
As we can see in this example, the firm reduced its investment in inventory from £1900 to 
£1300 during the year, and reduced its investments in accounts receivable from £800 to £700 
(i.e. it tightened up its credit policies), and decreased its cash holding from £1300 to £1100 to 
free liquidity. On the other hand, it increased its investment in trade credits (AP) from £1300 
to £1600 and increased its level of short-term debt from £1500 to £1600 to maintain its policy 
of additional use of trade credit and increasing the short-term borrowing capacity.  As a result, 
we can see that the change in NWC between the beginning and end of the year was -£1300 (that 
is, -£100-£1200), and the change in NCH was -£200 (that is, £1100-£1300).  Accordingly, we 
can observe that XYZ firm used all its working capital components to free liquidity to smooth 
its R&D. If cash holding (as the variable) was used as the only source of smoothing, based on 
this example we can see that the levels of cash decreased by -£200 to free up liquidity, but by 
using net working capital (as the variable) we can see that the firm reduced the non-cash 
working capital accounts by -£1100 to free up more liquidity to smooth its R&D investment. 
As in this example, the firm has chosen to cut investment in all of its working capital accounts 
proportionally to absorb the effect of the temporary cash flow shocks, rather than R&D 
investment. In conclusion, each of the working capital accounts can be considered as of a 
relaxing source of funds during financing constraints, whereas in our simple example we show 
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that XYZ firm freed up £200 from its cash holdings, and £1100 from its non-cash working 
capital accounts (a total of £1300 from its working capital) to smooth its R&D. 
